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This dissertation explores system-challenging political behavior in Israel 
among the non-Jewish Israeli Palestinian minority. System-challenging behavior 
(SCB) includes protest action and protest intent, as well as participation in 
national action days that commemorate important events in Palestinian history. 
Based on the protest literature, one would expect that the greater the grievances, 
the more system-challenging behavior one would find. However, I find that this 
grievance  SCB is conditioned by the kind of identity held. Using survey data 
from Israel, my study shows the importance of not only grievance but also 
identity to participation in SCB such as protest and national action. Individuals 
with an identity favorable to the state are less likely to engage in SCB even when 
they have a significant level of grievances. Thus, the effect of grievances is 
reduced by pro-state identities. For those who hold an anti-establishment identity, 
 viii
however, the impact of grievance is intensified. Thus the state can promote ethnic 
stability by cultivating identification with it, a difficult task in ethnically-based 
states such as Israel. The results of this study are relevant to the many multi-
ethnic states in the world seeking to improve ethnic relations.  
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Chapter 1:  The Scope of the Study  
With the end of the cold war in the 1990s, optimistic observers predicted 
that the end of history (Fukuyama 1989) would make ethnicity irrelevant. They 
argued that liberal democracy had triumphed over its primary alternatives, namely 
communism and fascist nationalism. Globalization had made states increasingly 
interdependent, they argued, which was thought to pose an obstacle to the nation-
state. 
The jubilation did not last long, however, as ethnic conflicts broke out and 
nationalist politics revived worldwide. Even western democracies, like Canada, 
Belgium, and Italy, long considered bastions of tranquility, have shown evidence 
of simmering ethnic tensions. Virulent nationalism, political fragmentation and 
intermittent violence have characterized new (and some old) democracies instead 
of the hoped-for stability. Millions have been displaced, wounded or killed as a 
result of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, for example, while continuing 
ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Cyprus, and Palestine/Israel, to 
name a few, appear to have no end in sight. 
For the developing world, liberal optimists prescribe democracy as a 
remedy to ethnic turmoil, though the jury is still out on its curative ability (Chua 
2003; Snyder 2000). Thus faith in democracy as a stabilizing agent  its many 
other virtues notwithstanding  may have been misplaced. As a result, the 
euphoria of the Third Wave has been replaced by disappointment, confusion, and 
resignation in the face of persistent ethnic conflict.  
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In the current environment, it is tempting to ask: is ethnic conflict 
inevitable? Few states are ethnically homogenous; despite the frequent demand 
that political borders coincide with ethnic boundaries, realistic assessments 
conclude that such arrangements are impossible (Cardenas and Canas 2002; 
Roberts 1999).  
The mere coexistence of different ethnic groups with differing 
identifications may not inevitably cause ethnic conflict. Instead, a number of 
preconditions must be met for ethnic conflict to arise. Perhaps the most important 
of these preconditions is the development of a politicized ethnic identity. People 
must first imagine (Anderson 1991) themselves as members of a distinct 
cultural group with common goals and interests, for which political mobilization 
is deemed necessary. It is this mobilization that often evolves into ethnic conflict. 
The degree to which ethnic imagining leads to mobilization depends on 
a number of factors, but the perceived need for mobilization constitutes a major 
contributing factor to ethnic mobilization and conflict. The perception that the 
group deserves more symbolic or material goods than it currently receives can 
provide a salient cause around which to mobilize the group. Particularly when the 
state is identified with a single ethnic group, ethnic dilemmas with considerable 
mobilization potential may be particularly acute. 
This project addresses the challenges of predicting and controlling ethnic 
conflict. More specifically, I consider the consequences of ethnic identity for 
political behavior, particularly system-challenging behavior (SCB), like legal and 
illegal protest, and participating in nationally oriented actions, most of them 
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protest-related. The role of the state in identity-formation and its consequences for 
ethnic conflict figures prominently in the analysis. 
Notably, not all members of the same ethnic group hold the same kind or 
degree of ethnic identification. Similarly, not all members perceive their interests 
and goals in the same way, nor do they all choose the same mobilizational 
strategies  or even to mobilize at all. Thus individual level analysis is required to 
understand the individual variations within an ethnic group, which can have 
important consequences for the outcome of ethnic mobilization. 
This dissertation aims to answer a number of questions: 
1. Who conducts system-challenging political behavior among Israeli 
Palestinians? Not all members of this community do in fact participate in SCB 
given the same environment, so explaining the individual variation in 
participation helps us understand the factors that promote SCB. Thus, uncovering 
the determinants of SCB is one of the main goals of the dissertation. 
System-challenging behavior is important to political scientists and policy-
makers for several reasons: 
•  SCB is related to the issue of regime stability. As a mass-based form of 
political behavior, too much SCB may be considered destabilizing, as may 
be violent and/or illegal activities.  
•  Protest, a major component of SCB, is sometimes thought of as a 
stepping stone to more serious activities, such as terrorism, 
assassination, or other forms of political violence. 
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•  Since SCB is uninstitutionalized political behavior, it may be considered 
to be analogous to a canary in the mine, sort of an indicator that the 
institutionalized channels of participation are not functioning optimally. 
•  SCB may in fact succeed, that is, to actually change the system by 
confronting it. From this point of view, it may actually lead to beneficial 
changes. 
2. What are the implications of individual identity for SCB? Although grievance 
is generally thought of as the leading candidate for promoting SCB and protest in 
particular (Gurr 1970), todays protesters are not always motivated primarily by 
tangible benefits. In fact, the expression of identity has emerged as a major factor 
in post-industrial political participation (Inglehart 1990). Furthermore, even when 
motivated by the redress of grievances, identity may alter the grievance-behavior 
relationship, since identification with an entity, such as a state, may induce 
individuals to act in accordance with the entitys goals (Tompkins and Cheney 
1985). Thus state-friendly identification may reduce the tendency toward SCB.  
3. What are the implications of grievance for SCB and identity? By giving 
individuals a motivation to act, grievance can be a powerful inducement to 
political action, as suggested by Gurr. Grievance may also be a factor in 
individual identity choices; high grievances may lead to anti-establishment 
identities. 
The findings of this project highlight the importance of identification with 
the state for ethnic stability. Residing within a state does not mean that all 
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individuals feel belonging to it. Those with a weaker sense of identification with 
the state are more likely to challenge it.  
Empirically, I focus on the case of Israel, but my theoretical concerns are 
with the role of ethnic identity in system-challenging behaviors. Within its 
internationally-recognized 1967 borders, Israel is widely considered a well-
established, relatively high-quality democracy (e.g., Lijphart 1993), though this 
characterization has been challenged (Ghanem 1998; Smooha 1990; Smooha 
1997).  
Less widely investigated is the importance of Israels Palestinian minority 
in shaping the countrys ethnic relations. Almost 20 percent of Israels citizens are 
of Palestinian origin, occuping the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic ladder in 
Israeli society. Until the 1980s, Israeli Palestinians have been relatively quiescent, 
but recent decades have witnessed an increase in Israeli Palestinian mobilization 
and a concomitant upsurge in identification as Palestinians, rather than Israeli 
Arab, the term favored by the Israeli establishment. Most recently, Israeli 
Palestinians have provoked concern for their participation in the October 2000 
riots, in which 13 Israeli Palestinians were killed by police, and for their 
widespread boycott of the February 2001 elections.  
My primary data come from two surveys I commissioned in Israel during 
early 2001. The larger data set consists of approximately 1200 face-to-face 
interviews with Israeli Palestinians, and the smaller of about 500 telephone 
interviews with Jewish Israelis. I wrote the questionnaires, and the sampling and 
interviewing were conducted by professional survey organizations. Givat Haviva 
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Center for Peace Research conducted the survey of the Arab sample, and the 
University of Haifas Survey Consulting Center performed the interviewing of the 
Hebrew sample. The surveys measure various attitudes towards the majority and 
minority in Israel, the political system, and measurement of demographics, 
subjective identity, and political participation.  
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the historical and political context of 
ethnic relations in Israel. Israels nationalizing policies (Brubaker 1996) and 
their role in the creation of identity and citizenship dilemmas among Israeli 
Palestinians constitute a major theme of this chapter. I explore the extent Israeli 
Palestinians consider themselves and are considered Israeli and the difficulties 
they face in adopting this identity. I contend that Israels nature as a Jewish state 
and the resulting policies inevitably distance Israeli Palestinians from affective 
attachment to the state in which they live. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of ethnic relations, 
identity and collective action. The chapter focuses on the social psychology of 
group identification: how and why individuals identify with a group and how 
group identification may facilitate collective action. I also examine the 
consequences of group identification for political behavior that challenges the 
state. My hypotheses focus on the extent of identification with the state or the 
Palestinian nation  where it comes from, and what are the resulting outcomes for 
system-challenging political behavior  which I can then test using my survey 
data. 
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Chapter 4 provides the broad outlines of a simultaneous equation model of 
system-challenging behavior. The model has three equations, one each to explain 
identity, grievance, and SCB.  I describe the methodological complexities of the 
model as well as its substantive meaning and implications. The next three 
chapters present and interpret estimates of the effects implied by each of the 
models three equations in turn. 
Chapter 5 investigates the occurrence of SCB among Israeli Palestinians. 
The results of the empirical analysis show that those with greater Palestinian 
identity engage in SCB at a greater rate. Multivariate analysis indicates that 
Palestinian identity increases the likelihood of engaging in SCB even when taking 
other factors that may impact political action into account. Since Palestinian 
identifiers lack an identification with the Israeli state, this finding suggests that a 
lack of identification with the state may be an important factor in ethnic 
instability. 
Chapter 6 attempts to explain the sense of ethnic grievance among Israeli 
Palestinians. Ethnic grievances identify the Israeli political system and society as 
responsible for the low status of Israeli Palestinians. My estimates suggest that 
Muslims, Palestinian identifiers, and those who affiliate with non-Zionist parties 
hold the strongest grievances. 
Chapter 7 attempts to explain identity choice by Israeli Palestinians. Israeli 
Palestinians use several distinct self-identifiers to describe themselves and to 
indicate their orientation towards Israeli state and society. I show that their 
identification form an ordinal scale from Israeli identification to Palestinian 
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identification. The estimates from my model demonstrate that a number of 
factors, most notably the extent of criticism of Israeli nationalizing policies, are 
associated with the propensity to identify as Palestinian. 
Finally, chapter 8 sketches the implications for the study of global ethnic 
conflict and directions for future research. I make the argument that a lack of 
affective identification with the Israeli state is associated with system-challenging 
behavior that may be destabilizing. The nationalizing nature of the Israeli state is 
implicated in both causing the lack of identification as well as politicizing the 
growing Palestinian identification among Israeli Palestinians. This finding does 















Chapter 2:  The State, Identity and Action in Israel: The 
Historical Context of Israeli Palestinian System-Challenging 
Behavior 
 
Im caught in the perfect paradox  I have to be a loyal citizen of a country that 
declares itself not to be my country but rather the country of the Jewish people.  
     -- Azmi Bishara, Israeli Palestinian MK 
 
Although it is nearly universally accepted that nation-states act to 
embody the desires of a particular nation for self-determination, only recently has 
the dilemma of minorities outside the privileged nation garnered significant 
attention. Particularly if the nation is defined in ethnic or cultural terms, as has 
often been the case in the past century, non-dominant ethnic minorities may be 
faced with distressing dilemmas of citizenship and identification.  
The case of Israel aptly demonstrates the complexity of the issue. Israels 
Palestinian minority, constituting nearly 20 percent of Israels citizenry, 
encounters great difficulty integrating into Israeli society and finding acceptance 
as bona fide Israelis. Economic, social, and political discrimination  justified by 
the Jewish majority as acceptable expressions of the states Jewishness  hinder 
the development of a meaningful Israeli identity among Israeli Palestinians. 
Despite the fact that the Israeli political system is widely considered to be a well-
developed democracy (e.g., Lijphart 1993), its treatment of its Palestinian 
minority has gained some academic attention for potentially violating the 
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important democratic principle of equality (Ghanem 1998; Rouhana 1998; 
Smooha 1990).  
This chapter focuses on the Jewish-Zionist nature of the Israeli state and 
its implications for its non-Jewish citizens. I argue that the policies implied by the 
states Jewish character distance Israeli Palestinians from affective attachment to 
the state, which in turn may render them more susceptible to participation in 
system-challenging political behavior. 
  
CITIZENSHIP, THE STATE, AND IDENTITY  
 
The academic controversy over Israels political system centers around 
minority rights. Although prevailing procedurally minimal definitions of 
democracy focus on the electoral institutions that allow for citizen control over 
the government and its policies (Dahl 1971), an underlying principle of 
democracy is the equality of all citizens (Braybrooke 1968). Liberal democracy 
institutionalizes the principle of equality not only through elections, but also 
through minority protections, usually as enshrined in a constitution or other 
foundational document (Diamond 1999).   
Sammy Smooha (1990; 1997) argues that Israel is a democracy of a new 
type, called ethnic democracy. This form of democracy, he argues, has all the 
necessary institutions and practices to qualify as a democracy. It has free and fair 
elections, and enough color-blind civil liberties to allow what are normally 
considered democratic processes to operate. However, it institutionalizes the 
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dominance of a single ethnic group within the democratic structure. Smoohas 
argument in many ways echoes that of Fareed Zakaria (1997), who describes 
illiberal democracy as a form of democracy that holds competitive elections but 
otherwise circumscribes individual freedoms. 
Several other scholars opposed to Smoohas position contend that Israels 
institutionalized ethnic dominance and poor treatment of its Israeli Palestinian 
minority disqualify it as a bona fide democracy. In their view, Israel is an ethnic 
state (Ghanem 1998; Rouhana 1998; Rouhana and Ghanem 1998) 
disempowering its non-Jewish citizens. Oren Yiftachel similarly argues that 
Israels status as a biethnic state composed of two rival homeland ethnic groups 
makes it comparable to unstable countries such as Northern Ireland and Cyprus, 
and that political violence is likely to erupt if Israel does not move to include 
Arab citizens in power-sharing arrangements (Yiftachel 1992). 
More recently, Alan Dowty (1998; 1999a; 1999b) has disputed this critical 
view of Israel, arguing that Israel is an imperfect democracy on par with 
democratic nation-states in Western Europe. Dowty argues that Ghanem, 
Rouhana and Yiftachels (1998) criteria for classifying states as democracies are 
too restrictive. Such European nation-states are also guilty of mistreating 
minorities to some extent or another, since the mission of the nation-state is to be 
the instrument of the (dominant) nations self-determination. Thus Israel, as a 
democratic nation-state, is no less democratic than countries widely accepted as 
democracies. 
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It is important to note that none of the authors claim that Israels 
Palestinian citizens are treated equally or fairly. Some, like Dowty, defend Israels 
self-definition as a Jewish state as relatively benign and at least potentially in 
harmony with democratic principles. But even they acknowledge that non-Jews 
are not treated equally.  
 
The Nationalizing State 
The academic debate over Israels Jewishness and democracy highlights 
the importance of a states nationalizing policies towards ethnic minorities. 
Some states, called nationalizing by Rogers Brubaker (1996) and organic, 
programmatic states by Nils Butenschon (2000), are ethnically non-neutral in 
character. These states, according to Brubaker, hold in common a number of 
characteristics: The existence of a core nation or nationality is imagined and 
defined in ethnocultural terms. This nation is thought to own the state, and the 
state exists as the polity of and for the core nation.  
Despite having its own state, however, the core nation is thought to be 
embattled by an outside force and is therefore in a weak cultural, economic, or 
demographic position within the state. This legacy of discrimination is used to 
justify the remedial or compensatory project of the state by promoting the 
specific (and heretofore inadequately served) interests of the core nation. This 
compensatory aim justifies the nationalizing policies of the state, which are 
generally aimed at strengthening the economic, political, or demographic position 
of the core nation at the expense of other ethnic groups in the state. 
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Slovakia provides one of many possible examples. Hungarians constitute 
just over 10 percent of the population of Slovakia and form a majority in some 
Slovakian provinces. Hungarians were formerly dominant under the Austro-
Hungaqrian Empire but encountered a reversal of fortune upon the formation of 
Czechoslovakia in 1918. The new nature of the Slovakian state, formed in 1993 
upon the breakup of Czechoslovakia, together with the past privileges of the 
Hungarians cause the Slovakian majority to pursue nationalizing policies to make 
up for insufficient Slovakian character in the state. Thus the 1993 constitution 
makes no mention of minority rights, and no official acceptance or proclamation 
of multicultural coexistence has taken place. Instead, the state has embarked on a 
compensatory project of Slovakisation, through territorial reorganization and a 
language law that discriminates against the Hungarian language (Bacova 1999). 
Such nationalizing states stand in sharp contrast to civic states, where the 
nation is the body of legal citizens and citizenship is tied to territorial, not 
ethnic considerations. Even states like France and Germany, which have varying 
degrees of ethnocultural stipulations attached to citizenship (Brubaker 1990), lack 
the compensatory project of the state and incorporate greater minority rights 
into their legal systems. They exemplify the hybrid model of minority rights in 
which the state is national, but not nationalizing (Brubaker 1996 ).  
 
Citizenship 
Citizenship acts is an important institutional link between an individuals 
identity and the state in which he or she lives. Citizenship has been described as 
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a scarce public good that is distributed by the state, a source of collective identity 
and an instrument of political control  that regulates the distribution of rights 
and obligations in a country (Butenschon 2000 ). Thus it is of great importance 
to individual identities and the distribution of power in a society whether national 
citizenship is implemented as ethnic or civic.  
Citizenship can refer to two different concepts: ones status as a legal 
citizen, and ones identity as a member of a community, usually referring to 
membership in a political community such as an internationally recognized state 
(Butenschon 2000). When these two concepts overlap, that is, when legal 
citizenship and identification with the political community are distributed to all 
residing within the boundaries of the state, the states inhabitants are said to enjoy 
civic citizenship. All are able to enjoy equal access to the resources of the state 
(Davis 2000) as well as equal opportunity to consider oneself as belonging to 
the state. If any legal citizens are excluded from identifying with the political 
community, such exclusion is considered an aberration. Claimants can refer to the 
contradiction between principle and practice in their attempts to rectify the 
grievance.  
When identification with the political community is reserved for a single 
ethnic group, excluding significant communities of legal citizens, an 
ethnonational conception of citizenship prevails. Legal citizens who are not 
members of the core nation are excluded from full membership in society and 
may not enjoy full access to the resources of the state.  
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As citizenship also acts as a form of identity that links the state with the 
individual, thus disjuncture between legal and national citizenship may create 
confusion in identification. Members of a national minority find it difficult to 
identify with the state that reigns over their homeland when that state is not their 
state. How can a Hungarian in Slovakia feel Slovakian when the state proclaims 
itself to be for Slovakians and is openly hostile to Hungarians? Affect, an 
essential part of identification and belonging, may be noticeably reduced or absent  
in such cases, when minorities are excluded from membership in the states 
primary political community.  
Under these circumstances, collective identities of national minorities may 
be incomplete or unbalanced (Rouhana 1997), thus provoking a psychological 
search for balance. The cognitive dissonance that results from living as an 
outsider in ones own land may be reduced by engaging in political activity aimed 
at correcting state-imposed conditions of imbalance.  
 
IDENTITY AND THE NATIONALIZING STATE: THE CASE OF ISRAEL 
 
Israel, like Slovakia and others, is a nationalizing state. The early Zionists, 
who first conceived of a Jewish state, were predominantly from Eastern European 
countries such as Poland and Russia. They were highly influenced by 
ethnonationalist thought based on the nationalizing projects there, as well as a 
mature conception of democracy and citizenship. Their state-building efforts in 
Israel were understandably influenced by these theories.  
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Motivated by Enlightenment ideas of the nation-state and the prevalence 
of anti-Semitic violence in Eastern Europe, Zionist pioneers began moving to the 
area called Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century. They established proto-
state institutions but were not prepared for the reality of Palestine. How could 
Zionists create a Jewish state in Palestine when Palestinian Arabs comprised the 
overwhelming majority of inhabitants? Zionist thought had not given much 
thought to the answer to this question, displaying instead mostly avoidance or 
denial of the issue (Dowty 1998).  
During the war of 1948 that established the state of Israel, the majority of 
Palestinians were expelled or fled. Those remaining comprised about 19 percent 
of the population of Israel and were eventually made Israeli citizens. Most of the 
Palestinian leadership and economic elite remained in exile, so Palestinians in 
Israel found themselves leaderless under harsh military rule. Unaccustomed to 
Jewish politics and institutions, as well as to Hebrew, Israeli Palestinians were 
largely unequipped to seriously negotiate with the new government about their 
plight. For their part, Jewish Israelis largely ignored the Israeli Palestinian 
minority and went about the business of state-building and nation-building.  
As the Israeli Palestinians comprised a relatively small numerical 
minority, their Israeli citizenship was not thought to constitute a threat to Jewish 
state and nation building activities, particularly since they were controlled by a 
tough military regime. Thus the Israeli government was able to clear the borders 
of Israeli Palestinian villages  thought to be a security threat  and confiscate 
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large amounts of land with little reaction from the demoralized and disorganized 
minority. These Israeli actions remained largely uncontested until the 1970s. 
The nationalizing policies of the Israeli elite were colored by the East 
European background of most of the elite membership. Influenced by late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century conceptions of ethnonational self-
determination as well as the experience of brutal pogroms and severe 
discrimination at the hands of Eastern European nationalizing elites, Israeli 
policy-makers shaped a nationalizing polity that embraced both majoritarian 
democracy and ethnonationalism with a compensatory color.  
Israeli policy-makers created policies meant to serve Jewish interests in 
the state of Israel and to solidify Jewish demographic, economic and political 
predominance in the formerly Arab-majority territory. Thus Israeli elites were 
able to use the democratic legitimacy of the Jewish majority to create policies that 
favor Jewish Israelis at the expense of the Palestinian minority.  
 
Israeli Policies and Ethnic Discrimination 
 
According to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Israel is the state of 
the Jewish people, but non-Jewish citizens are to be considered equal citizens of 
the state. In theory at least, they should therefore enjoy equal rights with Jewish 
citizens. The wording of most Israeli laws is ethnically neutral and appears to be 
non discriminatory at first glance. The effects, however, are far from equal. These 
laws often employ non-neutral criteria, like military service or geographic 
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location, for the distribution of benefits. Most Palestinian citizens do not serve in 
the military and tend to live in geographically concentrated areas, and therefore 
the laws are detrimental to their interests. 
As a result of Israeli policy, Israeli Palestinians suffer considerable 
economic deprivation. Israeli Palestinian localities receive only a fraction of what 
Jewish municipalities receive from the government. For example, the 1999 budget 
for Arab local authorities comprised only eight percent of the regular budget for 
local authorities in Israel, which represents an expenditure of only two-thirds of 
the per capita expense for residents of Jewish local authorities  (Ghanem, Abu-
Ras, and Rosenhek 2000). Additionally, Israeli Palestinian localities are generally 
excluded from designation as national priority areas, which receive additional 
development funds from the government, even though Palestinian areas are 
among the poorest in the country (Adalah 1998).  
Housing and land discrimination further compounds the Israeli Palestinian 
economic plight. Israeli Palestinian lands have been expropriated at a dizzying 
rate since 1948. Today, 93 percent of all land in Israel comes under direct state 
control, whereas the Jewish community owned just six to seven percent of the 
land prior to 1948, by some accounts (Adalah 1998) and up to 12 percent of 
cultivable land by others (Stein 1984). Much of the land that remains in 
Palestinian hands is restricted in use, which limits the growth of Palestinian 
localities. State lands are off-limits to Israeli Palestinians, as they are managed by 
the Israeli Land Administration in conjunction with the Jewish National Fund, a 
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quasi-governmental entity with the declared purpose of serving the Jewish people 
and the goals of the Zionist movement.  
Many pre-existing Israeli Palestinian communities were left out of state 
development plans, rendering the communities unrecognized. State law 
prohibits the delivery of services such as water, electricity, sewage disposal, road 
access, health clinics, schools, and other essential development infrastructure to 
unrecognized villages. The inhabitants suffer from health and educational 
handicaps as a result of this policy, but they remain determined to live on the land 
that in most cases they display undisputed ownership. 
In large part due to housing and land discrimination, Israeli Palestinians 
experience considerable economic deprivation. Land expropriation and 
displacement have reduced their collective wealth, leaving a legacy of economic 
disadvantage from the outset. Furthermore, inferior education in Israeli 
Palestinian localities inadequately trains them for high-paying jobs (al-Haj, Abu-
Sa'ad, and Yonah 2000), while inferior economic and physical infrastructures, 
combined with a lack of land and state investment provide an unfavorable climate 
for economic development in Israeli Palestinian centers of population (Sa'di, 
Shalev, and Schnell 2000).  Israeli Palestinians are generally not employable in 
the security complex, which plays a large role in the Israeli economy and 
provides a large proportion of high-skilled technical jobs but requires security 
clearance, which Israeli Palestinians find difficult or impossible to obtain. 
As a result of these disadvantages, Israeli Palestinian areas head the list of 
centers of unemployment. In the Central Bureau of Statistics ranking of 
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localities by socioeconomic level, 52 of the 77 lowest-rated localities on the list 
are Arab localities. In contrast, none of the 84 localities that top the list are Arab 
(Sinai 2002). Furthermore, Israeli Palestinians occupy a marginal position in the 
employment hierarchy in Israel. Almost two-thirds of Israeli Palestinian men are 
manual workers, while Jewish Israelis are concentrated in managerial and 
professional elite. Twenty-four percent of Jewish men are managers or 
professionals, but only 10 percent of Palestinian men are members of these elite 
occupational groups  (Sa'di, Shalev, and Schnell 2000).  As a result, more than 40 
percent of Israeli Palestinian households live below Israels poverty line (Gurr 
1993), and an Israeli government report estimates that 72 percent of those in long-
term poverty are non-Jewish (Itim 2001). 
Such inequities like these continue to exist in great part because of a lack 
of Israeli Palestinian representation in decision-making bodies. Israeli Palestinians 
 as Israeli citizens  have the right to vote in Israeli elections, but they are unable 
to translate their potential voting power into effective policy-making. One crucial 
reason lies in Section 7(A) of the Basic Law: The Knesset and the Law of 
Political Parties, which prohibits a party from contesting elections if it rejects 
Israels existence as a Jewish and democratic state, or incites racism or supports 
the armed struggle of an enemy state or of a terror organization against the state 
of Israel (Alon and Segal 2002).   
According to Supreme Court interpretation, the definition of Israel as the 
state of the Jewish people means that Jews form the majority in the state, and 
Jews are therefore entitled to preferential treatment. A political party that rejects 
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these principles may be disqualified, according to this interpretation. Thus a 
political party that calls for equality between Arabs and Jews conceivably could 
be disqualified from elections, leaving the Arab parties in a precarious state of 
legal limbo (Adalah 1998). 
Furthermore, the provision prohibiting supporting armed struggle against 
Israel potentially bans Israeli Palestinian expression of support for the uprising in 
the Palestinian territories against Israeli occupation. This limitation on political 
expression may curb the ability of Israeli Palestinian leaders to represent their 
constituencies in the Knesset. 
No Arab political party has yet been successfully disqualified on this 
basis, however. Attempts were made during the 2003 parliamentary elections to 
outlaw the nationalist Balad/Tajamu party and to prevent several Israeli 
Palestinian MKs from standing for re-election through the new amendments, but 
intervention by the Israeli supreme court restored the party and candidates ability 
to contest the elections.  
The Israeli Central Election Committees decision to ban the party and 
two candidates and the widespread support for this action among the Israeli 
Jewish population was interpreted by Israeli Palestinians as an attempt to 
undermine Israeli Palestinian representation in the Knesset and silence their 
political leadership, despite the Supreme Courts reinstatement of the candidacies 
(Ettinger and Bana 2003). If the Supreme Court had failed to reinstate the 
candidates and party, according to Nadim Rouhana, it could have irreparably 
damaged relations between the state and the Palestinian minority by threatening 
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the legitimacy of citizenship and erase the sense of identification Israeli Arabs 
have with the states political, leal and cultural institutions (HRA 2003b). 
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of Israeli democracy is the habitual 
exclusion of Arab parties from governing coalitions. Israels parliamentary system 
concentrates most state power in a coalition cabinet and prime minister. Exclusion 
from the coalition effectively means exclusion from any decision-making power 
at all. The most powerful position the Arab parties have ever reached was as part 
of a blocking majority that kept the rightist Likud party from forming a 
government between 1992 and 1996. Despite their status as a blocking force, the 
Arab parties could not point to any concrete achievements benefiting Israeli 
Palestinians (Ghanem 1997).  
Furthermore, Arab parties have never been part of a governing coalition in 
Israeli history and have only cooperated with the government from outside. They 
are not likely to be included in future coalitions because of the widespread 
opposition to inclusion of Arab parties in governing coalitions. Although Israeli 
Palestinian members of Zionist parties have been included in coalitions, their 
influence within the party is quite limited, and they have been unable or unwilling 
to express non-Zionist viewpoints. By and large, Israel sees itself as concerned 
with Jewish issues with which non-Jews should have no part in influencing. Thus, 
many Jewish members of the Knesset have vehemently opposed participating in 
any coalition that includes Arab parties, and as a result, any coalition negotiations 
that include Arab parties have been doomed to failure from the start.  
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The platforms of Arab parties lie outside of the Zionist consensus that is 
institutionalized in the Israeli state. According to this consensus, Israel is the 
state of the Jewish people, and thus it exists to benefit Jews and to rectify the 
legacy of centuries of antisemitism. Thus it is no surprise that Arab academics 
such as Asad Ghanem conclude that "...Arabs have never had any real 
opportunity to participate in decision-making, whether on domestic or foreign 
policy issues" (Ghanem 1997). 
As the Israeli political system is highly centralized, most policy is made at 
a high level, leaving few points of access for interest groups to influence the 
process. There are no institutionalized checks and balances, as there are in the 
United States, and the executive is not separate from the legislature, thus reducing 
horizontal accountability. The political system is considerably majoritarian and 
resembles the Westminister model, with the notable difference of a proportional 
representation electoral system, rather than the single member districts found in 
Britain. 
There is no constitution or bill of rights to protect the Palestinian minority 
from the excesses of majoritarianism. Palestinian citizens are thus left vulnerable 
to legal and extralegal discrimination and the use of Emergency Regulations, 
Absentees Property Law, and other laws used to the detriment of their interests. 
They have limited options for legal recourse when discrimination is directed 
toward them. 
This political system renders Israeli Palestinians vulnerable to nationalist 
policies supported by the Jewish population. The overwhelming majority of 
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Israels Jewish population strongly supports the Jewish nature of the state, which 
in practice means favoring Jews over Arabs in many policy areas. For example, a 
1988 survey reveals that 74 percent of the Jewish public in Israel believes that 
Israel should prefer Jews to Arabs, while decisive majorities supported Jewish 
preference in specific arenas, such as admission to universities, jobs in the civil 
service, and social security benefits (Smooha 1992).  
More recently, a survey by Haifa University indicates that only 27 percent 
of Jewish Israelis favor military intervention against Jewish demonstrators, but 61 
percent accept military intervention against protests by Israeli Palestinians 
(Halaby 2001).  In a poll conducted just days after rioting broke out, on October 
8, revealed that 60 percent of the Jewish respondents wanted Israeli Palestinians 
transferred outside the states borders, and close to 78 percent thought that the 
police were either light-handed or acted appropriately in dealing with the 
disturbances ( for similar poll results, see Sultany 2003; Zureik 2001).  
These attitudes prevail among the Jewish public despite the fact that 
thirteen Israeli Palestinians were killed as a result of police intervention during 
rioting that was no worse than that which has occurred among Israeli Jews. Jewish 
demonstrations, however violent, are not met with weapons, only tear gas (ACRI, 
Adalah, and HRA 2001). In short, the Israeli Jewish consensus remains 
unchecked by the political system, potentially subjecting Israeli Palestinians to 




Before the 1948 war that resulted in the establishment of the state of 
Israel, Palestinian Arab inhabitants of historical Palestine constituted the 
overwhelming majority of the area, but their identity as Palestinians was still 
relatively undeveloped. Identification with broader categories such as religion or 
the Arab nation was widespread, as was identification with the family, village, 
and clan. Nevertheless, awareness of a unique status as inhabitants of Palestine 
was found particularly among the educated and upper classes in the early 
twentieth century, and this awareness spread and deepened as conflict with the 
Zionist settlers intensified (Khalidi 1997). 
A number of factors have combined to inhibit the development of 
Palestinian identity among the Arab population (Khalidi 1997), both before and 
after the establishment of Israel. First and foremost is the absence of a Palestinian 
state to internally and externally propagate Palestinian nationalism and identity 
through the media, schools, and official discourse. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), the Palestinian government in exile, attempted to 
disseminate Palestinian nationalism, but without the territorial basis of a state, a 
recognized government, and state institutions, its success has remained limited. 
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in areas evacuated by the 
Israeli Army in 1995 and 1996, Palestinians in the occupied territories have 
gained a platform for propagation of Palestinian nationalism, but Israeli 
Palestinians of Israel still lack a national legitimizing institution. 
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In fact, Israeli policy towards the Palestinian minority since the 
establishment of the state has been described as designed to thwart the 
development of a unified Palestinian identity. In the domain of education, for 
example, Israeli educational policy and curriculum are repeatedly described as 
aiming to educate Israeli Palestinians for control and subservient status in Israeli 
society, to separate them from their Palestinian identity, and to inculcate separate, 
politically meaningful identities such as Christian, Druze or Bedouin (al-Haj, 
Abu-Sa'ad, and Yonah 2000; Copty 1990; el-Asmar 1978; 2001; Lynd, Bahour, 
and Lynd 1994). 
Israeli education of Israeli Palestinians is directed by the Ministry of 
Education, with little institutionalized input from the Palestinian minority as to 
either curriculum development or implementation. The main purpose of Israeli 
education is to inculcate Zionist values, even in Arab schools. Mandatory history 
texts and lessons  ideologically laden and revisionist (Copty 1990)  make 
great efforts to show the significance of the Land of Israel for Jews and to prove 
that only in historical Palestine could the State of Israel arise, while at the same 
time portraying the connection between the Arabs and Palestine as purely 
incidental (el-Asmar 1978). In all the books of the mandatory curriculum in Arab 
schools, the emphasis is put on the historical rights of the Jews to Eretz Israel 
(the Land of Israel) The Arab child is not taught that he too has the right to this 
land, a land his ancestors have cultivated for decades (Caspi and Weltsch 1998). 
Literature study has been similarly oriented towards Zionist portrayals of 
the land of Israel:  
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The material chosen for Arabic literature for the Arabic examination 
lacked any patriotic feeling and had no national tone. Moreover, it was as 
if the Palestinian authors did not exist; they were completely ignored 
while the Jewish work gave expression to a live and conscious people 
the Arab works that we were taught did not concern themselves with 
any nationalist ideals but were mostly works describing nature and lyrical 
moodswe felt deprived because of the total absence of national patriotic 
poems, especially since the Hebrew curriculum was full of them. In 
addition to this, it hurt us to see the total absence of Palestinian authors 
from the studies of poetry, and we could not see any reason for this except 
as a way of suppressing our national feelings.(el-Asmar 1978 ) 
History study is fragmented among Christian and Muslim history, but very 
little Arab history and no Palestinian history is included (Copty 1990). In short, 
the education system among the Arab citizens of Israel has been described as a 
tool used by the Israeli establishment for ideological control, manipulating it to 
divide the Arab population in a manner that clouds their Palestinian identity (al-
Haj, Abu-Sa'ad, and Yonah 2000) and to destroy Palestinian memory. 
In general, Israeli policy towards Israeli Palestinians has been described as 
a divide and rule system of control that not only aims to prevent the emergence 
of Palestinian identity but also to prevent the emergence of an Arab or Palestinian 
nationalist movement among the Palestinian minority. Lusticks comprehensive 
survey (1980) outlines a number of methods by which Israel has maintained a 
system of control over its Palestinian Arab minority. Most relevant for this 
discussion of Palestinian identity is the encouragement of religious, clan/tribal, 
and geographic segmentation as a means to discourage Palestinian identity and 
nationalist activity. Many of Lusticks conclusions have been confirmed and 
elaborated by later authors (e.g., Firro 2001; Meir and Zivan 1998; Yiftachel and 
Segal 1998). 
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Israeli encouragement of competing micro-identities aimed to retard the 
growth of broad, nationalist identities such as the Palestinian identity and to 
channel energy into sectorial conflict rather than national cooperation. Israeli 
religious segmentation is a case in point. Arabs in Israel have been historically 
divided between Christians and Muslims (including Druze and Bedouin); 
however, Israeli policy has emphasized these divisions, treating the groups 
differentially and encouraging disputes between groups. 
The military administration also encouraged geographic segmentation by 
dividing Palestinian areas into separate districts and restricting travel between 
districts only to specified holders of travel permits. In effect, this prevented all but 
the most essential travel between villages  except for travel by friends of the 
ruling Labor party, who could often obtain permits. This policy was meant to 
prevent nationalistic organizing (Lustick 1980 ), the return of Palestinians to 
their confiscated lands, and autonomous economic development. With the end of 
the military administration in 1966, these travel restrictions ended, but nearly 
twenty years of fragmented social, political, and economic development in Arab 
areas allowed integrated Jewish development to surpass Arab efforts. Geographic 
segmentation thus made it more difficult for Palestinians to become aware of 
common experiences, a necessary step for common identity. 
Some of the Israeli policies designed to reinforce divisions between 
different Palestinian groups are no longer actively pursued, as the Israeli 
government lost some of its leverage over Israeli Palestinians with the abolition of 
the military administration in 1966. Nevertheless, Israeli Palestinians continue to 
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be divided by the legacy of previous fragmentation efforts as well as 
contemporary policies. The development of politicized identity among Israeli 
Palestinians, therefore, has been handicapped by political, social, and economic 
fragmentation that inhibits Palestinians ability to join efforts and minds in a 
unified political identity. 
Zionist discourse has historically aimed to delegitimize Palestinian claims 
to nationhood. Both the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate, 
heavily influenced by Zionist considerations, referred to Palestinians only in the 
negative sense, as the non-Jewish communities in Palestine, despite the fact that 
Palestinian Arabs comprised the overwhelming majority of inhabitants until 1948 
(Khalidi 1997). Similarly, David Ben Gurion, considered the founding father of 
Israel, refused to recognize two nations in historical Palestine. He recognized 
only the Jewish nation, while Palestinian Arabs were considered merely part of 
the larger Arab nation. This tactic freed Zionists to argue that Palestinian Arabs 
could easily relocate to other Arab countries, and to claim that all of historical 
Palestine should be the Jewish homeland (Lustick 1980). 
Since the founding of the Israeli state, Israeli leaders continued their 
discourse of delegitimization, both internally and internationally. Perhaps most 
well-known is Golda Meirs famous statement in the 1950s: There was no such 
things as Palestiniansthey did not exist (Khalidi 1997). In recent decades, 
however, Israel has grudgingly acknowledged the existence of Palestinians as a 
nation, influenced by the favorable climate created by the 1987 Intifada and the 
post-Gulf War peace talks. Nevertheless, the term Palestinian refers only to 
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those Arabs living in the occupied territories, not inside Israel. Today, Israeli 
Palestinians are referred to as non-Jews, the minorities, Arabs and Druze, 
Arab Israelis or Israels Arabs in official discourse, not as Palestinians. 
Despite the formidable Israeli policies opposing the development of 
Palestinian identity, it has nevertheless survived and persisted. Collective 
memories of shared events have provided opportunities for group solidarity that in 
part transcends Israeli policy. According to historian Rashid Khalidi, the Nakba 
(disaster) that befell the Palestinian people in 1948 when Israel was established 
acts as the key event that unifies Palestinians. If the Arab population of Palestine 
had not been sure of their identity before 1948, the experience of defeat, 
dispossession, and exile guaranteed that they knew what their identity was very 
soon afterwards: they were Palestinians (Khalidi 1997 ). Thus the shared trauma 
of the Nakba solidified a common identity as Palestinians among those who 
remained inside Israel as well as those who were out.  
Since 1948, Palestinians in Israel have suffered many injustices and 
indignities because of their status as non-Jews in a Jewish state. Land 
expropriation, job discrimination and housing discrimination are just some of the 
daily humiliations that remind them that they are Palestinians. Some reminders 
have been deadly, such as the Kafr Kana massacre in 1956, Land Day in 1976, 
and the uprisings of 2000, and have thus turned into important dates of 
commemoration in Palestinian collective memory. Like the Nakba, these events 
have acted as potential activators of Palestinian identity in Israel, to be used by 
nationalist entrepreneurs when opportunities present themselves.  
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The commemoration of important dates in Palestinian history has also 
been part of this trend. Events such as Nakba Day and Land Day provide 
opportunities for people to learn about Palestinian history and to take pride in 
their Palestinian origins. Shared experiences such as the 1948 Nakba, Land Day, 
and day-to-day discrimination have provided the foundation for Palestinian 
identity in Israel despite official policies aiming to thwart its growth. 
It is important to note the opportunities provided by the Israeli Communist 
party in organizing Israeli Palestinians to assert their identity and mobilize for 
their rights. The Communist party has been legal since its inception over twenty 
years before Israeli statehood, though it has never been allowed to join 
government coalitions. Throughout its colorful history, the Communist party  
under various names and forms  has acted as a joint Arab-Jewish forum for 
progressive politics, including, most notably, an outspoken stance in favor of 
Palestinian rights both inside and outside Israel. Communists have fought for the 
rights of Palestinian citizens, opposed Jewish privilege in Israel, criticized Israeli 
domestic and international policies, and demanded that Israel allow Palestinian 
refugees to return, stop expropriating land, and make peace with the Arab states. 
It has acted as a thorn in the side of the Israeli establishment and has thus been 
ostracized by mainstream political elements. Nevertheless, it has remained a legal 
participant in Israeli politics, electing several representatives to the Knesset in 
most elections (Ghanem 2001).  
Its status as a legal party has not prevented the Israeli establishment from 
discouraging Israeli Palestinian participation in Communist politics, particularly 
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during the years of the Military administration, when the governments leverage 
over Israeli Palestinians was greatest. Activists would be frequently be harassed, 
denied travel permits, or put under administrative detention, as nationalistic 
organizing was considered a threat to the Israeli regime (el-Asmar 1978; Lustick 
1980). Such harassment was effective in preventing Israeli Palestinian 
participation in Communist activities on a wide scale, though the activities of 
party activists who withstood the harassment provided an important outlet for 
nationalist expression.  
Communist publications, such as al-Ittihad, al-Jadid, and the literary 
supplements, allowed Palestinians to voice their opinions against the regime and 
its policies as well as sustain Palestinian identity through literary works and 
alternative histories (Caspi and Weltsch 1998; Elad-Bouskila 1999). Though 
military censorship imposed some obstacles before Communist and other 
nationalist publications, Communist publications and activities allowed the 
expression of nationalist Palestinian Arab identity to openly exist during the times 
when Israeli pressure on the Palestinian community in Israel was strongest. 
 
Contemporary Trends in Identity 
In the previous two decades, the available evidence indicates that self-
identification as Palestinians has increased among Israeli Palestinians (Rouhana 
1997), despite the Israeli establishments efforts to mold them into Arab 
Israelis. Israeli Palestinians are active in reconstructing their national history and 
challenging the official Zionist version. The revival of national pride includes 
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publications in the Arabic press intended to teach about the Palestinian homeland, 
visits to ruins of Arab villages destroyed in 1948, efforts to rebuild destroyed 
mosques, churches, and cemeteries, attempts by students to retrace family 
histories, and demands to revert street names back to the pre-state names based on 
Palestinian, not Zionist, history (Grossman 1993; Nir 2001b; Shavit and Bana 
2001). 
For Israeli Palestinians, the Nakba and other historical events can shed 
light on current events. Israeli Palestinians thus can draw upon historical 
grievances from their collective history as Palestinians as well as their own 
experience in Israel to politicize their identity in a way that facilitates political 
action. The Israeli component of their identity, however weak, provides them with 
a venue  the Israeli political system  for their action, while their identity as 
Palestinians provides them with a heritage of dispossession and resistance that 
provides a motivation to target the political arena in an effort to improve their 
situation. 
 
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND BACKLASH 
 
In 1948, Israeli Palestinians found themselves leaderless, as most of the 
political elite had fled. They were placed under a harsh military administration 
that severely curtailed their ability to organize politically or develop their growing 
Palestinian identity. Since the Israeli government cultivated relations of economic 
dependence, leaving Israeli Palestinians unable to act autonomously on political, 
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social or economic matters of importance to the community. Thus, they were 
relatively quiet for the first twenty-five years of the state of Israel. They made few 
demands for equality, while Israeli Palestinians occupied themselves with 
adjusting to life under Israeli rule.  
Since the 1970s, however, Israeli Palestinians have grown more 
independent and active in asserting their rights. With the abolistion of the military 
administration and the rise of an Israeli-educated generation more acquainted with 
the Israeli system, Palestinians were able to begin the process of mobilization for 
equal rights. A number of nationwide organizations were formed in the 1970s, 
such as the National Committee of Arab High School Students (1974), the 
National Student Union of Arab Collegiates (1975), and the National Committee 
of Arab Heads of Municipalities (1974). The latter has been very influential in 
calling political strikes and mass protests, and was the closest thing to an elected 
Arab leadership body representing Arabs in Israel until the expansion of the 
Committee to include Arab MKs and Histradrut representatives in a new body 
called the Higher Follow Up Committee for Arab Affairs. 
The 1970s also witnessed the beginnings of mass mobilization among 
Israeli Palestinians. The first large-scale protests occurred in March 1976 
following word that the government planned to expropriate a large amount of 
Arab land for the purpose of Judaizing the Galilee. The national committee 
established by the Communist party, the dominant party among Israeli 
Palestinians at the time, called a general strike for March 30. Disturbances broke 
out March 29 and the following day, resulting in the death of six Israeli 
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Palestinian youths. Since then March 30 has been observed as Land Day, an 
annual day of protest and education on the importance of land in Palestinian 
politics and culture (Nir 2001a). 
In addition to regularly held days of protest, such as Land Day and Nakba 
commemorations, Israeli Palestinians have staged protests and general strikes on 
other occasions, such as the demolition of illegal Arab housing, the expropriation 
of Arab land, and international Palestinian events such as the Intifada or the 
invasion of Lebanon. Such acts of protest have been on the increase since 1976, 
according to geographer Oren Yiftachel (1996). 
Jewish Israelis generally view Israeli Palestinian protest negatively, 
considering it to be much more threatening than Jewish protest and worthy of 
greater countermobilization. Thus Israeli Palestinian protests can occasionally 
involve a degree of direct confrontation and violence, which may be provoked in 
part by the countermobilization of Israeli forces. 
The growing assertiveness and independence of Israeli Palestinians also 
are apparent in more conventional forms of participation like voting. The Arab 
vote for non-Zionist parties has increased considerably from the 1950s and 1960s. 
For example, the Arab percentage vote for Jewish-Zionist and Arab-sister 
parties (sponsored by the major Zionist parties) in the 1950s ranged in the mid-to 
high eighties, but it dropped to 63 percent in 1973 and to 50% in 1977, when 
protest and mobilization increased dramatically. More recently, it has dropped 
even further, to about 30 percent in 1999 (Ghanem 2001) and about 26 percent in 
2003 (HRA 2003c). 
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Non-voting has also been an increasing phenomenon among Israeli 
Palestinians. As the elaborate political control machinery run by the military 
administration and the dominant Labor party waned in the 1970s, Israeli 
Palestinians had more freedom to express their displeasure not only by voting for 
non-Zionist parties but also by refusing to vote at all. Voting participation usually 
ranged in the mid-eighty percent range for most elections until the 1970s, when it 
dropped to the low seventy percent range (Ghanem 2001) and to 64 percent in 
2003 (HRA 2003c). The boycott movement is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, with its own offices, platform, and leaders (Ettinger 2003). After 
the 2003 elections, the boycott movement was described as the most powerful 
political stream in the Arab sector (HRA 2003c).  
After the election reform of the 1990s allowing separate voting for 
Knesset parties and Prime Minister, many Israeli Palestinians cast votes (usually 
for Arab parties) for the Knesset but boycotted the Prime Ministerial election. 
When the Prime Minister election was held without a simultaneous Knesset vote, 
as was the case in February 2001, the circumstances were ripe for a widespread 
Arab boycott of the election. Thus only about 20 percent of Israeli Palestinian 
voted in 2001 (Alon 2001).  
In 2003, parliamentary elections were held, but the controversy over 
Israeli Palestinian disqualifications resulted in a relatively low turnout, with only 
about 64 percent of Israeli Palestinian citizens casting votes for a party list (HRA 
2003c). Many interpreted this low turnout as a victory for the boycott movement, 
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which claimed to represent the largest proportion of Israeli Palestinians in the 
political arena (Ettinger 2003). 
It is feared that the desperation of Israeli Palestinians will find outlet in 
terrorism against the state. Indeed, one successful suicide bombing was carried 
out in 2001 by an Israeli Palestinian, while the number of terrorist cells 
discovered among Israeli Palestinians has dramatically increased in the space of 
one year, from 2000 to 2001 (Schiff 2003). The development of an Islamic 
movement inside Israel since the mid-1980s is also viewed with concern, 
particularly since Israelis fear links with Islamic terror organizations in the 
territories, but also because the less moderate elements reject participation in 
Israeli institutions such as the Knesset.  
Furthermore, the emergence and growth of the nationalist stream in Israeli 
Palestinian politics is a source of concern for the Jewish majority, as its 
representatives engage in inflammatory speech and openly challenge the 
cherished Jewish nature of the state. The nationalist call for a state for all its 
citizens uses liberal democratic rhetoric to reveal the tension between democracy 
and a Jewish state in Israel, while the use of the Knesset platform by nationalist 
MKs to openly champion Palestinian identity and Arab causes  generally 
identified as encouraging Israels sworn enemies  routinely pushes the limits of 
Israeli tolerance.  
Since the outbreak of Palestinian-Israeli hostilities in the occupied 
territories October 2000, Israeli Palestinian citizens have been subject to greater 
scrutiny by the Jewish majority. Their links to the Palestinians engaged in a 
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violent uprising have not been viewed favorably, and new policies designed to 
neutralize Israeli Palestinians capability to threaten the Jewish majority and its 
grip on the state have been instituted.  
For example, new laws placing broader restrictions on parties and 
candidates for election were passed in 2002, which prevented candidates or 
parties that implicitly or explicitly deny Israels existence as a Jewish and 
democratic state or supporting armed struggle against Israel from contesting 
elections. Another law criminalized incitement to racism, violence or terror by 
prohibiting calls for an act of violence for terrorism, expressing sympathy, 
praise or encouragement for violence or terror, or supporting or identifying with 
such acts. A third law allows the Knesset to strip an MK of parliamentary 
immunity if he speaks out against the state, expresses support for armed struggle 
against Israel, or denies that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. These laws 
have been interpreted as prohibiting support for the Palestinian uprising or for 
equality between Israeli Palestinians and Jews, thereby silencing the Israeli 
Palestinian leadership and stripping the Israeli Palestinian public of its voice on 
issues central to the community (HRA 2002; HRA 2003a).  
Together with physical attacks on Israeli Palestinian MKs and expensive, 
time-consuming legal investigations of their activities, the new laws and other 
developments have come to be called a campaign of delegitimization aimed 
against Israeli Palestinians potential political power (HRA 2002). This 
combination of promises of democratic freedoms and influence and more than a 
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half century of discrimination and disempowerment has made Israeli Palestinians 
even more disillusioned than ever before. 
Many have come to identify the Jewish nature of the state as the cause for 
their suffering. Indeed, since the nationalizing policies of Jewish state aim to 
strengthen the Jewish demographic, economic, and political position in Israel, this 
may probably be at least partly the case.  The contrast also fees the trend towards 
toward greater Palestinian identification and lack of attachment to the state, and in 
fact may encourage system-challenging behavior such as vote boycotting and 
protest action meant to send strong signals of disenchantment to the political 
establishment. 
In sum, Israels nationalizing policies are hugely unpopular among Israeli 
Palestinians and are damaging to their interests. They discourage Israeli 
Palestinians from identifying, acting, and hoping to be accepted as Israeli, and 
exacerbate their sense of grievance.  Some Israeli Palestinians remain optimistic 
about their chances for equality, but their numbers appear to be diminishing. 
 
ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND PROTEST BEHAVIOR: DISCUSSION 
 
The problematic nature of Israeli citizenship has important implications 
for Israeli Palestinians. Since the states ethno-national conception of citizenship 
excludes Israeli Palestinians from full and equal citizenship (Peled 1992), this 
vital link between individual and state is severely weakened. Identification with 
the state among Israeli Palestinians is fragile and loyalty to the state 
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underdeveloped, a potentially significant factor in the volatile Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Under these circumstances, the growth in Palestinian identification 
among Israeli Palestinians can be understood as a reaction to the lack of 
availability of a meaningful Israeli identity for many Israeli Palestinians.  
Unequal citizenship may also generate ethnic grievances, which are linked 
to unconventional political behavior aimed at redress (Gurr 1970; Gurr 1993). 
Although the nature of Israeli citizenship and the implied nationalizing policies 
are meant to bolster the Jewish population after centuries of discrimination and 
oppression, the consequences of weak identification with the state and significant 
grievances derived from unequal citizenship may paradoxically increase a Jewish 













Chapter 3: Being Palestinian in Israel: Ethnic Identity and Conflict 
in Theoretical Perspective 
 
WHAT IS ETHNICITY? 
In the social sciences, there is no prevailing consensus as to what 
constitutes ethnicity. The term is generally understood to refer to unique cultural 
groupings, but agreement upon the objective features of ethnic groups remains 
elusive. One commonly used definition states that an ethnic group is a named 
human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, 
one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of 
solidarity among at least some of its members (Hutchinson and Smith 1996 ). 
This definition highlights the importance of shared myths and memories, 
characteristics that may contribute to feelings of group solidarity, and the groups 
conception of its own collective past. 
Use of the above definition, however, does not provide automatic 
agreement upon the status of any given group. These characteristics of ethnic 
groups, according to this definition, rely upon the subjective judgments of 
individuals to identify groups. For example, how does one determine if a group of 
individuals share one or more elements of common culture? Furthermore, not 
only ethnic groups share common historical memories. Religious groups  many 
of which are multiethnic  also display many elements of the above definition.  
This distinction is hardly lost on inhabitants of the Middle East, where the 
lines differentiating ethnic and religious groups can be ambiguous. Contention 
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still arises over the question of Jewishness  is it an ethnicity or is it a religion? 
Identity can be context-specific; in Israel, the Arab-Jewish distinction is salient in 
different contexts than the Ashkanazi  Sephardi distinction. Another ambiguity 
arises over Palestinians as a unique ethnic group. Zionists have traditionally 
argued that Palestinians are just part of the Arab category; they are merely 
Arabs who happen to live in Palestine.  
Given such ambiguities, subjectivists argue against the use of ostensibly 
objective criteria for the identification of ethnic groups. Ethnicity is inherently 
subjective, they claim; it is a way of distinguishing between us and them. 
Group boundaries can be fluid, conditional, and circumstantial, and objective 
criteria can easily miss the mark (Barth 1969). In the most flexible subjectivist 
approach, anyone who considers him or herself a member of an ethnic group is a 
member of that group. Group members can manipulate group boundaries to reject 
attempts at affiliation, but this is only partially successful. In any case, attempts 
by outsiders and marginal individuals to affiliate are not a widespread 
phenomenon. In effect, according to this approach, the group is who it says it is. 
If group identification and affiliation are so problematic, how is it that 
millions of people worldwide can readily identify with ethnic categories? How 
can such categories evoke such intense emotions and extreme behavior? A partial 




THE UTILITY OF GROUP AFFILIATION 
 
People affiliate with groups because groups fulfill a psychological or 
instrumental need. First of all, categorization into groups allows for the 
simplification of an infinitely complicated universe. Without filtering input 
through simplifying categories, our minds would be unable to process all the 
information. People are cognitive misers (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Taylor 1981) 
who require a simplified version of reality to function. Categorizing ourselves and 
others into groups imposes structure on an otherwise incomprehensible world. 
Judgments, evaluations, predictions, and stereotypes, unfortunately, often are 
based on group-based shortcuts.  
Distinguishing between social groups and attaching positive value to ones 
ingroup helps people to attain a positive social identity: the part of the self that is 
defined by interaction with society. Social identity includes social roles, 
membership in various groups, and a structure of values and priorities 
(Baumeister 1995). According to social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979), individuals have a fundamental desire to attain positive self-esteem; 
affiliation with a group that is positively valued in society or at least by oneself 
helps to achieve positive self-esteem. Ethnic identification is no exception; it can 
contribute to self-esteem. 
Belonging to a group also fulfils other needs, like the need for a feeling of 
belonging (Horowitz 1985; Scheff 1994). Being a part of something larger than 
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oneself, particularly when the group claims lofty goals and a grandiose vision of 
the past and future, can be a powerful inducement for group affiliation and even 
collective action. Other needs, which can only be fulfilled in a social setting may 
be fulfilled within rather than by the group. People with a need for dominance, for 
example, will find it rewarding to be in the company of others with more 
submissive personalities (Turner et al. 1987).  
Belonging to a group can fulfill other, more instrumentally oriented, 
needs. The categorization of people into groups creates expectations that allows 
for predictability of behavior among strangers and can impose normative 
obligations on transactions. People fulfill roles based on their position in society, 
their occupation, or their ethnic, social, or kin group. Thus in situations where 
interaction with strangers is imperative, people can know what to expect, even in 
an unfamiliar setting (Horowitz 1985).  
The reason why ethnic identifications may be preferred over others may 
be related to the resemblance of ethnicity to family (Horowitz 1985). In a rapidly 
modernizing world, where labor mobility is essential and family relations are 
contracting from the extended model to the nuclear model, ethnicity can act as a 
substitute for kinship. Ethnicity can provide family-like ties, emotional support, 
reciprocal help and dispute resolution, all traditional needs met by kinship ties. 
Members of an ethnic group need not face the world alone. 
Ethnic affiliation can resemble family relations in several ways.  Both 
ethnic and kinship ties are based on common descent, whether real or imagined. 
The idiom of family is used to justify ethnic group behavior, using references to 
 45
brotherhood or family quarrels to characterize events. Ethnicity can also 
create bonds of obligation or a sense of familiarity between members. Just as 
distant cousins can claim to have a common bond, members of the same ethnic 
community  perhaps meeting for the first time in a far away, impersonal setting  
also may feel a sense of commonality or mutual obligation. 
In Israel, real or imagined ties of kinship take on great importance for the 
social and geographic mobility of the Palestinian minority. Israeli Palestinians 
frequently need to move from their villages and towns to find work in the cities, 
where the Jewish majority speaks a different language and views Israeli 
Palestinians with suspicion and hostility. In this context, emotional support and 
community self-help may take on the traditional family roles as Israeli 
Palestinians struggle to overcome the many challenges they face.  
 
 
ETHNICITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
The mere existence of ethnic social identities does not ensure that political 
mobilization will take place. Some aspects of ethnic identity, however, may 
facilitate collective action on behalf of group goals. For example, the ability of 
social groups  ethnic groups included - to create feelings of solidarity, mutual 
cooperation, and unity of values makes the attainment of shared goals more likely 
(Turner et al. 1987). Social groups also create norms of behavior; fear of rejection 
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or criticism by the group can affect individuals perceptions and actions (Asch 
1952; Asch 1956; Turner et al. 1987).  
It is the ability to impose and enforce social norms that allows groups to 
limit the problem of free riding in collective action. Selective material incentive 
solutions (Olson 1965) have declined in popularity in recent years as explanations 
of how free riding is overcome. Other kinds of incentives and conditions may be 
involved (Hechter and Okamoto 2001). Monitoring individual behavior through 
extensive social ties facilitates collective action by discouraging free riding. 
Groups may provide social rewards and impose social penalties for conformity or 
nonconformity to norms of political action. 
Because ethnic ties approximate and potentially substitute for family ties, 
perceived threats to the ethnic group can be treated with the same intense 
emotions that are usually reserved for the family. This is why symbolic politics 
(Horowitz 1985) can have considerable impact on ethnic political competition. 
Since the quest for political power determines the status of a group, the political 
arena can become a symbolic battleground between ethnic groups jockeying for 
relative advantage. It only intensifies the fact that symbolic claims  articulated in 
absolute terms, evoking images of good versus evil and moralistic depictions of 
the way things should be often resist compromise. Thus obsession with national 
or group honor can serve as a motor for continuous conflict (Scheff 1994). 
Relations between Israelis and Palestinian citizens are fraught with 
mutually exclusive symbolic demands. As the dominant ethnic group, Jewish 
Israelis have imposed their vision of Jewish national goals without regard to the 
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symbolic and tangible effects on the Palestinian minority. Legislation regulating 
Kosher establishments and permissible activities on the Sabbath, for example, 
often work to the detriment of Israeli Palestinian businesses. While some Israeli 
Jews view such legislation as an essential expression of the Jewishness of the 
Israeli state, Israeli Palestinians tend to view them as an intrusion or handicap. To 
illustrate, the revocation of Kosher certification from a number of Israeli 
Palestinian businesses in the wake of the October 2000 disturbances was seen as a 
form of collective punishment by many Israeli Palestinians. 
Language legislation and use also involve the contestation of symbolic 
demands. Both Hebrew and Arabic are legally endowed with official status in 
Israel, but in practice Hebrew is dominant. Once again, Jewish Israelis see this 
fact as a normal consequence of the existence of a Jewish majority, while Israeli 
Palestinians view it as a blow to their national pride as well as an obstacle to 
social mobility.  
On a very basic level, the very definition of the state is a contested 
symbolic domain. The Israeli declaration of independence defines Israel as the 
state of the Jewish people, not the state of all its citizens, thereby excluding 
Israeli Palestinians. Jewish Israelis argue that the Jewish people need a state 
specifically defined as Jewish given millenia of anti-Semitism and dispersion. The 
Knesset has thus rejected proposals to define Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people and its citizens, regarding such efforts as subversive and potentially 
dangerous to Jewish national existence.  
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Israeli Palestinians, on the other hand, argue that their exclusion from the 
definition of the state constitutes not only a symbolic affront to their national 
honor, but also a tangible source of discrimination in many fields. For example, 
the Israeli Supreme Court has interpreted the Jewish definition of the state to 
exclude Arab political parties from electoral contestation due to their opposition 
to the exclusive Jewish nature of the state (Adalah 1998; Kretzmer 1990). 
 
ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
The state can have a decisive impact on identity formation through its 
control over resources involved in ethnic competition. An important goal of ethnic 
competition is to gain group prestige and power, both symbolic and material, 
which allow positive comparative evaluations that bolster individual self esteem. 
As an important marker of prestige and power, citizenship is a potent weapon in 
ethnic competition. 
The dominance of the state by one ethnic group can impose distressing 
identity dilemmas among minority groups. For example, the nationalizing state 
(Brubaker 1996) excludes the minority from belonging to the state in a 
fundamental way. Since nationalizing states are said to exist for the purpose of 
fulfilling the self-determination aspirations of a particular nation, the citizenship 
of minorities is symbolically diminished. They are not generally accorded equal 
cultural, economic, or political rights, since the minority often represents a threat 
to the core nation. They must suffer not only the cultural humiliation, but also the 
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tangible harm to their interests that the compensatory project of the state 
represents. 
What often ensues is a cycle akin to the classic security dilemma (Collins 
1998; Harlig 1997; King 1997; Posen 1993). What the dominant group sees as 
compensatory, the minority may see as threatening to its very existence or its vital 
interests. The minority frequently mobilizes out of a fear of cultural extinction, 
which in turn provokes greater threat perception in the majority and further 
compensatory actions. The contest for ethnic power and prestige, then, can spiral 
into an uncontrollable cycle of tit-for-tat, as each group struggles to retain 
national honor and ensure its cultural survival. 
Lost in the struggle is the minority groups sense of belonging to the state, 
which has purposefully excluded them from meaningful membership in the  
public community. It becomes difficult for a Hungarian in Slovakia to identify as 
Slovakian, and an Israeli Palestinian finds it difficult to claim to be an Israeli. 
Both the minorities themselves and the dominant majority find the state label 
inappropriate. 
The Israeli case illustrates the problem of identity. For Jewish Israelis, 
expressing their nationalism is relatively simple. The overlap between Jewish and 
Israeli identities allows them to identify with both state and nation. Israeli 
Palestinian citizens, however, face the dilemma of deciding between or combining 
Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian identities. Over 93 percent of Jewish Israelis but 
only 45 percent of Israeli Palestinians consider the term Israeli to be an 
appropriate self-description. Jewish Israelis are similarly reluctant to identify 
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Israeli Palestinians as Israeli; only 45 percent of the Jewish public considers the 
term Israeli applicable to Israeli Palestinians (Smooha 1992). 
The orientation of the state may thus impose restrictions on the identity 
choices of the various ethnic groups within the states borders. Because 
identification with the dominant ethnic group creates the conditions for group 
comparisons that enhance ones self-esteem, it also creates incentives to reinforce 
group boundaries and to preserve the states ethnic institutions. The ethnic 
institutions help perpetuate the conditions necessary for group comparisons, so 
individuals who benefit from these institutions are less likely to challenge them. 
The above discussion reveals several important implications for ethnic 
political action in Israel. Those who identify with the dominant group in Israel 
will be less likely to threaten the state or its nationalizing institutions since they 
can achieve a positive self-esteem through the states role in differentiating 
groups and bestowing privileges on the core group.  
Those who identify with the non-dominant group  Palestinians  will be 
more likely to choose an alternative strategy. They may attempt to redefine the 
core group to include themselves or otherwise blur group boundaries to their 
benefit. The effort to define Israel as the state of all its citizens and to include 
Israeli Palestinians in a meaningful Israeli civic identity appears to be one of 
such alternative strategies. Alternatively, Palestinian identifiers may attempt to 
influence the state for the benefit of their group through the use of confrontational 
tactics such as protest, riots, political violence or terrorism. 
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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND IDENTITY 
 
Ethnic groups mobilize in the political arena to achieve power, status, and 
security. This mobilization often takes the form of civil rights or social 
movements, in which identity can play a large role. In fact, new social 
movements are characterized by their emphasis upon fostering a new kind of 
identity  (Clemens 1996; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). Identity, then, can not 
only facilitate political action, but political action may also influence identity. 
Social movements create a secure space for the expression of identities 
that may not be viewed favorably among mainstream society, and may indeed 
have the expression of alternative identities as a primary goal (Polletta and Jasper 
2001). Radical gay and lesbian identities, for example, may flourish under the 
mobilizing conditions of gay rights social movements, but such identities are 
likely to be less freely expressed in a society at large seen as hostile to these 
identities. The Palestinian identity in Israel, likewise, is not viewed favorably by 
the dominant Jewish-Zionist society, which views Palestinian nationalism as a 
dangerous rival in the competition over controlling historical Palestine. 
Similarly, changing identities may also serve as an important movement 
goal (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Self-help or religious movements may enshrine 
identity change as a primary goal, but many other movement types have it as one 
goal among many. Similarly, the development of group pride  the strengthening 
or change of previous identity  is another form of movement identity work. 
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Whether identity change is an express movement goal or not, it may in any case 
result from intensive social activism (Calhoun 1991). 
Israeli Palestinian mobilization is not highly structured by traditional 
social movement organizations. Political parties carry the bulk of the mobilizing 
burden in Israel, reflecting Israels proportional representation electoral system. 
The Arab parties in Israel are thus acting similar to social movements, analogous 
to the role the Green party plays in American and European politics.  
The Arab parties do in fact aim toward increasing their vote share and 
achieving political power. But they attract only a small number of Israeli voters. 
Few Jewish Israelis vote for Arab parties, while a significant Israeli Palestinian 
minority vote for non-Arab parties. The Arab parties therefore have little hope of 
achieving their electoral goals in the immediate future.  
Thus they have turned to non-electoral goals, mobilizing Israeli 
Palestinians for direct action on issues relevant to the community. Direct 
mobilization probably serves several purposes: it may serve the interests of the 
party as it works in the Knesset for positive changes in the status of Israeli 
Palestinians, it may solidify group pride and a specific Palestinian identity, and it 
could strengthen the partys institutions of mobilization that can be called into use 
during elections. At least one Arab party (Balad/Tajamu) specifically aims 
towards the strengthening of Palestinian identity (Ghanem 2001), though other 
parties and movements may also be favorably inclined. 
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STRATEGIES OF DEPRIVED ETHNIC GROUPS 
 
Why do some members of deprived ethnic groups collectively organize 
and engage in system-challenging behavior and other do not? The answer, I 
suggest, is linked to the issue of identity. Merely identifying with a deprived 
group alone is not likely to provoke action. The identity must be politicized. 
Injustices must be seen and the blame must be placed on the political system 
(Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1992). People who perceive injustice and place the 
blame for their plight on the government will be more likely to act in the political 
arena for a redress of grievances. Motivation to act and a target for action 
established through individual perceptions of the state and society. 
A primary assumption of social identity theory is that people are 
motivated to value themselves positively. Inasmuch as they define part of who 
they are as a member of a group, they will be motivated to evaluate that group 
positively. That is, people seek a positive social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 
Turner et al. 1987). Groups, however, are evaluated in comparison with other 
groups. That means that some groups will be more positively evaluated than other 
groups. When a person belongs to a group that does not compare favorably with 
other groups, members may have an unsatisfactory social identity. In order to 
obtain a positive social identity, individuals may employ one or more of the 
following strategies (Brewer and Brown 1998; Hechter and Okamoto 2001; 
Turner et al. 1987): 
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1. social mobility  the exit option (Hirschman 1970). People may 
choose to dissociate themselves from the negatively valued group and affiliate 
with a positively valued one. In ethnic terms, a member of an oppressed minority 
may choose assimilation. This option is seen as more likely in more open social 
systems characterized by high opportunity for upward mobility (Brewer and 
Brown 1998). 
2. social creativity  People may reinterpret negative evaluations as a 
badge of pride. Black is beautiful changes a negative evaluation of black 
heritage into a positive one. It does not, however, challenge the existing social 
relationships between groups (Brewer and Brown 1998). This option is more 
likely to be used when group boundaries are relatively impermeable (Jackson et 
al. 1996). 
3. social change -  Individuals may engage in collective action meant to 
change the groups status in society. This strategy appears most common where 
the potential for social mobility is limited (Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 
1990) and on the part of those who perceive fraternal deprivation (relative 
group deprivation). Individual deprivation is associated with individual 
psychological reactions, such as depression, but group-based deprivation is often 
correlated with support for nationalist movements and a desire for social change 
and militancy  (Brewer and Brown 1998). 
These three strategies are not mutually exclusive, especially over the 
course of a lifetime. People will not always be completely consistent in their 
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choice of strategy over time, but it can be expected that an individual will develop 
a dominant strategy.  
These strategies are widely applicable to different places and times. Not 
only can we see these strategies at work among ethnic minorities worldwide, but 
we can also see them at work historically. For example, western colonization 
produced a similar trichotomy of strategies among colonized peoples: liberal 
assimilation and adoption of western values (social mobility), rejectionism and an 
affirmation of pre-colonial society (social creativity), and nationalist mobilization 
meant to drive out the colonists (social change).  
In Israel, the opportunity for Israeli Palestinian social mobility is not 
widespread. It is an option only for a few educated Israeli Palestinians who are 
willing to abide by the rules of the game. An Israeli Palestinian who speaks 
Hebrew with little or no accent, dresses and lives like a Jewish Israeli, and 
refrains from openly criticizing the Israeli political system and society can 
achieve some social mobility. But even then a glass ceiling will prevent him or 
her from attaining many high level occupations and political positions. This 
opportunity, modest though it is, makes the social creativity and social change 
options less attractive to some Israeli Palestinians, since engaging in these 
strategies makes integration into the dominant society more difficult (Taylor et al. 






Those identifying themselves using labels accepted or encouraged in the 
dominant Jewish society  such as Israeli, Israeli Arab, or Arab  are 
employing the social mobility strategy and are therefore less likely to engage in 
system-challenging behaviors. This sort of identification label indicates a strong 
desire to integrate into Israeli society at some level, and they are not likely to 
jeopardize their prospects for upward mobility through disfavored actions.  
Since the Israeli and Israeli Arab identifiers have cast their fate with 
that of the core nation, they are not likely to act against the state that enables 
favorable group comparisons and a positive social identity. They will be less 
likely to criticize the state and its ethnic institutions, and the criticisms that do 
emerge from this group will be relatively unthreatening to the state and core 
group. Thus they will be less likely to engage in confrontational behavior that 
challenges the ethnic system. 
Those who identify with a Palestinian component to their identity  
Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab  appear to be 
following the social creativity strategy to some extent or another. Expressing 
Palestinian identity voices a challenge to the status quo and societys negative 
evaluation of Israeli Palestinians. Like saying Black is beautiful, proclaiming 
Palestinian identity constitutes a powerful rejection of the negative social status 
associated with the group and of the societal norms that produced it. In effect, 
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Palestinian identifiers are attempting to redefine the core nation to include 
themselves. 
The Palestinian identifiers may also follow the social change strategy. 
Expressing a counter-establishment identity is not mutually exclusive from 
collective change. In fact, the two may go together. It was the civil rights activists 
of the 1960s who popularized the slogan Black is beautiful, suggesting that 
social creativity may accompany collective action.  
Therefore, Palestinian identifiers can be expected to engage in collective 
action, particularly system-challenging behaviors, at a much higher rate than the 
Israeli identifiers. To some extent, merely expressing Palestinian identity can be 
seen as a system-challenging behavior, as it challenges powerful societal norms. 
Furthermore, social movement activity may in fact reinforce group pride  as 
evidenced in expressions of Palestinian identity. Thus both social creativity and 
social change strategies are likely to be associated with system-challenging 
behavior. 
Among Palestinian identifiers, the state acts as a mechanism to perpetuate 
a negative social identity. Targeting the source of these negative group 
comparisons through political action may help limit some of the psychological 
incongruence inherent in negative social identity. Palestinian identifiers are more 
likely to express greater criticisms of the state and its ethnic institutions, and they 
may place greater emphasis on these criticisms when evaluating their choices for 
action. Thus their criticisms of the state can become a catalyst for forms of action 
that target the state and its institutions for change. 
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Thus the main hypotheses are: 
•  Having an Israeli or Israeli-leaning identity may be associated with lower 
system-challenging behavior, and the converse, 
•  Having a Palestinian or Palestinian-leaning identity may be associated 
with greater system-challenging behavior. 
•  Higher grievance leads to higher SCB. 
•  Israeli or Israeli-leaning identities may reduce the effect of grievance on 
SCB (conditional, or interaction effect) 
•  Grievance and Palestinian identity have a relationship of reciprocal 
causation. 
These constitute the primary hypotheses that I test in this project; related 
ideas and hypotheses will also be examined as needed throughout the work. The 
next chapter will outline a model of system-challenging behavior that will test 











Chapter 4:  A Simultaneous Equation Model of System-




 Political action is embedded in a social and psychological context. 
Individuals act but they rarely do so in isolation. The reality and perceptions of 
the social and political environment can therefore play an important role in 
shaping political participation. Perceptions of inequity, in particular, may be a 
strong precipitator of political action. Furthermore, individuals act based on a 
perception of self and others that reflects their highest aspirations. Thus self-
identification also has the potential to impact their political behavior. 
Personal identity, as an important individual characteristic that both acts 
and is acted upon by other factors, needs also to be included in a system-
challenging behavior model. Not all members of a group, ethnic or other, feel the 
same kind and degree of identity. Identity, then, is a variable within groups, not a 
constant, and it can have important ramifications for system-challenging political 
action.  
The model developed in this research is based upon this complex 
relationship between identity, grievance, and political action. As an individual-
level model, it uses survey research to explain individual variation in extent of 
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political action as a function of two key variables, identity and grievance, and a 
number of other variables. In the ethnically-charged Israeli environment, it is 
worth noting that significant variation is found on these three key variables. Since 
the relationship between these key variables is likely to involve multi-directional 




System-Challenging Behavior (SCB) 
My core dependent variable is System Challenging Behavior. While I will 
also attempt to explain identity and grievances in this model, it my theoretical 
interest in SCB that motivates this study. SCB is uninstitutionalized political 
action that in some way challenges the established political order. Leonard Binder 
(1962) distinguishes SCB from legitimizing processes and system-
maintenance processes that support the political order. Binder developed these 
concepts in the context of authoritarian developing countries, but they may also 
be applicable to mixed systems such as Israel, where significant democratic 
processes exist but are limited by what some would say are undemocratic 
practices toward the Israeli Palestinian sector.  
 61
System-challenging behavior aims to alter the political system or gain 
greater influence within it in untraditional ways that avoid directly legitimizing 
the established political order. Voting, for example, upholds the political order 
through participation in the systems institutions. Although voters may aim to 
alter the system or gain greater influence in it through the choice of alternative 
candidates, the act of voting directly acknowledges an acceptance of the 
institutions that maintain the political order. The direct political action of SCB 
bypasses the traditional voting path to influence, indicating either a lack of belief 
in the legitimacy of the institutions, or a lack of belief in the efficacy of traditional 
participation. 
Grievance 
 Grievance refers to perceptions of injustice that provide motivation for 
complaint or resistance. This project focuses on ethnic grievances, in particular, 
perceptions of ethnic bias in the political system and society. Grievances are 
perceptions infused with ideas of right and wrong; inequities are not grievances 
until individuals perceive those inequities as unjust. In general, the more 
grievances in a population, the more protest and other SCB we are likely to 
observe (Gurr 1970). The perception of injustice offers a motivation for political 
action, often a very powerful one. Ethnic grievance is expected to be particularly 





 Identity is self-perception, ones real and ideal self-image. Identity is 
multi-layered, conditional, and situational. People have many kinds of identity, 
for example, political, ethnic, religious, occupational, etc.  This project will focus 
only on one part of individual identity, the national-political dimension and its 
repercussions for political participation. In Israels ethnically-charged 
environment, it is expected that this dimension would be the most relevant for 
political participation. 
 In general, people tend to act in ways consistent with their self-image 
(Turner et al. 1987). Although the development of this self-image is a complex 
and ongoing process, its impact on political participation may be considerable. 
Knowing how one identifies can be a key clue to future political participation. An 
anti-establishment identity, for example, may predispose individuals to challenge 
the status quo in unconventional ways.   
 In addition, identification with a particular entity, such as a firm (or a 
state), may hinder actions that are not in accordance with the goals of that entity, 
even where grievances exist (Tompkins and Cheney 1985). A pro-establishment 
or pro-state identity may not only suppress system-challenging action, but it may 
reduce the importance of grievances in the action  grievance relationship. Thus a 
conditional relationship between identity and grievance will be investigated.  
An interaction term composed of the product of identity and grievance 
(described in detail below) will be included in the model to test for a conditional 
relationship. Two possibilities exist: intensification or substitution. In the case of 
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substitution, either identity or grievance is sufficient to provoke system-
challenging behavior. One can substitute for the other. This is more likely for 
low-initiative activities, such as national action. In the case of intensification, both 
identity and grievance work together to facilitate SCB. This is more likely for 
high-initiative activities like protest action. If identification with the state works to 
reduce the effect of grievance on SCB, the relationship is likely to be one of 
intensification. If an identity low on the scale (Israeli) works to lower the impact 
of grievance, the two factors are working in synergy to lower SCB. Thus I expect 




Education and income are expected to be positively associated with SCB. 
Although some protest literature argues that the lower income and less educated 
(the deprived) are more likely to protest and engage in other system-challenging 
activities (Gurr 1970), individual level analyses in many countries indicates that 
protest is a high-initiative activity that is facilitated by resources such as education 
and income (Jennings and van Deth 1990; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Since 
protest is a major component of SCB, I expect that SCB will be similar to protest 
in this regard.  
Males are more likely to engage in confrontational activities than females, 
particularly in traditional societies, and being Muslim  seen in Israel as being 
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more radical than the Christians or Druze  would make one more likely to 
protest. In most countries, the younger are more likely to engage in system-
challenging activities (Jennings and van Deth 1990), although there could be 
generational effects from high-impact events (Jennings 1987) such as the original 
Land Day in 1976. In general, however, the older Israeli Palestinian generations 
have tended to avoid system-challenging behavior. Thus I expect any generational 
effects to complement cohort effects.  
Political Engagement 
Being interested in politics and reading more newspapers is likely to increase 
ones probability of engaging in SCB, since ones interest or engagement with 
politics can act as incentive to take action in the political arena (Verba, Nie, and 
Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
Mistrust 
A lack of trust in the government may predispose individuals to undertake 
behavior that challenges the status quo and the government that upholds it. 
Partisan Engagement (PID, Party Membership) 
In the Israeli proportional representation electoral system, interest groups are 
weak, while political parties carry out much of the political mobilization that goes 
on. Therefore party membership  irrespective of which party  may positively 
impact protest through its mobilization structures. For partisan affinity, however, 
feeling close to an Arab party is more likely to contribute to protest than Zionist 
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parties among the Palestinian Israeli population. As opposition parties, Arab 
parties frequently use extraparliamentary tactics in their political strategy. The 
greatest impact, however, may be the combination of party membership and Arab 
party affinity. Thus the interaction between the two factors will be investigated 
through the use of a product term in the model. 
Recruitment 
Being asked to protest can be expected to raise ones probability of actually 




 System-challenging behavior may not only be the result of the above 
factors, it may in fact be the cause of some of them. Participating in SCB, for 
whatever reason, may activate previously latent or unknown grievances. It may 
also make anti-establishment identities seem more attractive. Just as voting for a 
political party may (in the long run) may make individuals more likely to identify 
with that party in the future (Campbell et al. 1960), engaging in SCB may make 
individuals more likely to adopt an anti-establishment identity. Action, in other 
words, can change attitudes or identity. Thus we must investigate the possibility 
of reverse causality with a simultaneous equation model. The model will include 
three equations with three endogenous variables: SCB, identity, and grievance. 
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The above discussion has outlined the effects on SCB; next we will turn to the 
effects of SCB and other variables on identity and grievance, in turn. 
Identity 
Identity is not a fixed phenomenon; it can be altered, depending on the 
circumstances. The identities found among Israeli Palestinians in Israel are ethno-
political identities; that is, they are not purely ethnic or purely political. To call 
oneself Israeli Arab indicates a political position, as well as an ethnic identity. 
Similarly, to call oneself Palestinian in Israel suggests a different, more 
nationalist political position, but nevertheless indicates membership in the same 
ethnic group, however differently defined. Changing ones choice of self-
identification label suggests a change in political orientation; this change can be 
caused by many possible factors, including choices in behavior and changes in 
attitudes. 
SCB 
Conceivably, participating in SCB may predispose individuals towards an anti-
establishment identity, like the Palestinian identity in Israel. Acting to confront 
the political system is compatible with anti-establishment identities, and changing 
a pro-establishment identity to an anti-establishment one may help resolve 
cognitive dissonance.  
Grievance 
 67
Perceptions of systemic ethnic bias in Israel may facilitate Palestinian 
identification. The Palestinian identity is based upon a collective memory of 
dispossession at the hands of Zionists and Israelis; therefore, when one perceives 
Israeli discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, it is likely to play into this 
shared history, thus making Palestinian identification that much more attractive. 
 
Ethnic Distance 
When individuals feel distant from members of another ethnic group, they may be 
less likely to identify with that group or its institutions (like the state). Israeli 




Perceptions of cultural dissimilarity may predispose individuals to identify 
contrary to the distant culture. Since feelings of belonging to the culture are not 
present, people are not likely to identify with it. 
 
Demographics 
Since the younger tend to gravitate towards anti-establishment identities, age may 
be negatively associated with the Palestinian identity. It is often those in the 
higher education categories who lean towards these anti-establishment identities. 
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College students in particular have generally been at the forefront of contentious, 
anti-establishment politics. Since Muslims and Christians are thought of as more 
nationalist and anti-Israeli than Druze, it may be that they are more likely to also 
identify as Palestinian, rather than Israeli.  
 
Political Engagement 
Some of the activities meant to foster Palestinian identity takes place in the media 
and political arena, those who are more politically engaged may be more exposed 
to these activities and therefore may be more likely to identify as Palestinian. 
 
Grievance 
Perceptions of ethnic bias depend not only on the external environment, but also 
individual predispositions. Environmental changes are likely to be reflected in 
individual perceptions, though not specifically one-to-one. Grievance may be 




Acting in a system-challenging manner may make individuals more aware of 
grievances. Since much of SCB is issue-oriented, often regarding issues of a 
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critical nature, SCB may have the effect of highlighting grievances and raising 
individual perceptions of ethnic discrimination.  
 
Identity 
Having a Palestinian identity, which is by nature built upon a historical collective 
memory of discrimination, may accentuate perceptions of ethnic bias when 




If someone has personally experienced discrimination as a result of belonging to a 
particular ethnic group, sociotropic group grievances are going to be more readily 
visible. Thus personal experiences with discrimination are likely to lead to greater 
grievances in the long run. 
 
Demographics 
The young sometimes are more critical than their elders, according to their 
position at the forefront of anti-establishment politics. When this is true, age will 
be negatively associated with grievances. Education, if there is an effect, is likely 
to be positive, since the more educated are similarly more critical, though this 
effect is likely to be small. It is possible that the poor could have greater ethnic 
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grievances, since their economic status may be caused, in part at least, by ethnic 
bias. Muslims and Christians, who are less accommodating to the Israeli political 
system than Druze, may be more likely to perceive ethnic bias, since their 
political cultures are more likely to encourage criticism of Israel. 
 
Engagement 
Ethnic grievances dominate the political scene among Israeli Palestinians. Being 
engaged in politics is thus likely to expose people to messages favorable to 
grievance issues. The more engaged a person is, the more likely he/she is to have 
higher grievances.  
 
PID 
In Israel, parties are highly active at the grassroots level, and Arab parties in 
particular are likely to be involved in the mobilization of grievance. Arab parties 
benefit electorally by playing the ethnicity card; they can thus attract the large 
numbers of Israeli Palestinian voters who believe that working through traditional 
politics will help improve the situation of the Israeli Palestinian community. Thus 






If someone lacks trust in government, then he/she may be likely to perceive ethnic 
bias or discrimination, at least if the government is involved in perpetuating these 
grievances. Since much of the Israeli Palestinian population places blame on the 
government for discrimination (see Chapter 6), mistrust, then, may be associated 
with higher grievances. 
MODEL 
 Based on the above description, a model of System-Challenging Behavior 
should include the three key variables (depicted in bold type), SCB, identity, and 
grievance as endogenous variables, and a number of exogenous variables. 






































The triangular bloc of variables encompassing identity, grievance, and 
SCB indicates a mutually reinforcing relationship. Each may be a cause and an 
effect at the same time. Furthermore, it is possible that identity can affect the 
magnitude of the grievance  SCB relationship, as depicted by the arrow from 
identity to the grievance  SCB arrow. Since the relationship is symmetrical, 
grievance also has the potential to affect the magnitude of the identity  SCB 
relationship.  
The model is embodied in a set of equations as follows (endogenous 
variables in italics): 
1)  SCB = α + β1Age + β2Educ + β3Income + β4Gender + β5Muslim 
+ β6Christian + β7Engagement+ β8Grievance + β9Identity + 
β10Id*Att + β11Recruitment + β12PID + β13Partymember + 
β14PID*PMEM + β15Mistrust + ε 
 
2) Identity = α + β16Age + β17Educ + β18Muslim + β19Christian + 
β20Engagement + β21Grievance + β22SCB + β23EthnicDistance + 
β24CulturalDissimilarity + ε 
 
3)  Grievance = α + β25Age + β26Educ + β27Income +β28Muslim + 
β29Christian + β30Engagement + β31Identity +β32SCB + β33PID + 




In this project, I consider three main aspects of SCB: protest action, 
protest intent, and national action. Each of these groupings was analyzed 
separately as well as combined into a SCB index.  
Protest Action. Since protest actions may be legal or illegal, I measure this 
variable as the mean of two binary variables distinguishing respondents who 
reported participating in legal protest such as demonstrations and marches or 
illegal protest such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches at least 
once in the previous five years. The variable thus takes the value of 0, .5, and 1. 
Protest Intent. This too may refer to legal or illegal protest. Thus again I average 
two variables regarding the respondents estimate of the chance the he or she 
will participate in the future in legal protest actions such as licensed 
demonstrations and marches or illegal protest actions such as unlicensed 
demonstrations and violent marches. The five response categories were assigned 
equal interval scores (0, .25, .5, .75, 1) on a 0 to 1 scale. The resulting combined 
variable takes nine values between 0 and 1. 
National Action. This variable measures the respondents participation in national 
action days such as Land Day and Nakba Day commemorations. As noted in 
chapter 2, these days act as a sort of national days of protest in which participants 
engage in rallies, protest marches, poetry readings, and consciousness-raising 
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workshops, for example. Respondents were asked how often they participated in 
Land Day events in general, and if they had participated in Nakba Day events in 
the current year. The four-point Land Day variable was projected onto a 0 to 1 
scale, while Nakba Day participation was originally a binary variable. I average 
these two variables to produce a seven-point variable on a 0 to 1 scale taking the 
values of 0, .165, .33, .5, .665, .83 and 1.  
I also consider SCB as a whole. To that end, I average the six component 
SCB variables, each on a 0 1 scale (legal protest action, illegal protest action, 
legal protest intent, illegal protest intent, Land Day, Nakba Day). This produces a 
SCB variable with 63 points between 0 and 1. 
The item SCB index coheres nicely. All load on a single factor in 
exploratory factor analysis, they are strongly and significantly correlated with one 
another, and scale reliability is within the acceptable range (Cronbachs Alpha = 
.7033). Substantively, the six variables do not include traditional institutionalized 
political behavior such as voting that maintains or legitimizes the political system. 
In fact, the six variables in some ways challenge the prevailing system. National 
action days such as Land Day and Nakba Day commemorate events that lie 
outside the Jewish Israeli consciousness and challenge the Jewish Israeli 
interpretation of history. They include rallies, demonstrations, marches, and 
consciousness-raising activities. Protest, particularly the illegal variety, expresses 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and a sense of urgency about the current state 
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of events. Protest intent expresses a lack of confidence that current grievances 
will be addressed through traditional participation. All involve some sort of 
challenge to the political system and express a desire for change.  
Grievance 
 The grievance index averages items asking about ethnic discrimination: 
the degree to which the government considers Arab citizen opinion in its 
decision making, the degree to which Arab citizens have influence on state 
affairs, the degree of discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel, the size of 
the gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews, and the degree of 
government responsibility for the ethnic gap. The items were scaled so that higher 
numbers reflect greater grievance. (Cronbachs Alpha = .7250) For comparability 
purposes, the grievance index was projected to a 0 to 1 scale. 
Identity 
The identity variable consists of a single item asking how would you identify 
yourself if you had to choose one of the following: Arab, Palestinian Arab, Israeli 
Arab, Israeli, Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian. This question 
has been asked in several surveys since the 1980s with the same response 
categories to preserve comparability. None of the other studies have attempted to 
order the responses in a meaningful scale. As I will show in the following 
chapters, a meaningful order can be established based on empirical and theoretical 
arguments. The seven-point identity variable uses this order:  Israeli, Israeli Arab, 
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Arab, Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab, Palestinian. Thus 
the lower numbers indicate a stronger Israeli identity and a weaker Palestinian 
identity, while the higher-valued responses indicate a stronger Palestinian 
identity. As with grievance and SCB, identity was projected onto a 0 to 1 scale to 
facilitate comparability. 
Identity*Grievance (product term) 
 The product of identity and grievance is included to test for a conditional 
relationship between them. The two parts of the variable are constructed as above, 
then multiplied to make the product term.  
Exogenous Variables 
In addition to the three key (endogenous) variables and the endogenous 
product term, a number of exogenous variables are expected to directly or 
indirectly impact behavior. These exogenous variables include demographics, 
various attitudes, and political involvement measures. 
Demographics. The demographic variables in the model include age (actual age 
coded), income (five categories), education (nine categories), gender (dummy 
variable, male coded 1), and religion (two dummy variables, Muslim and 
Christian, omitted category = Druze). 
Attitudes. In addition to the endogenous variable grievance, a number of 
exogenous attitudinal variables are included in the model: 
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 PID: The party the respondent feels closest to, arrayed on a right (Zionist) 
to left (Palestinian nationalist) scale: Zionist right, Zionist left, Communist, 
United Arab List, Balad/Tajamu. 
 Mistrust: the extent to which the respondent has trust in government. 
 Personal Discrimination: the degree to which the respondent personally 
been hurt by discrimination against Arabs. 
 Cultural Dissimilarity: the inverse (due to coding) of the degree to which 
the respondent believes that the cultures of Arabs and Jews in Israel [are] similar 
to each other. 
 Ethnic Distance: the inverse (due to coding) of the degree to which the 
respondent feels close toward the Jews in Israel.  
Political Involvement. These variables capture the extent of the respondents 
psychological or actual involvement in politics.  
 Political Engagement: a summary variable consisting of political interest 
and newspaper consumption. Each five-point variable was projected onto a 0 to 1 
scale and added to create the engagement variable that ranges from 0 to 2.  
 Party Membership: A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent reports 
being a member of a political party, 0 if not. 
 Recruitment: A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent reports having 
been asked personally to participate in a protest action such as a demonstration, a 
march, or a petition in the previous five years. 
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 Party Membership * PID (product term): This is the product of the binary 
party membership and the interval partisan identification variable, as described 
above. This product term tests for the possibility that partisan identity could 
intensify the effect of party membership, and vice versa. 
 With the exception of age, all variables so coded are expected to have a 
positive impact on SCB, identity and/or grievance. 
Identification 
 Both identification and estimation are complicated by the nonadditivities 
(product term) in two of the endogenous variables (identity and grievance) in the 
SCB equation.  This makes the application of the necessary and sufficient rank 
condition prohibitively difficult, but the model does at last meet the necessary 
order condition. We may note, moreover, that nonadditivities of this sort 
generally make identification easier to achieve and that such models meeting the 
order condition also likely meet the rank condition, making it likely that my 
model satisfies the rank condition as well (Wooldridge 2001).  
ESTIMATION 
Regarding estimation, the nonadditivities noted require the use of an 
appropriate estimator whose first stage regresses four endogenous variables, SCB, 
identity, grievance, and the product of the latter two, on the exogenous variables, 
their squares, and their pairwise crossproducts (Greene 2000). This estimation is 
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nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS), as first offered by Kelejian (1971) and 
generalized by Amemiya (1974).  
The standard errors for the SCB equation with nonlinearities obtained by 
this estimation are not corrected for the nonlinearity, so I cannot make strong 
claims about the statistical significance of a variable for this equation. 
Nevertheless, the direction and magnitude of effect should be illustrative of the 
relationships tested in the model. The results of the model will be discussed in 




















It is generally assumed that the more aggrieved an individual is, the 
likelier is system-challenging behavior (Gurr 1970). But other factors also 
facilitate protest. One is personal identity, which may also act as to condition 
factor the grievance  behavior relationship. An identity with the relevant 
outgroup may heighten grievances effect, and an identity with the ingroup 
diminish it.  Of particular interest are cultural or ethnic-based identities, which 
may be particularly salient in ethnically conscious countries like Israel.  
Ethnic identity can be an important driving force behind system-
challenging mobilization and protest. A salient ethnic identity makes it likelier 
that a person will define his or her interests in ethnic terms and be easier to 
mobilize by ethnic entrepreneurs (Gurr 2000). Furthermore, group disadvantages 
provide an important motivation for targeting the political system through protest 
action.  
Minorities may find identifying with the state and its affiliated ethnic 
group useful since it may facilitate access to state privileges and a level of social 
and economic mobility unavailable to others (Brewer and Brown 1998). This may 
make them less likely to challenge the prevailing order through confrontational 
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action. Thus those who identify with the state may exhibit less system-challenging 
behavior, irrespective of the extent of grievances they hold. 
 This chapter investigates system-challenging political behaviors by Israeli 
Palestinians and the role that grievances and identity play in promoting it. I 
contend that identity conditions the grievance  behavior relationship by reducing 
grievances effect for those who identify with the state. From the Israeli states 
perspective, then, cultivating state identification is important for promoting ethnic 
stability. 
 
SYSTEM-CHALLENGING ACTION IN ISRAEL 
 
 Protest  which comprises a major part of what I am defining as system-
challenging behavior  is relatively high in Israel among both Arabs and Jews, 
compared to many western democracies. Wolfsfelds 1985 survey found that 16 
percent of all Israelis had participated in demonstrations, which he argued is 
second only to Italians among western democratic citizenries (Wolfsfeld 1988). 
Sam Lehman-Wilzig similarly finds a high rate of Israeli protest: in the early 
1980s, almost 22 percent of Israelis reported having participated in a protest event 
at least once (Lehman-Wilzig 1991). In my own 2001 survey, 23 percent of 
Jewish respondents and 31 percent of Arab respondents reported engaging in legal 
protest activities in the previous five years. 
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Table 1     System-challenging Behavior in Israel 
 Israeli 
Palestinians Jewish Israelis 
Legal Protest Intent  
(great or considerable chances) 29% 13% 
Illegal Protest Intent 
(great or considerable chances) 6 1 
Legal Protest Action 
(yes/no) 31 23 
Illegal Protest Action 
(yes/no) 
6 2 
Land Day  
(every few years or every year) 25 ____ 
Nakba Day  
(yes/no) 
16 ____ 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians, and Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and Ethnic Attitudes: 
A Survey of Adult Israeli Jews. 
 
 A number of factors could account for the relatively high rate of protest in 
Israel. The most prominent include include a high level of political interest, 
antipathy toward political parties, and distrust of authority. Observers of Israel 
generally agree that Israelis are very politically engaged. Political interest and 
rates of newspaper consumption are high (Arian 1998; Lehman-Wilzig 1990; 
Wolfsfeld 1988). Yet a 1983 survey revealed that 56 percent of Israelis had no 
trust or almost no trust in political parties (Lehman-Wilzig 1990). The volatile 
combination makes it likely that Israelis will not trust political authorities to 
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implement policies in the public interest and makes the most likely response 
apathy, rather than action. 
 To make matters worse, Israeli political institutions are seen as 
unresponsive to public demands. The strong party system insulates policymakers 
from the public, which results in citizen frustration. A situation of blocked 
political communication exists in Israel, according to Lehman  Wilzig (1990), 
who argues that public input is blocked from reaching policy makers through 
institutional means. 
 In the case of Israeli Palestinians, the policy-making process is further 
insulated from public input. The perpetual exclusion of Arab parties from 
governing coalitions means that many of the concerns of Israeli Palestinians are 
largely unheard in the corridors of power. When coupled with the high level of 
grievances among Israeli Palestinians, the situation has the potential to be even 
more explosive than that of Jewish Israelis. The higher rate of protest among 
Israeli Palestinians is not completely unexpected. 
 Aside from protest, Israeli Palestinians participate in other forms of 
system-challenging participation. National action days, like Land Day and Nakba 
Day, are widely observed (as shown in Table X) for several reasons. They lack a 
sense of identification with Israels holidays, which are either religious in nature 
(Yom Kippur, Passover) or Zionist (Memorial Day, Independence Day). Israeli 
Palestinians feel the need for their own alternative holidays which act as 
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national days of mourning, commemorations of important events, and ritualized 
outlets for expressing communal grievances. Thus national action days provide 
annual opportunities for ethnic protest. 
 
SYSTEM-CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR: WHO AND WHAT? 
 
 Breaking SCB down into its component parts illuminates the 
interconnected nature of these kinds of actions. Included in SCB is protest intent, 
protest action, and national action (Land Day and Nakba Day activities). In 
general, less than half of the Israeli Palestinian population engaged in SCB, given 
its high-initiative nature, although rates of participation may still be higher than 
may be expected for these relatively difficult forms of participation.  
Table 2 Protest Action: Legal vs. Illegal   (frequencies) 






(no) 768 4 
772 
Legal Protest 
(yes) 282 58 
340 
Total 1050 62  
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians 
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The different kinds of participation are mutually reinforcing: those who 
participate in one kind of behavior are more likely to also have participated in 
others. In the case of protest action, only a small minority had engaged in either 
legal or, especially, illegal protest. A similar pattern obtains for legal and illegal 
protest intent. Most respondents indicated they were unlikely to engage in legal 
protest, still more so in illegal protest.  
 
Table 3 Protest Intent: Legal vs. Illegal (frequencies) 













No Chance 389 6 1 2 2 400 
Few 
Chances 199 62 8 5 1 275 
Moderate 
Chances 96 40 28 5 1 170 
Considerable 
Chances 91 43 15 16 4 169 
Great 
Chances 59 43 27 24 15 168 
Total 834 194 79 52 23 1182 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 





 The two components of National Action, Land Day and Nakba Day, 
appear to go hand in hand for most Israeli Palestinians. People who participate in 
one are likely to participate in the other. For example, of the 192 respondents who 
reported participating in Nakba Day activities in the current (2001) year, 141 of 
them also say they participate in Land Day activities every year or every few 
years, a rate of 73 percent compared to only 25 percent in the Israeli Palestinian 
population as a whole. 
 
Table 4 National Action (frequencies) 
Nakba Day Participation  
 yes no Total 
Never 648 21 669 
Seldom 186 30 216 
Every few years 81 66 147 




Total 985 192 1177 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 The different components of System-Challenging Behavior also seem to 
work together. For example, protesters are overrepresented among national action 
participators. Eighty percent of the respondents in the highest two categories on 
the national action scale reported engaging in protest action. In contrast, only 18 
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percent of respondents scoring on the lowest two categories of the national action 
scale and 32 percent of the general Israeli Palestinian population reported protest 
participation. 
 






















Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
IDENTITY AND SYSTEM-CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR 
  
An important theme running throughout this dissertation is the differences 
among the identity groups, their significance, and their ordering. Chapter 6 will 
show that Israeli identifiers differ significantly from Palestinian identifiers in 
terms of the degree of discrimination they perceive in Israel. Chapter 7 shows that 
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they also differ in terms of political attitudes and voting participation. In this 
chapter, a similar relationship is discussed for system-challenging behavior. The 
more Palestinian (and less Israeli) the identity, the more system-challenging 
behavior is reported. A consistent order of identities is revealed, upon which the 
identity measure is based. 
 For example, the mean of the SCB variable increases as identity becomes 
more Palestinian. The more Palestinian (and less Israeli) the identity, the more 
system-challenging behavior the group conducts. The mean of the Israeli 
identifiers is almost .5, but the Palestinian identifiers mean is 2.14, on a 0 to 6 
scale. 
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Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 




 The same relationship holds for each of the component parts of system-
challenging behavior. For protest action, protest intent, and national action, the 
greater the degree of Palestinian identity, the greater incidence of system-
challenging behavior. Though the increase is not always strictly monotonic, the 
generally increasing pattern is nonetheless readily apparent.  For Israeli 
identifiers, the mean protest action is 0.13 on a scale of 0 to 1, but for Palestinian 
identifiers, the mean is 0.30. 
 
































































 For protest intent, the mean increases from 2.77 to 4.83 on a scale of 2 to 
10 as identity goes from Israeli to Palestinian. National action likewise increases, 
from .04 to .37 on a scale of 0 to 1. Like protest action and the SCB index, these 
measures show a relatively consistent increase as the identity becomes more 
Palestinian.  































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 









































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
In short, as identity becomes more Palestinian, system-challenging action 
increases. The order of the identities is remarkably consistent both here and in 
chapters 6 and 7, where various attitudes and actions are similarly considered. 
Based on this and similar findings in the following chapters, the identity measure 
can be constructed to reflect the order revealed: Israeli, Israeli Arab, Arab, Israeli 
Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab, Palestinian. 
These results aptly describe the phenomenon of the Arab rights 
movement in Israel. Much protest activity among Israeli Palestinians aims 
towards securing their rights in a hostile environment. Those who identifying 
wholly or partly as Palestinians, can be expected to engage in collective action at 
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a higher rate, since they appear to be rejecting social mobility strategies and are 




 The bivariate relationships depicted above are indicative of who is 
engaging in SCB in the Palestinian Israeli community. Those who are doing so 
are concentrated among those with more Palestinian identity. 
Estimating the model outlined in chapter 4 will shed light on the 
relationships among identity, grievance, and SCB, and on why some Israeli 
Palestinians but not others engage in SCB. This chapter focuses on the first 
equation of the three-equation system, that for SCB. The equation is reproduced 
below (endogenous variables in italics). 
 
SCB = α + β1Age + β2Educ + β3Income + β4Gender + β5Muslim + 
β6Christian + β7Engagement+ β8Grievance + β9Identity + β10Id*Att + 
β11Recruitment + β12*PID + β13Partymember + β14PID*PMEM + β15Mistrust + ε  
  
The estimation of the above equation illuminates the direct effects on SCB 
as well as the mediated relationship between identity and grievance, captured in 
the equations product term. My expectations about the signs of the coefficients, 
set out in chapter 4, are that all will have a positive effect on SCB, with the 
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exception of age. The diagram below illustrates the expected relationship between 
the independent variables and dependent variable of this equation. (Product terms 
not shown.) 
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 The N2SLS estimates are reported in Table 5. The table includes a first 
differences column in order to indicate the magnitudes of the effects.  More 
precisely, the first differences are the change in the expected value of SCB from 
varying a single explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum, holding 
all the other explanatory variables constant: 
  [E(y) | xk = max]  [E(y) |xk = min] 
For gender, this would be: 
[E(SCB) | gender = 1]  [E(SCB) | gender = 0] 
According to the results, being male as opposed to female increases ones 
expected SCB by seven percent (.07 on the 0 to 1 SCB scale).  Being a party 
member, then, increases the expected value by 15 percent, while being asked to 
protest increases the expected value of SCB by 14 percent, and being engaged in 
politics, 20 percent. 
 The first difference for identity is:  [β9 + β10*Grievancemean][Identitymax  
Identitymin]. Using this formula gives a first difference of .122, a moderately large 
effect. For grievance, the first difference is : [β8 + β10*Identitymean][Grievancemax 




Table 5 N2SLS: Determinants of System-Challenging Behavior 
 
Coefficient First Difference 
Constant -0.021  
Age 0.001 .061 
Education 0.002 .014 
Income -0.011 -.044 
Gender (male) 0.071 .071 
Muslim 0.042 .042 
Christian 0.029 .029 
Political 
Engagement 0.086 .196 
Grievance 0.062 .480 
Identity 0.001 .122 
Griev*Identity 0.004 --- 
Recruitment 0.143 .143 
PID -0.006 -.011 
Party Member 0.042 .154 
PartyMem*PID 0.029 --- 
Mistrust -0.018 -.072 
R squared = .364 Range SCB: 0 to 1 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 These results show grievance as having the strongest direct effect on 
system-challenging behavior. Increasing grievance from its minimum to its 
maximum increases SCB 48 percent of the way from its minimum to its 
maximum. The literature on protest and grievance is correct to stress the 
importance of individual dissatisfaction with the status quo for political action, 
but these results also indicate that other variables have relatively strong effects. 
Political engagement, party membership, recruitment, and identity show first 
differences of .196, .154, .143, and .122 respectively.  
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 Analyzing the parts of SCB reveal similar results. In all cases, grievance 
has the largest effect. After grievance, other factors with strong effects are, as 
with the index SCB, political engagement, party membership, recruitment, and 
identity. Party membership has the strongest effect for national action (.204), 
which probably reflects the role of political parties in organizing Land Day and 
Nakba Day events. Party membership has the weakest effect for protest intent 
(.099), as is also the case for recruitment. The mobilizing role of parties and 
individual recruitment could be expected to be weak for protest intent, which 
involves less action than other components of SCB. Organizing action, rather than 
action-oriented attitudes, is the specialty of mobilizing structures.  
Interestingly, identity has the weakest effect for national action (.11), and 
indeed has almost no effect for Land Day (.003), a part of national action. This is 
a relatively surprising result given the association of these events with Palestinian 
solidarity. It could be that mobilizing efforts are more effective with Israeli and 
Israeli Arab identifiers than with Palestinian identifiers, who are likely to attend 
regardless of mobilizing efforts. Identity has the strongest effect on protest intent 








Table 6 Protest Action  
 Coefficient First Difference 
Constant -0.038  
Age -0.001 -.075 
Education -0.001 -.006 
Income -0.001 -.004 
Gender (male) 0.080 .080 
Muslim 0.011 -.011 
Christian 0.020 .019 
Political Engagement 0.049 .170 
Grievance 0.010 .466 
Identity 0.056 .132 
Griev*Identity 0.017 --- 
Recruitment 0.172 .172 
PID -0.006 -.029 
Party Member 0.154 .152 
PartyMem*PID 0.001 --- 
Mistrust -0.005 -.019 
R squared = .240 DV Range 0 to 1    Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation 
and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
Table 7 Protest Intent  
 Coefficient First Difference 
Constant -0.206  
Age -0.001 -.082 
Education 0.006 .045 
Income -0.003 -.013 
Gender (male) 0.052 .052 
Muslim 0.040 .040 
Christian 0.002 .002 
Political Engagement 0.106 .222 
Grievance 0.052 .375 
Identity 0.018 .199 
Griev*Identity 0.003 --- 
Recruitment 0.122 .122 
PID -0.005 -.003 
Party Member -0.024 -.099 
PartyMem*PID 0.032 --- 
Mistrust -0.018 -.074 
R squared = .313 DV Range 0 to 1   Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation 
and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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Table 8 National Action  
 
Coefficient First Difference 
Constant -0.263  
Age -0.001 .041 
Education -0.001 -.006 
Income -0.025 -.100 
Gender (male) 0.082 .082 
Muslim 0.083 .083 
Christian 0.065 .065 
Political Engagement 0.090 .179 
Grievance 0.073 .446 
Identity 0.013 .110 
Griev*Identity 0.001 --- 
Recruitment 0.166 .166 
PID -0.001 -.027 
Party Member 0.015 .204 
PartyMem*PID 0.053 --- 
Mistrust -0.027 -.109 
R squared = .270 DV Range: 0 to 1     Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation 
and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
Table 9 Land Day  
 Coefficient First Difference 
Constant -0.426  
Age 0.000 .001 
Education 0.010 .077 
Income -0.033 -.134 
Gender (male) 0.086 .086 
Muslim 0.145 .145 
Christian 0.106 .106 
Political Engagement 0.090 .133 
Grievance 0.105 .432 
Identity 0.033 .003 
Griev*Identity -0.007 --- 
Recruitment 0.151 .151 
PID -0.001 -.029 
Party Member 0.033 .234 
PartyMem*PID 0.052 --- 
Mistrust -0.018 -.072 
R squared = .232 DV Range 0 to 1    Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation 
and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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 Further analysis indicates that the relationship between grievance and SCB 
is conditioned by the kind of identity one holds. When holding identity constant at 
Israeli, the SCB first difference for grievance is considerably less (.398) than 
when identity is held at the other end of the scale, at Palestinian (.557). 
Grievances matter less to Israeli identifiers than Palestinian identifiers when it 
comes to system-challenging behavior. Breaking down the SCB variable into its 
component parts once again shows how this relationship changes for different 
kinds of behavior. For protest action, for example, the contrast between Israeli 
and Palestinian identifiers is the largest, with the first difference for Israeli 
identifiers at .16 and for Palestinian identifiers at .75. The contrast is quite small, 
on the other hand, for national action (.42 for Israeli identifiers and .46 for 
Palestinian identifiers). 
 
Table 10 First Differences: Grievance 
Dependent Variable Israeli Palestinian 
SCB .398 .557 
Protest Action .159 .752 
Protest Intent .316 .430 
National Action .426 .464 
Land Day .561 .313 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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 Since the conditional relationship between identity and grievance is 
symmetrical, we can discern a similar pattern for the first difference of identity at 
different levels of grievance. For SCB, having a Palestinian identity is not an 
important factor for individuals with low levels of grievance. It is more important, 
however, for those with high levels of grievance. This relationship indicates a 
synergy between the two: low grievances and low Palestinian identity are found 
hand in hand, while high grievances and high Palestinian identity work together to 
increase system-challenging behavior at a much higher rate. With the exception of 
Land Day, an intensification effect takes place between identity and grievance.  
Table 11 First Differences: Identity 
Dependent Variable Low Grievance High Grievance 
SCB .003 .162 
Protest Action -.311 .282 
Protest Intent .114 .227 
National Action .081 .119 
Land Day .189 -.059 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 
 The meaning of grievances differential impact for Israeli and Palestinian 
identifiers is most apparent for protest action: identification with the state (as 
Israeli) may attenuate the effect of grievance on protest. If individuals identify 
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with the state, they are less likely to protest even if they hold significant 
grievances. Thus cultivating identification with the state among minorities can be 
an important tool in the struggle to maintain ethnic stability. 
 However, the gap between Israeli and Palestinian identifiers is narrower 
for other kinds of system-challenging behavior. This fact reflects the differences 
in the kind of behavior. Protest action, for example, probably requires the highest 
level of initiative. It is relatively confrontational and requires time and effort to 
inform oneself about upcoming protest activities as well as to attend. It may 
therefore require both a high level of grievances and a strong anti-establishment 
identity (Palestinian).  
National action, on the other hand, is relatively nonconfrontational (most 
of the time), involves only minor information costs since Land Day and Nakba 
Day are well-known annual occurrences. It may therefore only require moderate 
levels of grievances and anti-establishment identity. Interestingly, for Land Day 
alone, the interaction between identity and grievance is reversed: grievances 
matter more for Israeli identifiers than for Palestinian identifiers. In this case, only 
one or the other may be required; it may be sufficient to have only relatively high 






The estimates of the direct effects on SCB emphasize the importance of 
both grievance and identity. Although grievance has a strong direct effect on 
political action, this impact may be tempered by Israeli or Israeli-leaning 
identities. More generally, states may be able to promote stability by cultivating 
identification with the state. This finding is consistent with those in the study of 
organizational behavior, to the effect that employees tend to act in keeping with 
the firms objectives if they have acquired the firms organizational identity 
(Tompkins and Cheney 1985). The state, therefore, can choose to either reduce 
ethnic grievances or increase state identification (or both) in an effort to improve 
ethnic relations. The next two chapters will investigate the determinants of 












Chapter 6:  Ethnic Grievance in the Israeli Palestinian Context 
 
Grievance refers to the feelings of injustice found among individuals who 
believe they have been wronged. According to Websters dictionary, grievance is 
an act that inflicts undeserved hurt, a cause of distress that affords reason for 
complaint or resistance. As measured in my survey, grievance indicates 
perceptions of ethnic discrimination, group powerlessness, and an ethnic bias in 
the political system. Among Israeli Palestinians, feelings of grievance are salient 
and dominate the political environment.  
The protest literature suggests that grievances are an important 
determinant of protest behavior (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Gurr 1970; Jennings and 
van Deth 1990). The analysis of the previous chapter similarly indicates that 
system-challenging behavior  of which protest is a major component  is in part 
driven by ethnic grievances. Grievances provide major motivation for political 
action: in the cost-benefit calculus of political action, one important payoff 
from the cost of participation is the redress of grievances. Thus, for those who are 
primarily motivated in political action by tangible outcomes (Downs 1957; 
Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991; Riker and Ordeshook), the force of grievances 
can play an important role in provoking system-challenging political action such 
as protest. For others, whose motivation for action may be less tangible, such as 
the expression of identity or opinion, grievances may still play an important role, 
though its impact may be indirect, for example, through the formation of protest-
prone anti-establishment identities. 
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Ethnic grievances may be a particularly potent form of grievances, since 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) ethnic identities tend to provoke intense emotions. As 
the resource-distribution role of the modern state has grown, it has inevitably 
created ethnic differentials. When ethnic identity is salient, these differentials are 
highly visible, which is likely to generate significant ethnic grievances. Ethnic 
political action is the probable result. 
 
ETHNIC GRIEVANCE IN ISRAEL 
 Among Israeli Palestinians, there are three main sets of grievances: 
economic, political, and symbolic. The economic grievances focus on the low 
socioeconomic status of Israeli Palestinians. Several factors combine to drive 
down the SES of Israeli Palestinians. First of all, Israeli Palestinians do not 
usually serve in the army and are therefore not given the extensive veterans 
benefits given to most Jewish Israelis. Because of the security situation, it is 
difficult for Israeli Palestinians to obtain high-level security clearances, making 
employment in the large military-security complex  where much of the skilled 
engineering labor is employed  extremely rare. Government subsidies and 
investment in local projects are generally distributed unevenly, with Israeli 
Palestinian localities usually getting short thrift. As a result, Israeli Palestinians 
occupy the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic ladder. 
  The political grievances revolve around the lack of Israeli Palestinian 
power in the political system. While some of the reasons for the lack of influence 
are internal, such as Arab party fragmentation and infighting among leaders, 
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Israeli Palestinian grievances focus on the external causes of their 
disempowerment. Zionist ideology generally is suspicious of non-Jewish political 
power and anti-Zionist ideologies, so both formal and informal procedures work 
to reduce Israeli Palestinian political power below what would be expected based 
on their proportion of the electorate. An informal consensus works to exclude 
Arab parties from governing coalitions and to exclude Israeli Palestinians from 
other sensitive decision-making bodies (such as the Israeli Lands Authority), 
while formal legislation limits the expression of anti-Zionist ideas popular among 
Israeli Palestinians.  
 The importance of symbolic politics (Horowitz 1985) for ethnic relations 
is readily apparent in the Israeli political arena. For Jewish Israelis, whose 
collective memory includes centuries of oppression and attempts at extermination, 
the Jewish nature of the state provides a comforting symbol of security for the 
Jewish people. However, this same symbol is an important source of grievance for 
Israeli Palestinians due to its exclusionary nature. As the state of the Jewish 
people, according to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, and not of all its 
citizens, Israeli Palestinians feel a profound sense of exclusion. The state flag, 
holidays, and dominant language likewise leave Israeli Palestinians out. In short, 
Israeli Palestinians suffer from a feeling of not belonging to the collectivity that 
the state is meant to serve and represent. As a result, their identification with the 
state is low, as we will see in the following chapter. 
 
 106
THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRIEVANCE 
 
 The extent of Israeli Palestinian grievance is apparent in the results of the 
survey. Israeli Palestinian responses were concentrated at the high grievance end 
of the scale for every question. For example, only 5 percent of the sample 
reported that the government considers Arab citizens opinion in its decision-
making to a very large degree or a large degree, while nearly eighty percent 
thought that Arab opinion was considered to a small degree or not at all. 
 

















small degree not at all







Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 The distribution of opinions was reversed when Israeli Palestinian 
respondents were asked about the extent that Jewish citizens opinions were 
considered in opinion-making. Ninety-one percent of respondents reported that 
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they believed the government considers Jewish citizens opinions to a very large 
degree or a large degree, while only three percent believed Jewish opinions 
were considered to a small degree or not at all.  
 

















small degree not at all







Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
The differential between the two questions is illustrative of the Israeli Palestinian 
perception of disempowerment. Subtracting the second question from the first 
question for each respondent provides a measure of the respondents perception of 
the ethnic power gap in Israel. Each question was a five-point scale, so the middle 
position (5) on the figure below represents parity, that is, no difference between 
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Arab and Jewish power. Responses above 5 represent a differential in favor of 
Jewish power, and below 5 represent a differential in favor of Arab power. 
 
Figure 10 Arab-Jewish Power Differential: Opinions in Decision-Making 
























Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
Only 24 respondents (two percent) believe that Arabs opinions are considered 
more than Jewish opinions, while only 73 (six percent) reported parity. The rest 
(92 percent) perceived a differential in favor of Jewish opinion. This gap reveals 
the extent to which Israeli Palestinians feel left out of the decision-making 
process. Without government responsiveness to their opinions, Israeli Palestinians 
feel vulnerable to state abuse. 
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 A similarly-constructed differential is shown below. When asked, Israeli 
Palestinians rated Arab influence on state affairs very low and Jewish influence 
very high. The difference between the two is shown in the figure below. The 
question responses were four-point scales, so the middle position (4) represents 
parity, above 4 indicates a differential in favor of Jewish citizens, and below 4 
represents a differential in favor of Arab citizens. Once again, the distribution is 
heavily skewed toward the perception of Jewish power. 
 
























Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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Political power differentials are a very important form of grievance, because it is 
through political power that other grievances may be redressed. Without political 
power, hope for an improved situation remains low.  
 A general measure of perceptions of discrimination also reveals a skewed 
distribution. When asked how much discrimination against Arabs there is in 
Israel, the overwhelming majority (78 percent) responded that there is a large 
degree or very large degree of discrimination. When asked about their personal 
experience with discrimination, the distribution appeared more normal in shape 
but nevertheless reveals considerable experience with ethnic discrimination. 
 






























 Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 Respondents also perceive a large economic gap between Arabs and Jews, 
and generally place the blame for the gap on the government. When asked about 
the extent of the Arab-Jewish gap, respondents generally perceived considerable 
Arab-Jewish difference, with over 81 percent perceiving a large or very large 
gap. Most of the respondents placed blame on the government for this gap: almost 
60 percent chose the highest category. The two combined, large economic gap 
and high degree of state responsibility for the gap, could be seen as a sign of gross 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. It indicates a willingness to target the state 
with political action designed to improve the situation of Israeli Palestinians. 
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Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 

































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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 The existence of high grievances and state blame for at least some of the 
grievances suggests lack of faith in the political system. Indeed, a growing 
sentiment blames the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state for discrimination. 
Advocates of this position argue that a Jewish-Zionist state, by definition, cannot 
treat non-Jews equally. The political, economic, and symbolic discrimination is 
part and parcel of the nature of the state. As a result, the state must lose its ethnic 
Jewish element, becoming the state of all its citizens, before it can be truly 
democratic and end ethnic discrimination. Survey responses indicate that this 
sentiment is indeed strong, though not unanimous. 
 















strongly agree agree disagree strongly
disagree








Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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 On these same items, a large difference between Jewish and Arab 
respondents can be seen. In general, Israeli Palestinians perceive much more 
ethnic discrimination than do Jewish Israelis. For example, only 40 percent of 
Jewish Israelis perceive a large or very large degree of discrimination against 
Arabs, while 80 percent of Israeli Palestinians do. This degree of perception gap 
is generally reproduced across the grievance and discrimination items.  
 
Table 12 Arab-Jewish Comparison: Grievance 
 Jewish Israelis Israeli Palestinians 
Discrimination against Arabs 
(large or very large degree) 40% 80% 
Gap between Arabs and Jews 
(large or very large) 65 81 
Arab input into Israeli 
decision-making (small or none) 47 80 
Government blame for Arab-
Jewish gap (large or very large 
degree) 59 87 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A 
National Survey of Israeli Palestinians and Lowrance, S. 2001 Political Participation and Ethnic 
Attitudes: A Survey of Adult Israeli Jews.  
 
GRIEVANCE AND IDENTITY 
 The grievances described above are not randomly distributed throughout 
the Israeli Palestinian population. Identity, one of this studys key variables, is 
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highly correlated with grievance (.4088). The most anti-establishment identity, the 
Palestinian identity, is overrepresented among the highest grievance category 
across most variables. That is, the most aggrieved individuals tend to identify on 
the upper end of the identity scale, in whole or in part as Palestinian.  
 In the power differentials shown above, the highest category (9 in the case 
of Arab opinions and 7 in the case of influence on state affairs) in each case has a 
high percentage of Palestinian identifiers. Those who perceive the largest power 
gap between Arabs and Jews generally identify in a counter-establishment 
manner. 
 




































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 












































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
In both cases, the Israeli identities are found in the highest power 
differential category only at a very low rate, while the Palestinian identities are 
well represented in the high category. Only nine percent of Israeli identifiers but 
45 percent of Palestinian identifiers perceived the largest possible Arab-Jewish 
gap in opinion considered in state decision-making, while seven percent of Israeli 
identifiers but 54 percent of Palestinian identifiers reported the largest Arab-
Jewish influence gap. 
 Similarly, the Palestinian identifiers perceive greater discrimination, a 
larger Arab-Jewish gap and place greater blame for the gap on the state. This 
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suggests that those on the upper end of the identity scale, who identify in whole or 
in part as Palestinian, have the motive as well as the target - the state - for system-
challenging political action. 
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Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 


























































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
Figure 21 Identity and State Blame for Arab-Jewish Gap 























































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
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DETERMINANTS OF GRIEVANCE: A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 The above analysis shows that a bivariate link exists between identity and 
grievance. It is possible, however, that the correlation may be spurious, caused by 
a third variable correlated with both identity and grievance. The multivariate 
analysis conducted according to the model laid out in chapter 4 can reveal the 
determinants of grievance, taking into account the effect of other variables. In 
other words, what causes a person to feel aggrieved? 
 A number of factors are expected to significantly impact grievance, as 
discussed at length in chapter 4. Most important are the key variables of identity 
and system-challenging behavior. Given the bivariate relationship between 
identity and grievance, it may be expected to also hold on a multivariate level. 
Those who hold an anti-establishment identity may in fact perceive ethnic 
differentials more readily, since their Palestinian identity primes them to think in 
ethnic categories and frame issues in terms of justice and victimization. Also, 
engaging in system-challenging action may in fact encourage individuals to 
perceive greater injustice. In other words, actions may cause a change in attitudes, 
producing greater grievances as a result of engaging in SCB. Other variables, such 
as religion, partisan affinity, and personal experiences with discrimination, are 
likely to impact grievances as well, as previously described. In general, variables 
are coded with the expectation of a positive relationship with the dependent 
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variable, where expectations exist. Below, my expectations are noted in the 
figure. Only age is expected to have a negative effect. 









































Grievance = α + β25Age + β26Educ + β27Income +β28Muslim + β29Christian + 
β30Engagement + β31Identity +β32SCB + β33PID + β34Pdiscrim + β35Mistrust + ε 
 
 The results of the analysis are as follows: 
Table 13 Determinants of Grievance  
 Coefficient Std. Error First Difference 
Constant .307 .025  
Age .001* .000 .041 
Education .011** .003 .049 
Income -.007* .003 -.028 
Muslim -.085** .018 -.085 
Christian -.077** .019 -.078 
Engagement -.018* .009 -.036 
Identity .193** .037 .193 
SCB -.016 .031 -.016 
PID .009** .003 .043 
Personal Discrimination .062** .003 .248 
Mistrust .041** .004 .162 
R squared = .5549 *p≤ .05; **p≤ .01 Scale of DV = 0  1 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 The results of the above analysis generally confirm expectations. For the 
key variable of identity, a positive, statistically significant impact on grievance 
was found. The magnitude of effect, found in the first differences column, was the 
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second largest in the equation. Thus, having a Palestinian identity makes one 
more likely to hold significant grievances. For the other key variable, SCB, 
however, expectations were not confirmed; the relationship between grievance 
and SCB was not statistically significant. Therefore, one cannot conclude that 
engaging in system-challenging political action makes individuals more aware of 
potential grievances. In this case, the political action does not appear to change 
attitudes, despite the potential for such a possibility. 
 The variable with the strongest impact on grievances was the personal 
discrimination measure. Having more personal experience with discrimination 
makes an individual more likely to have high grievances. It is possible that the 
personal experience makes individuals more aware of more abstract grievances 
that affect the group as a whole.  
Another factor impacting grievance is mistrust. Grievances, particularly 
ones that focus on the failings of the state, require a level of mistrust to be active. 
Simultaneously trusting the government and blaming it for problems may not be 
compatible positions. Other variables had small effects on the dependent variable, 
though sometimes in the opposite direction of prior expectations. For example, 
being more engaged in politics makes one less likely to have grievances. 
Similarly, Muslims and Christians are also less likely to be aggrieved, compared 
to the reference category of Druze. Despite the fact that Muslims and Christians 
are considered to be less accommodating to Jewish Israelis than the Druze, the 
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Druze are more likely to have grievances than Muslims and Christians, once other 
factors are taken into account, though the effect is small. Older, more educated 
individuals with lower incomes are more likely to have grievances as well, as are 
those who identify with Arab parties, though once again these effects, though 




 This chapter has shown the extent of grievances among Israeli 
Palestinians, and their distribution among the Israeli Palestinian population. 
Israeli Palestinians strongly feel discriminated against because they are non-
Jewish Arabs, believe that the political system ignores them, and blame the 
government for the large Arab-Jewish gap they perceive. These grievances are 
more likely to be found among those who hold Palestinian identities, that is, on 
the upper end of the identity scale. On a multivariate level, this relationship 
between grievance and identity held up. Having a Palestinian identity makes one 
more likely to have more grievances. It was theorized that a counter-establishment 
ethno-political identity such as the Palestinian identity may make individuals 
more aware of ethnic differentials and place greater value on them, thus activating 
higher grievances.  
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 The fact that identity has a strong impact on grievances has implications 
for system-challenging behavior. Since grievances have a strong direct effect on 
SCB, as discussed in the previous chapter, identity, then, has an indirect effect on 
SCB through grievances. This is in addition to the direct effect found in the 
previous chapter. The next chapter will turn to identity as a dependent variable, 















Chapter 7: Being Palestinian in Israel: Identity and the Context of 
Political Action 
 
Identity remains central to the conflict over historical Palestine. The 
congruence or divergence of personal identity and state identity often act as 
sources of conflict between peoples of differing national character. In Israel, the 
Jewish nature of the state  heavily contested among Israeli Palestinians but 
cherished among Jewish Israelis, creates dilemmas of identity among Israeli 
citizens who are not Jewish. This chapter explores the development and meaning 
of identity among Israeli Palestinians, with an empirical look at the different kinds 
of identities and the factors leading to them. 
 
THE DISTRIBUTION AND NATURE OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY 
 
Because of the competing trends both facilitating and retarding Palestinian 
identity outlined in chapter 2, not all Palestinians share the same degree of 
identification with the Palestinian people. There are a number of self-
identification labels in use in Israel today, each with different meanings and 
political implications. Thus investigating distributions of identity at the individual 
level is essential for understanding its effect in the political arena. 
The data on Palestinian Arab identity in Israel are sparse, particularly 
before the 1980s and mainly are based on small, convenience samples like 
students. Different researchers have asked different questions and used different 
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methods, making comparisons. Yet the scholarly consensus is that there has been 
a growing trend towards greater Palestinian identification and less Israeli 
identification, particularly since 1967 (Lustick 1980; Mi'ari 1987; Rouhana 1997; 
Smooha 1992).  
For example, the earliest study of Palestinian Arab identity reported that 
before 1967, a sample of adolescents, young adults, and parents chose Israeli as 
the most accurate definition of themselves, given the choice between Israeli, 
Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli Arab. After 1967, however, interviews with a 
comparable sample revealed that Arab had moved to first place and Israeli to 
last (Peres and Yuval-Davis 1969). The first indications of a specifically 
Palestinian identity emerged in research carried out in 1974 and 1975. In this 
study, 47 percent of a sample of 348 adults in four Arab towns and three mixed 
Arab-Jewish cities indicated that the term Israeli described them a little or not at 
all, and only 14 percent thought that it was completely suitable, whereas 63 
percent of the respondents said the term Palestinian described them very well 
and only 15 percent said it described them a little or not at all (Tessler 1977).  
The first fully representative sample of Palestinian Arab citizens was 
carried out in 1976 by the sociologist Sammy Smooha, who followed up with 
further surveys in 1980, 1985 and 1988. These surveys have indicated a gradual 
decline in the reported suitability of the term Israeli (from 52 percent in 1976 to 
46 percent in 1988) and an increase in the suitability of the term Palestinian 
(from 58 percent in 1976 to 68 percent in 1985) (Smooha 1992). My surveys, 
conducted in 2001, indicate a continuation of this trend, with 70 percent of Arab 
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respondents reporting that the term Palestinian is very appropriate or 
appropriate to them. When given a choice between seven self-identification 
categories, nearly 66 percent chose a label that included the term Palestinian.  
 































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A 
National Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
There are many possible reasons why Palestinian identity has been 
increasing in Israel. First of all, social change in the Palestinian population has 
involved a weakening of local identities such as the clan (hamula) as education 
and other indicators of social change have increased. Furthermore, the strength of 
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Arab nationalism, an anti-Zionist form of identification that somewhat competes 
with Palestinian identity, drastically decreased following the defeat of the Arab 
armies in the 1967 war. After Israels occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 
the same war, Israeli Palestinians renewed contact with Palestinians in the 
territories, where a strong sense of Palestinian nationalism already existed and 
undoubtedly affected Israeli Palestinians own sense of nationalism. Finally, the 
outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987 increased Israeli Palestinian solidarity with 
their compatriots under fire across the Green Line, and also intensified the latters 
Palestinian nationalism. Of course, some of the increase may be a reduction of 
systematic measurement error. As noted, then loosening of Israeli restrictions on 
Palestinian expression and political activity over the past three decades have 
allowed more open expression of Palestinian identity. 
The meaning of Palestinian identification, however, remains unsettled and 
controversial. Smooha (1992), for example, identifies indications of simultaneous 
Israelization and Palestinianization occurring in Israel among Arabs. He 
points to growing trends of Palestinian recognition of Israels right to exist, a 
desire to remain in Israel even if a Palestinian state is established, interaction with 
the Jewish population of Israel, and bilingualism and biculturalism as indicators 
of Israelization. These trends have occurred concurrently with the shift in 
distribution of opinion towards Arab respondents identifying themselves as 
Palestinians in surveys. 
Nadim Rouhana, on the other hand, argues that Smooha conflates Israeli 
identity with mere Palestinian accommodation of Israeli reality (1997). Rouhana 
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uses the results of his own survey to construct a persuasive social-psychological 
model of Palestinian identity in Israel. He distinguishes between national 
identification and civic identification. National identification governs the realm of 
ideology, allegiance and belonging, whereas civic identity defines individuals as 
legal citizens of a state and members of a political entity regardless of their 
national affiliation. According to Rouhana, Palestinians in Israel lack an 
integrated collective identity, one that successfully integrates various dimensions 
(socio-cultural, political, and formal-legal) with affective axes of attachment. 
Israeli identity dominates only the formal-legal dimension, and makes some 
impact on the socio-cultural dimension, but Palestinian identity dominates the 
political dimension and, most significantly, the affective axes. In other words, 
Israeli identity has not been internalized by Israeli Palestinians as a national 
identity; instead, it merely describes the civic and geographic affiliation of 
Palestinians in Israel.  
Rouhanas findings indicate that most Israeli Palestinians have no  
sentimental attachment and a sense of belonging to Israel. They may formally 
interact with the Israeli system administratively, legally, economically, and 
politically, and they may be bilingual, familiar with Israeli culture and influenced 
by democratic values, but this does not mean that they identify with Israel as a 
nation. This affective attachment to a nation is reserved for the Palestinian people. 
Rouhanas interviews revealed that Israeli Palestinians express solidarity with 
Palestinians in the occupied territories and diaspora, agree with Palestinian goals 
such as statehood in the occupied territories, and respect national symbols. They 
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feel that they share Palestinian culture and society, a common history, heritage 
and social values. Pride and patriotism are expressed in relation to the Palestinian 
people, not for the Israeli state. Thus Rouhana concludes that Israeli Palestinians 
have not internalized Israeli identity or feel like part of an Israeli collective. 
Instead, they interact with the Israeli system and culture, but identify as 
Palestinians on the affective level. 
Rouhana makes generalizations about the entire Israeli Palestinian 
population, although his own data indicate that the nature of identity is much 
more varied. In fact, the extent of identification with the state varies from person 
to person, as Figure X suggests. Therefore, individuals who hold different 
identities diverge significantly in terms of political attitudes and other precursors 
to ethnic political action. 
In the previous chapter, the distribution of grievance among the different 
identity groups was outlined. Individuals on the high end of the identity scale, 
who identify as Palestinian in whole or in part, perceive greater discrimination, 
powerlessness, and Arab-Jewish economic gap. This chapter shows the 
distribution of partisan affinity, party vote, and vote boycotting among identity 
groups. Once again, Palestinian identity is associated with the nationalist position. 
In general, these identities are infused with political meaning as well as ethnic 
identity. 
The political meaning of the identity groupings becomes clear upon 
examination of the distribution of partisan affinity. When asked which party 
respondents feel close to, only 14 percent of Israeli identifiers expressed affinity 
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for Arab parties over Zionist parties, while 95 percent of Palestinian identifiers 
(and 98 percent of Palestinian Arab identifiers) felt close to Arab parties. In a 
similar vein, the Balad/Tajamu party, generally considered the most nationalist 
party, was favored by Palestinian identifiers at a much higher rate than Israeli 
identifiers. 












































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
















































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 Vote boycotting is also associated with the Palestinian identity. The 2001 
Prime Minister elections was widely boycotted among Israeli Palestinians due to 
their anger at the Barak administrations perceived culpability in the riots of the 
previous autumn that killed 13 Israeli Palestinians. Palestinian identifiers 
boycotted at a higher rate than Israeli identifiers, probably reflecting the 





Figure 26 Identity and Vote Boycott (2001) 
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 When asked which party they would vote for if party elections were held 
today, respondents with a Palestinian identity favored Arab parties at a higher rate 
than Israeli identifiers. Arab parties are considered to be anti-Zionist (or non-
Zionist at best, in the case of the Communist party), and as such, their appeal is to 
























































































Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 Regarding external politics, only 16 percent of Israeli identifiers (and 15 
percent of Israeli Arab identifiers) opposed the Oslo Accords, but nearly 45 
percent of Palestinian identifiers opposed the agreements. Most opposition to the 
Oslo Accords in the Arab world comes from the nationalist stream of politics, 
which argues that the Accords did not give the Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza enough rights. In Israel, a similar phenomenon is found among Israeli 
Palestinians. Palestinian identifiers, the most nationalist among Israeli 
Palestinians opposed the Accords much more than Israeli identifiers and others on 
the lower end of the identity scale. 
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Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
 The above figures have shown the consistency of political identification 
among Israeli Palestinians. The order of identities from least Palestinian to most is 
relatively consistent across different measures. Those who identify as Israeli or 
Israeli Arab (the favored term of the Israeli establishment), are reasonably 
accomododating to Israeli political priorities. They support the Oslo Accords, vote 
for (and identify with) Zionist parties, perceive less discrimination, and did not 
boycott the 2001 elections at a high rate. Those identifying as Palestinian or 
Palestinian Arab, having rejected any identifying label that includes Israeli, 
hold the most nationalist positions and are least satisfied with the status quo. 
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Israeli Palestinian and Palestinian in Israel identifiers attempt to combine 
both Palestinian and Israeli identities of some sort, and are generally in between 
the two extremes. 
 The enigmatic Arab label is difficult to explain in these terms, since it 
lacks either a Palestinian or Israeli marker. Historically it has referred to Bedouin 
and may still carry that connotation. The Bedouin in Israel have historically acted 
instrumentallyl within the Israeli system, often volunteer for the army, and have 
been thought of as non-political. Recently, however, Bedouin have become more 
politically active and have been heavily recruited by the Islamic movement (Nir 
2002). Thus, the location of Arab identifiers towards the Israeli side of the scale 
on most measures reflects their historical accommodation with Israel. 
Nevertheless, Arabs are not as accommodating as Israeli or Israeli Arab 
identifiers, which may indicate that some are becoming more nationalist as a 
result of recent events. 
 The above results reveal the political nature of these identities. The 
identities are ethno-national on the surface, depicting a relationship of an ethnic 
minority to the state that it lives in. An Israeli Arab, for example, chooses that 
identity to show he or she belongs to the country Israel but is also a member of 
an ethnic minority, Arabs. But underneath the national nature of these identities 
is a strong political orientation reflected in the figures of this chapter and the last. 
Individuals identify themselves according to their political orientation on the 
nationalist dimension. The nationalist dimension (as opposed to economic or 
social) dominates the political scene among Israeli Palestinians, so ones choice of 
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identification labels is an important political form of self-definition. Knowing 





The above description explains the significance of different identities 
among Israeli Palestinians, but it does not explain why some choose to identify 
they way they do. Given the difficult environment that Israeli Palestinians find 
themselves in, why do some choose to identify with the state, as Israelis, and 
others choose to reject the state and identify with an anti-establishment identity 
such as the Palestinian identity? The variation of identity can be explained at least 
in part by a multivariate analysis such as the one described in the previous 
chapter.  
At this point I consider the third (identity) equation of the model outlined 
in chapter 4. With the exception of age, all variables are expected to have a 
positive effect on Palestinian identity. 
 
Identity = α + β16Age + β17Educ + β18Muslim + β19Christian + 
β20Engagement + β21Grievance + β22SCB + β23EthnicDistance + 
























The table below contains the results of the analysis. Many, though not all, 
of the expectations were confirmed.  As in the previous two chapters, I have 















first difference is the difference in expected value of the dependent variable when 
an independent variable is varied from its minimum to its maximum. This 
provides an illustration of the full range of the impact of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable, in this case, identity. 
 
Table 14  N2SLS: Determinants of Identity 
Dependent Variable = Identity  
Variable Name Coefficient 
Standard 
Error First Difference 
Constant -0.356 0.059  
Age 0.001 0.001 0.041 
Education 0.001 0.006 0.010 
Muslim 0.30** 0.029 0.299 
Christian 0.240** 0.034 0.240 
Engagement 0.025 0.018 0.050 
Grievance 0.547** 0.008 0.547 
SCB 0.092 0.061 0.092 
Ethnic Distance 0.047** 0.010 0.187 
Cultural Dissimilarity -0.007 0.010 -0.028 
R-squared = 0.346 *p≤ .05; **p≤ .01 Scale of DV: 0 to 1  
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National 
Survey of Israeli Palestinians. 
 
Based on the above results, it appears that ethnic-based grievances have 
the strongest effect on identity choices. The effect of having strong grievances 
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(maximum on the scale) compared to weak grievances (minimum on the scale) is 
a change in the expected value of the identity variable by .55 on a total scale of 0 
to 1. Having strong grievances makes an individual much more likely to identify 
at the high end of the identity scale  with a Palestinian identity. 
After grievance, religion and ethnic distance have relatively strong effects 
on identity. As predicted, Muslims and Christians are more likely to identify as 
Palestinian than Druze, with Muslims the most likely and Christians next. Feeling 
personally distant from Jewish Israelis also has a relatively strong effect. Both 
religion and ethnic distance have a relatively strong magnitude of effect as 
measured by the first difference. Other variables only showed modest effects and 




Despite decades of Israeli efforts to deny, discourage, and suppress the 
Palestinian identity as a threat to Israeli-Zionists hegemony, it has nonetheless 
persisted. However, not every Israeli Palestinian identifies  in whole or in part  
as Palestinian. The empirical analysis has shown that the different self-identifying 
labels used differ in their political content and implications for political 
participation. The group of individuals that call themselves Israelis differs 
significantly from those who call themselves Palestinians in terms of their 
political attitudes, their partisan affinity, and their political participation 
(boycotting, Arab party vote). 
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The multivariate analysis found that the factor most strongly encouraging 
Palestinian identification is a feeling of ethnic grievance. Perceptions of endemic 
bias against Israeli Palestinians as a community may activate the salience of 
Palestinian identity, thereby encouraging a Palestinian identity. In effect, Israel 
may be helping to cause what it least desires: a growing Palestinian identity. The 
source of the grievances, Israels official policies and unofficial societal practices, 
may in fact be generating the identity that is considered threatening by most 
Israelis. The persistence of this identity reinforces a competing claim to the land 
Jewish Israelis claim, as well as reduces a much-needed identification with the 















Chapter 8:  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
SUMMARY 
This project has aimed to answer a number of research questions.  
1. Who conducts system-challenging political behavior among Israeli 
Palestinians and why? In other words, what are the determinants of 
SCB in Israel? 
2. What are the implications of individual identity for SCB?  
3. What are the implications of grievance for SCB and identity?  
 The findings indicate a complex and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between the key variables, identity, grievance, and SCB.  
1. The findings of the project indicate that highly aggrieved individuals, 
other things being equal, will engage in system-challenging action 
more than others. The direct effect of grievance was relatively strong, 
supporting the conclusions of others such as Gurr, who argue for the 
importance of grievance for protest. Other variables affecting SCB 
were largely according to expectations: the politically engaged, party 
members, and recruited individuals were also found to be more likely 
to engage in SCB. 
2. Having a Palestinian identity has a moderate direct effect on SCB; the 
more Palestinian (and less Israeli) ones identity, the more SCB the 
individual is likely to perform. Palestinian identity also affects 
grievance; Palestinian identifiers are more likely to hold significant 
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grievances. Since identity has a direct effect on grievance, identity 
thus has an indirect effect on SCB through grievance, as depicted in 
the model representation below. In addition, identity has a conditional 
effect on SCB in interaction with grievance. When identity is 
Israeli, the effect of grievance on SCB is much lower than when one 
identifies as Palestinian. Thus having an identity friendly to the state 
helps individuals act in accordance to state goals such as preserving 
the ethnic status quo. Religion (Muslims and Christians as opposed to 
Druze) and ethnic distance (feeling distant from Jewish Israelis) were 
also found to be positively associated with the Palestinian identity. 
3. Not only does grievance have a strong direct impact on SCB, but it 
also strongly affects identity choices. Aggrieved individuals are more 
likely to identify as Palestinian, in whole or in part. Thus the 
relationship between grievance and identity is a mutually reinforcing 
one; each causes the other. The Palestinian identity primes individuals 
to be aware of ethnic grievances, since the Palestinian identity is based 
on a sense of historical injustice. On the other hand, having grievances 
makes one more likely to choose to identify as Palestinian. 
 
The relationship between the three key variables, identity, grievance, and SCB, is 
depicted in the diagram below. The direct effect of identity is drawn in red, and 
the direct effect of grievance in blue. The direct effect of SCB remains black, 
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since the analysis did not find significant effects of SCB on either of the other two 
key variables.  















 The findings of this study suggest that Israeli policy-makers may want to 
cultivate feelings of affinity with the state and/or reduce ethnic grievances if they 
want to avoid system-challenging behavior among Israeli Palestinians. That is, 
they could address the identity variable or the grievance variable, or preferably, 








 Some Israeli moderates, both Jewish and Arab, have suggested that Israel 
should decrease the Arab-Jewish gap and reduce ethnic discrimination. This 
would address the grievance variable. These advocates do not say such moves 
would satisfy everyone, but they would satisfy enough people so that relatively 
few system-challengers would remain. 
 The results of this study suggest that addressing the grievance variable 
would have a powerful effect on SCB. Grievance has the strongest direct effect on 
SCB, so reducing grievance would reduce SCB. Since individuals with high 
grievances are also more likely to identify as Palestinian, lowering grievance 
would also have the effect of reducing the attractiveness of the Palestinian 
identity, which is considered to be radical and undesirable by most mainstream 
Jewish Israelis. 
 There is considerable support in Israel for reducing discrimination against 
Israeli Palestinians, at least in abstract terms. However, the fact that no action has 
been taken on this issue suggests that support may be less forthcoming on specific 
policies, as opposed to the abstract principle of equality, as has been suggested 
elsewhere (Shamir and Sullivan 1985). In addition, the difficult economic 
situation in Israel is currently unfavorable to a new redistribution of the economic 
pie, so the relatively powerless Israeli Palestinians are unlikely to increase their 
share in the near future. 
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 Identity 
 Other Israelis, mostly Israeli Palestinians, argue that they cannot be 
bought off by higher standards of living. Instead, the entire political system 
needs to change to bring about a transformation of ethnic relations. Thus the 
exclusive Jewish-Zionist nature of the state needs to be changed so that the state 
can belong to all its citizens, not just the Jewish ones.  
 By addressing the identity variable in this way, the ethnic identity of the 
state could expand to include Israeli Palestinians as well as Jews. Thus Israeli 
Palestinians could have hope of attaining an affective identification with the state 
that may act, as my research suggests, as a factor to decrease the importance of 
grievance for system-challenging action. 
 There is little support for this proposition in Israel, however. The Jewish 
nature of the state is cherished among Jews both in Israel and worldwide, and 
diluting Israels Jewish character would be highly unpopular at this time when the 
state is seen as under attack. In the future, however, if Israeli-Palestinian relations 
improve, such a proposal may become viable. 
 A relatively symbolic change can go far towards incorporating Israeli 
Palestinians into the state, which may make them less likely to act against it even 
if they still feel aggrieved. It is much more difficult to undo the effects of more 
than a half century of discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, though I believe 
it is important to try. In short, even though it is politically more difficult, in the 
end it may be physically easier to change the symbolism of the state rather than 
attempting to undo the effects of several generations of discrimination. 
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 Israeli Palestinians 
 The results of this study suggest that Israeli Palestinian efforts to preserve 
and enhance Palestinian identity in Israel may not only be a positive phenomenon 
in itself, but may also useful for encouraging activism, from the Israeli Palestinian 
point of view. Since the Palestinian identity appears to encourage system-
challenging behavior, and may also magnify the effect of grievance on SCB, 
encouraging Palestinian identity may in fact encourage political action. Action 
that challenges the ethnic status quo may be particularly valuable to Israeli 
Palestinians, so the encouragement of SCB through identity-building could be a 
fruitful avenue to pursue. 
 It is worth mentioning that the simultaneous encouragement of Israeli 
identity and Palestinian identity are generally incompatible at this time. The way 
these identities are currently constructed leaves very little room for the other. 
Although some manage to combine both Israeli and Palestinian identities (note 
that only 9.5 percent of the survey sample identified as Israeli Palestinian), in 
general, the appropriateness of the Israeli identity and the Palestinian identity are 
negatively correlated (-.3). The Palestinian identity is based on a collective 
memory of disempowerment and dispersal at the hands of Zionists and Israelis, 
while the Israeli identity is based on a nearly exclusive claim to historical 
Palestine and negation of parallel Palestinian claims. 
However, some observers do not believe that this situation needs continue 
unchanged. Altering the meaning of Israeli identity and/or Palestinian identity to 
include an acceptance of the other can help make these identities more 
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compatible. There may be several ways to do this, but one often-mentioned way is 
to re-define Israel as the state of all its citizens, thus creating an Israeli identity 
that is civic, rather than religio-national (Grossman 1993; Rouhana 1997). In any 
case, the compatibility of the two identities is essential for resolving the ethnic 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, both inside and outside Israel. 
 
 Other Countries 
 The results of this study are also applicable to other countries experiencing 
ethnic conflict. Post-Communist Europe, for example, has been experiencing 
ideological transformation since the fall of communist governments in 1989. 
Taking the place of the communist identity of the state has been national 
identities, often constructed in such a way as to exclude minorities long residing 
in its borders. Discrimination, identity conflict, and mutual recriminations, as in 
the case of Israel, plague majority-minority relations in places such as Slovakia 
(Bacova 1999; Harlig 1997), Estonia and Latvia (Smith 1996), and Croatia 
(Brunner 1996). For these countries and others, the lessons of this research may 
be instructive. 
 In general, these results may serve as a warning that ethnic grievances are 
not likely to be easily ignored or suppressed, as some nationalists may hope. The 
outcome of ethnic grievances may be further ethnic mobilization. The study also 
points out the importance of symbolic politics, and that of identity in particular, 
for the persistence and resolution of ethnic conflict. On a less optimistic note, the 
importance of identity suggests the difficulty of resolving some ethnic conflicts. 
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Identities are not easily negotiable and tend to provoke intense emotions, and thus 
conflicts may become less amenable to resolution when closely-held identities are 
seen as being at stake. 
 
CONTRIBUTION 
 This study has contributed to the literatures of ethnic identity, ethnic 
conflict, and Israeli ethnic politics. It has contributed to the ethnic identity 
literature by illuminating the motivational nature of an ethno-political identity, the 
Palestinian identity in Israel. This identity has important effects on political 
behavior and some attitudes, such as grievance.  
The study has also contributed to the ethnic conflict literature by both 
confirming and clarifying research by Gurr (2000), who argues that ethnic conflict 
may be reduced by a commitment to minority rights. The results of my study 
suggests that increasing minority rights may reduce grievances, which will in turn 
reduce system-challenging behavior by minorities. My research goes further, 
however, to qualify this grievance  action relationship. If minorities identify with 
the state and its goals, the impact of grievances can be reduced.  
Finally, this dissertation has added to the Israeli ethnic politics literature. 
Rather than dichotomizing identity into Israeli and Palestinian, I have put identity 
on an ordinal scale, which provides a more detailed picture of identity. This study 
has also sketched the implications of Palestinian identity for Israeli politics. 
Palestinian identity is not simply an irrational hatred of all things Israeli; rather, it 
derives from perceived discrimination and other legitimate grievances. And this 
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study has used quantitative methods to address the consequences of Palestinian 
identity for political behavior in Israel. Palestinian identity can result in greater 
system-challenging action by Israeli Palestinians, but the Israeli identity may in 
fact reduce this tendency toward system-challenging action. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Four main avenues for future research immediately present themselves. 
First of all, it much research remains to be done on why people identify with a 
state and the implications for this identification. This dissertation has attempted to 
uncover one main implication: the reduced likelihood for system-challenging 
behavior. However, it is not clear why individuals identify with the state at all, 
particularly under difficult circumstances such as those experienced by Israeli 
Palestinians. What are the mechanisms by which these identities develop? How 
are the identities sustained? Changed? How do these identities affect other forms 
of participation, including state-supporting as well as state-challenging action? 
 The second avenue is to investigate the impact of other kinds of identity, 
in particular, religious identity. In the Middle East, where political Islamic 
movements are active, it may be fruitful to clarify how, if at all, religious identity 
differs from national identity, and if participation outcomes differ. Since religious 
movements are in some areas of the Middle East the only organized opposition, 
such research may have implications for democratization efforts in the region. 
 A third avenue for research is the investigating the effect of system-
maintenance processes and legitimizing processes, like voting, on SCB. It is 
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possible that such activities drain the energy from system-challenging activities 
rather than reinforcing them. If this is the case, working within the system could 
end up prolonging the status quo in the long run, rather than changing it. 
Testing this proposition, however, is more difficult than one would expect 
at first glance. Voting, in all likelihood, is endogenous. Preliminary analyses, 
ignoring votings likely endogeneity, suggest that the role of political parties is 
crucial to the understanding of both SCB and system-legitimizing processes in 
contexts such as Israel. Voting in the 1999 general elections is positively 
associated with SCB, while voting in the 2001 elections is negatively associated 
with SCB. In 1999, the political parties mobilized voters to turn out, while in 
2001 the parties actively boycotted the elections and worked with the organized 
boycott movement to mobilize voters to stay home on election day.  
Given that Arab parties are active in organizing SCB as well as voting, as 
discussed in chapter 5, one could expect this mixed result. In fact, some political 
parties, such as the Balad/Tajamu party, operate on the edge of legality and state 
as a primary aim the changing of the political system from an ethnic-Jewish to a 
civic-egalitarian system. It is likely that different kinds of voting  not only the 
choice of party but also the choice as to vote or boycott  have different effects on 
SCB. 
However, to fully test these hypotheses, a new model must be specified. 
Both grievance and identity, among other things, probably affect voting, and may 
even be affected by voting. Adding a fourth equation to the model with voting as a 
dependent variable would thus be necessary to take into account votings 
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endogeneity. This will complicate identifying the model, and thus it is a project 
best left for future research. 
 Finally, the expansion of the system-challenging behavior model to other 
countries may be pursued. As mentioned above, several Eastern European 
countries have similar ethnic structures and the conflict between groups in many 
ways resembles that in Israel. Testing the SCB model in a similar environment as 
well as a dissimilar environment, such as the United States, may reveal the 
applicability and the limitations of the model. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 This study has shed light on the importance of identity politics in the 
world today. Identity can be a tool of the state for state- and nation-building, and 
it can also be a tool of minorities for mobilizing system-challenging action. 
Identity has often been underestimated by political scientists due to the difficulty 
in measurement and definition, since political scientists prefer instead to leave the 
study of identity to psychologists. However, I would recommend a blurring of the 
lines between fields, allowing some cross-fertilization between politics and 
psychology. It is important for political scientists to gain insights into identity, but 
also it has outcomes that political scientists are eager to comprehend. Identity has 
been a motivating factor behind anti-colonial movements, nationalist movements, 
and religious movements of the preceding centuries. It is behind the religious 
terrorism of al Qaida that confronts us today. Thus it is important to understand 
how others perceive the world and the logical action outcomes of that perception. 
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Such an understanding is essential to navigating the minefields of the modern 
world , as well as to the acceptance of the other and the creation of a world built 





















Appendix A: About the Survey 
 
The Arabic sample of the survey was conducted using face-to-face 
interviews in Arabic during the months of January  May of 2001 by the Givat 
Haviva Center for Peace Research. It was based on a name sample, randomly 
drawn from the population register of the Ministry of Interior. Included in the 
sample were residents of 44 villages and towns inside the Green Line, which 
constitutes a representative stratified sample of all localities in which Palestinian 
citizens live. The resulting data set consists of 1202 respondents. 
The Jewish sample of the survey was conducted by the Survey Consulting 
Unit of the University of Haifa, January 21  February 5, 2001. The interviewing 
was carried out in Hebrew by telephone. The sample consists of a simple random 
sample of the Israeli Jewish population within Israels pre-1967 borders. The 









Appendix B: English translation of the Arabic Questionnaire 
My name is __________________ and I am a survey interviewer from the University of Haifa. 
We are conducting a survey on a number of issues. Your name was randomly chosen to be in a 
sample of 1200 people from all parts of the country. All of the information that you express will 
be anonymous and will be used for research purposes only. The goal of this research is to know 
peoples opinions about the society and country we live in.  In the questions we will ask you, there 
are no correct or incorrect answers. I will read you the questions and the possible answers and you 
may choose the response that is closest to your opinion. 
 
ID Serial number. 
1. To what degree do you have trust in government? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
2. To what degree are you interested in politics and public affairs? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
3. How often do you read a newspaper? 
1 Daily 
2 Several times a week 
3 Once a week 
4 Seldom 
5 Do not read 
4. To what degree do you agree with the statement: "Sometimes political and 
governmental matters are so complicated that a person like me cannot really 
understand what is going on." 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
5. To what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Arab citizens 
opinion in its decision making? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 





6. And to what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Jewish citizens 
opinion in its decision making? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
7. Do you support or oppose the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO? 
1 Strongly Support 
2 Support 
3 Oppose (skip the next question) 
4 Strongly oppose (skip the next question) 
8. If you support the Oslo accords, do you accept the way they are implemented? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
9.  To what degree do you feel close toward the Jews in Israel? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
10. Culture is expressed in matters like music, food, language, and values of right and 
wrong. To what degree are the cultures of Arabs and the Jews in Israel similar to 
each other? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
11. How are the relations, in your opinion, between Arab citizens and Jews in Israel 
today? 
1 Very good 
2 Good 
3 Neither good nor bad 
4 Bad 
5 Very bad 
12. To what degree, in your opinion, do Arab citizens have influence on state affairs? 
1 Too much influence 
2 Sufficient influence 
3 Little influence 
4 No influence at all 
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13. To what degree, in your opinion, do Jewish citizens have influence on state affairs? 
1 Too much influence 
2 Sufficient influence 
3 Little influence 
4 No influence at all 
14. To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Arab citizens in 
Israel? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
15. To what degree have you personally been hurt by discrimination against Arabs? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
16. To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Arab citizens 
and Jews? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
17. To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for the gap in 
the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews? 
1 To a very large degree 
2 To a large degree 
3 To a moderate degree 
4 To a small degree 
5 Not at all 
 
We are interested in knowing about different ways people participate in politics. For 
example: 
18. During the last election campaign, did you try to persuade certain people to vote for 
any party or candidate? 
1 Yes 
2 No (skip the next question) 
19. If yes, whom did you try to persuade? (1-3 answers are possible) 
1 Family members 
2 Close friends 
3 Neighbors 
4 Other persons. Indicate 
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20. In how many legal protest actions such as demonstrations and marches have you 
participated in the past five years? _____ (Indicate an exact number, if 0, skip the 
next question) 
21. (If participated in at least one demonstration or march) What issue did the most 
recent legal protest action you participated in address?) 
1 Peace  
2 Equality (budgets of local governments, unemployment, housing distress, 
destruction of illegal buildings, lands, unrecognized localities, educational services, 
etc.) 
3 Affairs internal to Arab (women status, violence against women, dysfunctioning of 
local authorities, hamula and communal disputes, crime) 1-3 answers. 
4 Environmental issues 
5 Other issues. Indicate 
22. In how many illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent 
marches have you participated in the past five years? _______ (Indicate an exact 
number, two digits) 
23. How often do you participate in Land Day events? 
1 Never 
2 Seldom 
3 Every few years 
4 Every year 
24. Did you participate in the Naqba commemoration events this year? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
25. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in legal protest actions 
such as licensed demonstrations and marches? 
1 Great chances 
2 Considerable chances 
3 Moderate chances 
4 Small chances 
5 No chances 
26. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in illegal protest actions 
such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches? 
1 Great chances 
2 Considerable chances 
3 Moderate chances 
4 Small chances 
5 No chances 
 
Now I'm going to ask you about requests directed sometimes to people to participate in 
politics. For example: 
27. Have you personally been asked by someone to vote or to abstain from voting in the 
past five years? 
1 Yes 
2 No (skip the next question) 
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28. If yes, by whom? (1-3 answers). 
1 A family member 
2 A close friend 
3 A neighbor 
4 A superior in a job 
5 An active member of a political party 
6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association 
7 Other. Indicate 
29. Have you personally been asked by someone to vote for or against a certain 
candidate or a certain party in the past five years? 
1 Yes 
2 No (skip the next question) 
30. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers. 
1 A family member 
2 A close friend 
3 A neighbor 
4 A superior in a job 
5 An active member of a political party 
6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association 
7 Other. Indicate 
31. Have you personally been asked by someone to participate in a protest action such as 
a demonstration, a march or a petition in the past five years? 
1 Yes 
2 No (skip the next question) 
32. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers. 
1 A family member 
2 A close friend 
3 A neighbor 
4 A superior in a job 
5 An active member of a political party 
6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association 
7 Other. Indicate 
33. In the past five years, have you attended a meeting in your mosque/church/khilwie 




Now, I am going to read to you some statements, and I would like you to tell me to what degree 
you agree with each one. 
34. Israel can be a democracy and a Zionist Jewish state at the same time. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 




35. Israel must recognize Arabs as a minority with equal and full rights. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
36. Despite its flaws, the Israeli regime offers Arab citizens more civil rights and 
political freedoms than what Arab states offer their citizens. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
37. Voting in elections is one of the most efficient ways to achieve equality for Arabs in 
Israel. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
38.  I am a citizen of Israel but for me it is like a foreign country. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
39.  Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
40.  Is the term "Israeli" appropriate in describing your identity? [The fourth category 
Not appropriate at all was deleted from the Arabic questionnaire by technical 
mistake] 
1 Very appropriate 
2 Appropriate 
3 Not too appropriate 
41. Is the term "Palestinian" appropriate in describing your identity? [The fourth 
category Not appropriate at all was deleted from the Arabic questionnaire by 
technical mistake]? 
1 Very appropriate 
2 Appropriate 
3 Not too appropriate 
42. Is the term "Israeli Palestinian" appropriate in describing your identity? [The fourth 
category Not appropriate at all was deleted from the Arabic questionnaire by 
technical mistake] 
1 Very appropriate 
2 Appropriate 




43. How would you define yourself if you had to choose one of the following  
1 Arab 
2 Palestinian Arab 
3 Israeli Arab 
4 Israeli 
5 Israeli Palestinian 
6 Palestinian in Israel or Palestinian Arab in Israel 
7 Palestinian 
44. To which of the following parties do you feel closest? 
1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement, Mahamid) 
2 The Front (Rakah) 
3 Balad headed by Bishara 
4 The Arab Renewal Party headed by Tibie 
5 Jewish parties such as Labor, Meretz and HaMerkaz 
6 Jewish parties such as Likud, Mafdal and Shas 
45. For which party would you vote if elections to the Knesset were held today? 
1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid) 
2 The Front (Rakah) 
3 Balad headed by Bishara 
4 The Arab Renewal Movement headed by Tibie 








13 Yahadut Hatorah 
14 Yisrael Baaliya 
15 Yisrael Betenu 
16 Haihud Halumi 
17 Another Party. Indicate 
18 I have not decided 
19 I will not vote 
20 Not willing to say 
46. For which candidate for a Prime Minister would you vote if elections were held 
today? 
1 The Labor candidate 
2 The Likud candidate 
3 Blank vote 
4 I have not decided 
5 I will not vote 





47. For which party did you vote in the Knesset elections in 1999? 
1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid) 
(skip the next question) 
2 The Front (Rakah) (skip the next question) 
3 Balad and the Arab Renewal Party headed by Bishara and Tibie (skip the next 
question) 
4 One Israel (Labor, Gesher, Memad) (skip the next question) 
5 Meretz (skip the next question) 
6 HaMerkaz (skip the next question) 
7 Shinui (skip the next question) 
8 Am Ehad (skip the next question) 
9 Likud (skip the next question) 
10 Shas (skip the next question) 
11 Mafdal (skip the next question) 
12 Yahadut Hatorah (skip the next question) 
13 Yisrael Baaliya (skip the next question) 
14 Yisrael Betenu (skip the next question) 
15 Haihud Halumi (skip the next question) 
16 Haderekh Hashlishit  (skip the next question) 
17 Mifleget Hanashim  (skip the next question) 
18 Panina Rosenblum Party  (skip the next question) 
19 Hagimlaim Party  (skip the next question) 
20 Casino Party headed by Tisona  (skip the next question) 
21. Ale Yarok  (skip the next question) 
22. Hayrukim  (skip the next question) 
23 The New Arab Party headed by Makhul  (skip the next question) 
24 Da'am (Democratic Labor Party) (skip the next question) 
25 Another party: ____________________  (skip the next question) 
26 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote) 
27 I Did not have the right to vote (I was under 18) (skip the next question) 
28 Not willing to say 
48. Why did not you vote in the Knesset elections in 1999? 1-3 answers. 
1 I had difficulty getting to the polls, I was abroad, I was out of  town, I was sick, I 
had problems with my identity card 
2 I was busy 
3 I was not interested in politics 
4 I was not familiar with the parties 
5 I felt that my vote will make no difference 
6 There was no appropriate party with good candidates 
7 Voting is against my conscience or religion 
8 I did not have the right to vote (I was under 18) 
9 I did not vote for another reason. Indicate 
49. Which candidate for a Prime Minister did you vote for in 1999? 
1 Shimon Peres 
2 Benyamin Netanyahu 
3 Blank vote 
4 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote) 
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5 I did not have the right to vote (I was under 18) 
6 Not willing to say 
50. Are you a member of a political party? 
1 Yes 
2 No (skip the next question) 
51. If yes, which party? 
1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid) 
2 The Front (Rakah) 
3 Balad headed by Bishara 
4 The Arab Renewal Movement headed by Tibie 








13 Yahadut Hatorah 
14 Yisrael Baaliya 
15 Yisrael Betenu 
16 Haihud Halumi 
17 Another Party:_______________  
18 Not willing to say 




53. With regard to religious observance, what do you consider yourself? 
1 Very religious 
2 Religious 
3 Religious to some extent 
4 Not religious 
54. How old are you? (age in number of years)_________ 
55. Martial status 
1 Married 
2 Widowed 
3 Single  
4 Divorced 
56. What is the last class you attended in school? 
1 No schooling 
2 Incomplete primary 
3 Complete primary 
4 Incomplete secondary 
5 Complete secondary 
6 Post-secondary, incomplete higher 
7 Bachelor degree 
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8 Master degree 
9 Doctoral degree 
57. What do you do in the main? 
1 Employed (including a civilian in the army or a soldier in the professional army) 
2 A soldier in a compulsory service 
3 Not working but seeking work 
4 Neither working and nor seeking work 
5 Retired 
6 A university student, a Yeshiva student, another student, a youth before the draft, a 
volunteer 
7 A housewife 
58.  How many persons do live in this home?______ 
59.  The average net monthly income of an Arab family in Israel is about 6,500 NIS. In 
comparison, the income of your family is: 
1 Much above the average 
2 A bit above the average 
3 About the average 
4 A bit below the average 
5 Much below the average 
 
Additional Details on the Respondent Completed by the Interviewer 
60. What was the overall reliability of the information given by the respondent? 
1 Not reliable 
2 Sufficient 
3 Good 




62. Place of residence. 







Profiles of Places of Residence 
 
RELIGCOM Religious composition 
1 Moslem 
2 Mixed, with Moslem majority 
3 Druze 
4 Mixed, with Druze majority 
5 Christian 
6 Mixed, with Christian majority 
7 Mixed, with no majority 
REGION Region 




MUNICIPL Municipal status 
1 Municipality 
2 Local council 
3 Regional council 
4 Unincorporated 
 
SIZE Population size 




5 Under 1,000 
 












RAAM %vote for Raam (Arab United Party) in the 1999 Knesset elections 
 
HADASH %vote for Hadash in the 1999 Knesset elections 
 





INTIFADA Involvement of place of residence in the October 2000 Arab uprising (impressionistic 
evaluation) 
1 Small or no involvement 
2 Medium degree of involvement (demonstrations, road blocking, etc) 






















The Arabic Questionnaire:Appendix C 
 
. نحن نجرى استطالعات راى فى مواضيع ش4تى .   وأنا مقابل من جامعة حيفا             أسمى
آ44ل .  ش44خص م44ن جمي44ع أنح44اء ال44بالد 1200لق44د أختي44ر أس44مك ص44دفة فىعين44ة عش44وائية م44ن 
. البحث اإلحص4ائى فق4ط المعلومات التى تدلى بها تبقى سرية و بدون أسماء وتستعمل إلغراض 
ف4ى األس4ئلة الت4ى . هدف البحث هو معرفة أراء األش4خاص للمجتم4ع و الدول4ة الت4ى يعيش4ون به4ا 
تطرح علي4ك ال يوج4د اجاب4ات ص4حيحة و غي4ر ص4حيحة س4وف أق4رء علي4ك األس4ئلة واألجاب4ات 
 اإلجاب4ت أقرء على المقابل آاف4ة : المقابل(والمطلوب منك هو أختيار األجابة األقرب إلى رائيك 
إذا أج4اب القاب4ل قب4ل ق4راءة . لكل س4ؤال وض4ع دائ4رة ح4ول إجاب4ة واح4دة إال إذا ذآ4ر غي4ر ذل4ك 
 ) .األجوبة فاقراء فقط الجابات المالئمة
 
 إلى أى مدى تثق فى الحكومة-1
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 ال أثق بتاتًا -5
 
 ضايا الجمهورإلى اى مدى أنت تهتم فى السياسة و ق -2
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 ال أهتم بتاتًا -5
 
 
 بأى وتيرة تقراء جرائد ؟ -3
 آل يوم -1
 عدة مرات باألسبوع -2
 مرة فى األسبوع -3
 فى فترات متباعدة -4
 ال اقرء -5
 
أحيانًا تكون قضايا السياسة و الحكومة معقدة إلى (إلى أى مدى توافق مع الجملة القائلة  -4
 )رجة ان أنسانًا مثلى اليستصيع فهم ما يجرى على حقيقتة د
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 ال وافق بتاتًا -5
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إلى أى مدى حسب رائيك تأخذ الحكومة باإلعتب4ار راىء الم4واطنين الع4رب ف4ى أتخ4اذ  -5
 قراراتها ؟
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 إلعتبار بتاتًااخذة با -5
 
إلى أى مدى حسب رائيك تأخذ الحكومة باإلعتب4ار راىء الم4واطنين اليه4ود  ف4ى أتخ4اذ  -6
 قراراتها ؟
 
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 التاخذة باإلعتبار بتاتًا -5
 
 هل انت مؤيد أم معارض لإلتفاقيات أوسلو ومنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية؟ -7
 مؤيد جدًا -1
  مؤيد -2
 )ال تجب على السؤال التالى(معارض  -3
 )ال تجب على السؤال التالى(معارض جدًا  -4
 
 
 هل مقبول عليك طريقة تطبيقهم ؟. إذا آنت مؤيد ألتفاقيات أوسلو  -8
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 بالمرة ال -5
 بأى مدى تشعر قربيًا للمواطنين اليهود فى أسرائيل ؟ -9
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
 بمدى قليل -4
 بالمرة ال -5
اللغ4ة و ق4يم الخي4ر والش4ر إل4ى أى , الف4ن , تتجلى الثقافة فى مجاالت عدة مثل الموسيقا  -10
 مدى ثقافة اليهود والعرب فى أسرائل متشابهتين ؟
 بمدى آبير جدًا -1
 بمدى آبير  -2
 بمدى متوسط -3
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 بمدى قليل -4
 بالمرة ال -5
 
 بين اليهود والعرب فى اسرائيل اليوم؟ ,ما هو وضع العالقات حسب رأيك -11
 جيده جدًا -1
 جيده  -2
 غير جيده و غير سيئة -3
 سيئة -4
 سيئة جدًا -5
 حسب رائيك تأثيرًا للمواطنين العرب على قضايا الدولة؟, إلى اى مدى يوجد  -12
 تأثيرًا آبيرًا جدًا -1
 تأثيرًا آافيًا -2
 تأثيرًا قليًال -3
 ال يوجد تأثيرًا بتاتًا -4
ج4د ت4أثيرًا للم4واطنين اليه4ود ف4ى أس4رائيل عل4ى قض4ايا إل4ى اى م4دى  حس4ب رائي4ك يو -13
 الدولة؟
 تأثيرًا آبيرًا جدًا -1
 تأثيرًا آافيًا -2
 تأثيرًا قليًال -3
















 بأى مدى يوجد اليوم حسب -14
رأي4444ك تمي4444ز ض4444د الم4444واطنين 
 رب فى إسرائيل ؟الع
     
 ب444أى م444دى عاني444ت بش444كل -15
شخص444444ى م444444ن التي444444ز ض444444د 
 المواطنين العرب ؟
     
 ب4444أى م444دى حس4444ب رأي444ك -16
توج444د فج444وة باإلنج444ازات ب444ين 
الع4444444رب واليه4444444ود م4444444واطنى 
 إسرائيل ؟
     
 حس4444ب رأي4444ك ب4444أى م4444دى -17
الحكوم4444ة ه4444ى المس4444ئولة ع4444ن 
الفج44وة باإلنج44ازات ب44ين الع44رب 
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 إسرائيل ؟واليهود مواطنى 
 
 خالل اإلنتخابات األخيرة للكنسيت ورئاسة الوزراء هل حاولت أن تقن4ع أشخاص4ًا م4ن  -18
 التصويت لصالح حزب معين أو مرشح معين ؟
 نعم -1
 )ال تجب على السؤال التالى,  إذا آان الجواب ال ( ال  -2
 
 ) إجابات 3-1يمكن إختيار (  إذا آان الجواب نعم من حاولت أن تقنع -19
 رب من العائلة  أقا-1
  أصدقاء مقربون-2
  جيران-3
  أخرون-4
  آم هو عدد الفعاليات اإلحتجاجي4ة القانوني4ة مث4ل مظ4اهرات ومس4يرات الت4ى اش4ترآت -20
 بها فى السنوات الخمس األخيرة ؟
 فعاليات أحتجاجية                               
 )ة العبرية يجب ذآر العدد الدقيق بالغ, للمقابل             ( 
 )ال تجب على السؤال التالى , إذا آان الجواب صفر             ( 
 
  إذا أش44ترآت عل44ى األق44ل بواح44دة م44ا ه44و الموض44وع ال44ذى دارت حول44ة الفعالي44ة -21        
 اإلحتجاجية القانونية األخيرة التى أشترآت بها ؟
  سالم -1
, ح4ق اإلحتج4اج , تنظ4يم ح4ق ال , حق التعبي4ر ع4ن ال4رأى ( حقوق ديمقراطية -2
 )حق التمثيل فى مؤسسات الدولة 
هدم بيوت غير , ضائقة المسكن , بطالة , ميزانية السلطات المحلية ( مساواة -3
 )خدمات تعليم وغيرها , قرى غير معترف بها , أراضى , قانونية 
 . مواضيع داخلية تخص القرية أو المجتمع العربى -4
نزاع44ات , عم44ل الس44لطة المحلي44ة , ن44ف ض44د الم44راءة الع, مكان44ة الم44راءة   (-5
 )اجرام , عائلية وطائفية 
  جودة البيئة-6
 ما هو ,  أخر -7
 
  آ44م ه44و ع44دد الفعالي44ات اإلحتجاجي44ة غي44ر القانوني44ة مث44ل مظ44اهرات غي44ر قانوني44ة -22        
 ومسيرات عنيفة التى أشترآت بها فى السنوات الخمس األخيرة ؟
 )آر العدد القيق باللغة العبرية يجب ذ, للمقابل (
 
  آل آام سنة أنت تشترك فى فعاليات يوم األرض ؟-23
  لم أشتراك بها بتاتًا -1
  فى فترات متباعدة-2
  آل آام سنة-3









المستقبل فى فعاليات أحتجاجية قانوني4ة مث4ل مظ4اهرات  ما هى أحتماالت اشتراآك فى -25
 ومسيرات قانونية ؟
  إحتماالت آبيرة -1
  إحتماالت جيدة-2
  إحتماالت متوسطة -3
  إحتماالت قليلة 4
  ال يوجد إحتمال-5
 
 م4ا  ه4ى إحتم4االت مش4ارآتك ف4ى المس4تقبل ف4ى فعالي4ات إحتجاجي4ة غي4ر قانوني4ة مث4ل -26
 ونية ومسيرات عنيفة ؟المظاهرات غير القان
  إحتماالت آبيرة -1
  إحتماالت جيدة-2
  إحتماالت متوسطة -3
  إحتماالت قليلة 4
  ال يوجد إحتمال-5
 
أن تص44وت أو تمتن44ع ع44ن ,  ه44ل طل44ب من44ك بش44كل شخص44ى م44ن قب44ل أح44د الش44خاص -27
 التصويت فى السنوات الخمس األخيرة ؟
 نعم -1
 )ال تجب على السؤال التالى(  ال  -2
 
 ؟)  أجابات 3-1يمكن أختيار ( , ذا آان الجواب نعم من طلب منك ذلك  -28
  أقارب من العائلة -1
  صديق قريب-2
  جار -3
  مسؤول فى العمل  4
  نشيط حزبى-5
  عضو فى منظمة أ و جمعية -6
 ............حدد ,  أخر -7
 
 
مرش4ح أن تص4وت م4ع أو ض4د ,  هل طلب منك بشكل شخصى من قبل أح4د الش4خاص -29
 معين  فى السنوات الخمس األخيرة ؟
 نعم -1
 )ال تجب على السؤال التالى(  ال  -2
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 ؟)  أجابات 3-1يمكن أختيار ( ,  ذا آان الجواب نعم من طلب منك ذلك -30
  أقارب من العائلة -1
  صديق قريب-2
  جار -3
  مسؤول فى العمل  4
  نشيط حزبى-5
  عضو فى منظمة أ و جمعية -6
 ............د حد,  أخر -7
 
 
أن تش4ترك بفاعلي4ة إحتجاجي4ة ,  هل طلب منك بشكل شخصى من قب4ل أح4د األش4خاص -31
 مثل مظاهرة مسيرة  أو عريضة ؟
 نعم -1




 ؟)  أجابات 3-1يمكن أختيار ( ,  إذا آان الجواب نعم من طلب منك ذلك -32
  أقارب من العائلة -1
 ريب صديق ق-2
  جار -3
  مسؤول فى العمل  4
  نشيط حزبى-5
  عضو فى منظمة أ و جمعية -6
 ............حدد ,  أخر -7
 
او الخلوة فى السنوات / الكنيسة /   هل أشترآت بلقاء فى موضوع سياسى فى المسجد -33










 يمك4444ن إلس4444رائيل أن تك4444ون دول4444ة -34
ديمقراطي44ة ودول44ة يهودي44ة ص44هيونية ف44ى 
 نفس الوقت ؟
1 2 3 4 
 على دولة إسرائيل أن تعترف -35
بالعرب آأقلية صاحبة حقوق آاملة 
 ومتساوية
1 2 3 4 
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  مع آل نواقص النظ4ام ف4ى إس4رائيل -36
إال ان444ة يق444دم للم444واطنين الع444رب حق444وق 
 أآث44ر م44م تقدم44ة مدني44ة وحري44ات سياس44ية 
 الدول العربية لمواطنيها
1 2 3 4 
 التصويت فى األنتخابات ه4ى أح4دى -37
أنج44ح الط44رق م44ن أج44ل الحص44ول عل44ى 
 المساواة للعرب فى إسرائيل ؟
1 2 3 4 
 أن4ا م4واطن إس4رائيلى و لك4ن بالنس4بة -38
 4 3 2 1 لى أسرائيل هى دولة غربية
 إلس44رائيل الح44ق ف44ى الوج44ود آدول44ة -39
 4 3 2 1 دية صهيونية ؟يهو
 
 




" إس4رائيلى " ما هو م4دى مالئم4ة الوص4ف -40
 3 2 1 لوصف هويتك ؟
" فلسطينى" ما هو مدى مالئمة الوصف -41
 لوصف هويتك ؟
 
1 2 3 
  م4ا ه4و م4دى مالئم4ة الوص4ف فلس4طينى -42
 3 2 1 إسرائيلى لوصف هويتك ؟
 
 تك لو طلب منك إختيار أحدى األمكانيات التالية ؟ آيف تعرف هوي-43
  عربى -1
  عربى فلسطينى-2
  عربى إسرائيلى -3
  إسرائيلى 4
   فلسطينى  إسرائيلى-5
  فلسطينى فى إسرائيل أو عربى فلسطينى فى إسرائيل-6
                                            فلسطينى                                                                       -7
     ر؟ألي حزب من األحزاب التالية تشعر قريبًا لك أآث-44
          
   . 
 الحزب العربي ، الحرآة اإلسالمية وهاشم محاميد (  القائمة العربية الموحدة -1
 ) .الحزب الشيووعي األسرائيلي (  لجبهة الديمقراطية -2
 . التجمع الديمقراطي برسائة عزمي بشارة 3
 . الحرآة العربية للتغير برسائة أحمد طيبي -4
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 .عمل ، ميرتس والمرآز  أحزاب يهودية مثل ال-5
 . أحزاب يهودية مثل الليكود ، المفدال وشاس -6
 
  ألي حزب ستصوت فيما لو أجريت األنتخابات للكنيست اليوم ؟ -45
الحزب الديمقراطي العربي الحرآة األس4المية وهاش4م ( القائمة العربية الموحدة 
 )محاميد 
 ).لي الحزب الشيوعي األسرائي(  الجبهة الديمقراطية -2
 . التجمع الديمقراطي برسائة عزمي بشارة -3
 .  الحرآة العربية للتغير برسائة أحمد طيبي -4
 ) . أسرائيل موحدة ( العمل -5
 . ميرتس -6
 .  المرآز -7
 .  شينوي -8
 .  عام أحاد -9
 .  الليكود -10
 .  شاس -11
 . مفدال-12
 ) . علم التوراة + أغودات يسرائيل(  يهدوت هتوراه -13
 .  يسرائيل بعلباه-14
 . يسرائيل بيتنو برسائة أفغدور ليبرمان -15
 . ايحود لئومي -16
 . حزب أخر -17
 .  لم أقرر بعد -18
 .  لن أصوت -19
 .  أرفض األجابة -20
 
  ألي من المرشحين لرسائة الحكومة ستصوت فيما لو أجريت األنتخابات اليوم؟ -46
 . يهود براك -1
 .ون  ارييل شار-2
 . ورقة فارغة -3
 .  لم أقرر بعد -4
 . أرفض األجابة -5
 
إذا صوت أو : الحظة للمقابل  ( 1999 ألي حزب صوتت في أنتخابات الكنيست في سنة -47
 ) . لم يصوت بسبب عدم حصوله علي حق التصويت تنازل عن السؤال التالي 
لحرآ44ة األس44المية الح44زب ال44ديمقراطي العرب44ي ا (  القائم44ة العربي44ة الموح44دة -1
 ) .ومحاميد
 ) .الحزب الشيوعي (  الجبهة الديمقراطية -2
 ). التجمع برسائة أحمد طيبي -3
 ) . العمل، جيش ، ميماد (  أسرائيل واحدة -4
 .  ميرتس -5
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 .  المرآز -6
 .  شينوي -7
 .  عام احاد -8
 .  ليكود -9
 .  شاس -10
 .  مفدال -11
 .  يهدوت هتورات -12
 . رائيل بيتنو  يس-13
 .  ايحود لئومي -15
 .  هديرخ هشلشيت -16
 .  حزب النساء -17
 .  بنينا روزنبلوم-18
 .  حزب المتقاعدون -19
 . حزب الكازينو طيسونا -20
 .  علي يروك-21
 .  الخضر برسائة دوي تسوآر-22
 .  حزب العمل الجديد برسائة مخول-23
 ) . حزب العمال العربي(  دعم -24
 .حزب أخر  -25
 ) . ولكني آنت صاحب حق أقتراع (  لم أصوت -26
 ) .  عامًا 18آنت أقل من (  لم يكن لي حق التصويت -27
 .  أرفض األجابة -28
 
 ) . 1999( لماذا لم تصوت في األنتخابات الماضية -48
 لم أصوت بسبب صعوبة الوصول إلي صندوق األقتراع ، آن4ت خ4ارج البل4د -1
 .مع بطاقة الهوية ، مريض، مشاآل 
 .آنت مشغوًال /  لم أصوت النه ال وقت لدي -2
 . لم أصوت ألنني ال أهتم باالنتخابات -3
 .  لم أصوت ألن صوتي لن يغير -4
 .  لم أصوت ألن صوتي لن يغير -5
 .  لم أصوت ألنه ال توجد اليوم قائمة مالئمة ومرشحين مالئمين - 6
ولكن4ي آن4ت ( من4اف لض4ميري أو ل4ديني  لم أصوت ألن التصويت للكنيس4ت -7
 ). صاحب حق أقتراع 
 ) . عام 18أقل من (  لم يكن حق األقتراع -8
 .  لم أصوت لسبب أخر ، أآره -9
 
 . 1999 ألي مرشح لرسائة الحكومة صوتت في أنتخابات -49
 .                      يهود براك 
 . بنيامين نتنياهو  -1
 ) .  صاحب حق أقتراع آنت( لم أصوت . ورقة فارغة  -2
 ) . آنت حق أقتراع ( لم أصوت  -3
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 ) .  عامًا18لم أبلغ أناك ( لم أآن حق أقتراع  -4
 . أرفض األجابة  -5
 
  هل أنت عضو في حزب ما ؟ -50
 . نعم  -1
 ) . ال تجب علي السؤال التالي ( ال  -2
 
  إذا آان الجواب نعم ، أي حزب أنت عضو به؟ -51
ح44زب ال44ديمقراطي العرب44ي ، الحرآ44ة األس44المية وهاش44م ال( القائم44ة العربي44ة الموح44دة  -1
 ) . محاميد 
 ) . الحزب الشيوعي األسرائيلي ( الجبهة الديمقراطية  -2
 . التجمع برئاسة عزمي بشارة  -3
 .  الحرآة العربية للتغير برسائة أحمد طيبي  -4
 ) . أسرائيل واحدة ( العمل  -5
 .  ميرتس  -6
 . المرآز  -7
 . شينوي  -8
 . عام أحاد  -9
 .ليكود  -10
 . شاس  -11
 . مفدال  -12
 . يهدوت هتورات  -13
 .  يسرائيل بعلباة  -14
 . يسرائيل بيتنو  -15
 . أحود ليئومي  -16
 . حزب أخر  -17
 . أرفض األجابة  -18
 
  ما هي ديانتك ؟ -52
 .مسلم  -1
 . مسيحي  -2
 . درزي  -3
 
  بالنسبة للمحافظة علي الدين هل تعتقد أنك اليوم؟ -53
 . متدين جدًا  -1
 . متدين  -2
 . متدين بقدر معين  -3
 . تدين غير م -4
 
 ) أآتب رقم السنوات باالعبرية (  آم عمرك ؟ -54
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  حالتك الشخصية -55
 .ة/ متزوج  -1
 . ة / أرمل -2
 . عزباء/ أعزب  -3
 .ة / مطلق -4
 
  ما هو الصف األخير التي أنهيته؟ -56
 . لم أذهب إلي المدرسة  -1
 . تعلمت في الكتاب أو مدرسة أبتدائية أخري لكني لم أنه تعليمي  -2
 . تعليمي في مدرسة أبتدائية تعلمت وأنهيت  -3
 . لكني لم أنه تعليمي ) نظري، مهني ، أو ديني ( تعلمت في مدرسة ثانوية  -4
 . أنهيت تعليمي الثانوي  -5
 . تعلمت في مدرسة ثانوية أو جامعه لكنني لم أنه تعليمي  -6
 ) .ب،أ(أنهيت تعليمي الجامعي وحصلت علي اللقب األول  -7
 ) . م، أ( اللقب الثاني أنهيت تعليمي الجامعي وحصلت علي -8
 ) . دآتور( أنهبت تعليمي الجامعي وحصلت علي اللقب الثالث  -9
 
 .  ما هو عملك األساسي -57
 ) . يشمل عامل مدني في الجيش أو جندي دائم في الجيش ( عامل  -1
 . جندي في الخدمة األجبارية  -2
 . ال أعمل ولكني أبحث عن عمل  -3
 . ال أعمل وال أبحث عن عمل  -4
 . متقاعد  -5
طالب جامعي ، طالب في معهد ديني ، طالب مدرسي ، شاب قب4ل الخدم4ة العس4كرية ،  -6
 . متطوع 
 ربة بيت  -7
  آم عدد األفراد في البيت الذي تسكنه؟  58
 ) . أآتب العدد باللغة العبرية ( 
 
ج بالمقارنة م4ع .ش" 6500" معدل الدخل الشهري الصافي للعائلة العربية في أسرائيل هو -59
 : الدخل هل دخلك هذا 
 . أعلي بكثير من المعدل  -1
 . أعلي بقليل من المعدل  -2
 . مثل المعدل  -3
 . أقل بقلبل من المعدل  -4
 .أقل بكثير  -5
 
  آيف تقيم صدق المعلمومات العامة التي حصلت عليها من المقابل ؟-60
 . غير مرضية  -1
 .  مرضية  -2
 . جيدة  -3
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 . جيدة جدًا  -4
 
 :  الجنس -61
 .ذآر  -1
 . أنثي -2
 
 ) .أآتب أسم البلدة باللغة العبرية :       ( ان السكن مك-62
 
 




Appendix D: English Translation of the Hebrew Questionnaire 
1. To what degree do you have trust in government? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99. No Answer 
 
2. To what degree are you interested in politics and public affairs? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99. No answer 
 
3. How often do you read a newspaper? 
 1 Daily 
 2 Several times a week 
 3 Once a week 
 4 Seldom 
 5 Do not read 
 99. No answer 
 
4. To what degree do you agree with the statement: "Sometimes political and governmental 
matters are so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on." 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99. No answer 
 
5. To what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Arab citizens' opinion in 
its decision making? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 








6. And to what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Jewish citizens' 
opinion in its decision making? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99. No answer 
 
7.    Do you support or oppose the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO? 
 1 Strongly support 
 2 Support 
 3 Oppose 
 4 Strongly oppose 
 99.  No answer 
 
8. (If answered "support or strongly support) How much do you accept the way  the Oslo 
accords are implemented? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99 No answer 
 
9. To what extent do you support the participation of Arab parties in government coalitions? 
        1 Strongly support 
 2 Support 
 3 Oppose 
 4 Strongly oppose 
 99 No answer 
 
10.To what degree do you feel close toward the Arab citizens in Israel? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99 No answer 
 
11.Culture is expressed in matters like music, food, language, and conceptions of right and wrong. 
To what degree are the cultures of Arabs and the Jews in Israel similar to each other? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 





12.   How are the relations, in your opinion, between Arab citizens and Jews in Israel today? 
 1 Very good 
 2 Good 
 3 Neither good nor bad 
 4 Bad 
 5 Very bad 
 99 No answer 
 
13. To what degree, in your opinion, do Arab citizens have influence on state affairs? 
 1 Too much influence 
 2 Sufficient influence 
 3 Little influence 
 4 No influence at all 
 99 No answer 
 
14. To what degree, in your opinion, do Jewish citizens have influence on state affairs? 
 1 Too much influence 
 2 Sufficient influence 
 3 Little influence 
 4 No influence at all 
 99 No answer 
 
15. To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99 No answer 
 
16.  To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Mizrachim in Israel? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99 No answer 
 
17. To what degree have you personally been affected by discrimination against Mizrachim in 
Israel? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 






18. To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and 
Jews? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99. No answer 
 
19. To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Mizrachim and other 
Jews in Israel? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99  No answer 
 
20. To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for the gap in the 
achievements of Arab citizens and Jews? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99 No answer 
 
21. To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for the gap in the 
achievements of Mizrachim and other Jews? 
 1 To a very large degree 
 2 To a large degree 
 3 To a moderate degree 
 4 To a small degree 
 5 Not at all 
 99 No answer 
 
22. During the election campaign, did you try to persuade certain people to vote for any party 
or candidate? 
 1 Yes 
 2 No (skip the next question) 
 99 No answer 
 
23. If yes, whom did you try to persuade? 1-3 answers are possible 
 1 Family members 
 2 Close friends 
 3 Neighbors 
 4 Other persons 
 99 No answer 
 
24. In how many legal protest actions such as demonstrations and marches have you participated 
in the past five years? _______ (if 0, skip the next question) 
 183
25. What issue did the most recent legal protest action you participated in address? 
 1 Peace 
 2 Labor and economic issues 
 3 State and religion, religious-secular disputes 
 4 Environmental issues 
 5 Other issues 
 99 No answer 
 
26. In how many illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent 
marches have you participated in the past five years? _______ (two digits) 
 
27. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in legal protest actions such as 
licensed demonstrations and marches? 
 1 Great chances 
 2 Considerable chances 
 3 Moderate chances 
 4 Small chances 
 5 No chances 
 99 No answer 
 
28. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in illegal protest actions such 
as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches? 
 1 Great chances 
 2 Considerable chances 
 3 Moderate chances 
 4 Small chances 
 5 No chances 
 99 No answer 
 
29. Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to vote or to abstain from voting in 
the past five years? 
 1 Yes 
 2 No (skip the next question) 
 
30. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers. 
 1 A family member 
 2 A close friend 
 3 A neighbor 
 4 A superior in a job 
 5 An active member of a political party 
 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association 
 7 Other _______ 
 
31. Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to vote for or against a certain 
candidate or a certain party in the past five years? 
 1 Yes 






32. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers. 
 1 A family member 
 2 A close friend 
 3 A neighbor 
 4 A superior in a job 
 5 An active member of a political party 
 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association 
 7 Other _______ 
 
33. Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to participate in a protest action such 
as a demonstration, a march or a petition in the past five years? 
 1 Yes 
 2 No (skip the next question) 
 
34. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers. 
 1 A family member 
 2 A close friend 
 3 A neighbor 
 4 A superior in a job 
 5 An active member of a political party 
        6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association 
 
Now, I am going to read to you some statements, and I would like you to tell me if you agree or 
disagree with each one. 
 
35. Israel can be a democracy and a Zionist Jewish state at the same time. 
 1 Strongly agree 
 2 Agree 
 3 Disagree 
 4 Strongly disagree 
 99 No answer 
 
36. Israel must recognize Arabs as a minority with equal and full rights. 
 1 Strongly agree 
 2 Agree 
 3 Disagree 
 4 Strongly disagree 
 99 No answer 
 
37. Despite its flaws, the Israeli regime offers Arab citizens more civil rights and political 
freedoms than what Arab states offer their citizens. 
 1 Strongly agree 
 2 Agree 
 3 Disagree 
 4 Strongly disagree 






38. Voting in elections is one of the most efficient ways to achieve equality for Arabs in 
Israel. 
 1 Strongly agree 
 2 Agree 
 3 Disagree 
 4 Strongly disagree 
 99 No answer 
 
39. For which party would you vote if elections for the Knesset were held today? 
 1 Labor (One Israel) 
 2 Meretz 
 3 The Center Party (Merkaz) 
 4 Shinui 
 5 Am Echad 
 6 Likud 
 7 Shas 
 8 Mafdal 
 9 Yahadut Hatorah 
 10 Yisrael Ba'aliya 
 11 Yisrael Betenu 
 12 Ha'ihud Hal'umi 
 13 Other party 
 14 I haven't decided 
 15 I will not vote 
 16 Not willing to reply 
 17 Ra'am 
 18 Hadash 
 19 Balad (headed by Bishara) 
 20 Arab Movement for Renewal (headed by Tibi) 
 27 Blank ballot 
 28 Not eligible to vote 
 
40. For which candidate for a Prime Minister will you vote in the coming elections? 
 1 Ehud Barak  
 2 Ariel Sharon 
 3 Blank ballot 
 4 Haven't decided 
 5 Will not vote 














41. For which party did you vote in the Knesset elections in 1999? 
 1 Labor (One Israel) 
 2 Meretz 
 3 The Center Party (Merkaz) 
 4 Shinui 
 5 Am Echad 
 6 Likud 
 7 Shas 
 8 Mafdal 
 9 Yahadut Hatorah 
 10 Yisrael Ba'aliya 
 11 Yisrael Betenu 
 12 Ha'ihud Hal'umi 
 13 The Third Way 
 14 The Women's Party 
 15 Panina Rosenblum Party 
 16 Hagimala'im Party 
 17 The Casino Party headed by Tisona 
 18 A'le Yarok  
 19 Hayarukim 
 20 The New Arab Party headed by Makhul  
 21  Da'am (Democratic Labor Party) 
 22 Other party 
 23 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote) 
 24 I was not eligible to vote 
 25 Not willing to say 
 26 Ra'am (The United Arab List :Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and  
     Mahamid)  
 27 Hadash (Rakah)  
 28 Balad and the Arab Renewal Party headed by Bishara and Tibie  
 
42. Which candidate for a Prime Minister did you vote for in 1999? 
 1 Ehud Barak 
 2 Benyamin Netanyahu 
 3 Blank ballot 
 4 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote) 
 5 I was not eligible to vote  
 6 Not willing to say 
 
43. Are you a member of a political party? 
 1 Yes 
 2 No (skip the next question) 










44. If yes, which party? 
 1 Labor (One Israel) 
 2 Meretz 
 3 The Center Party (Merkaz) 
 4 Shinui 
 5 Am Echad 
 6 Likud 
 7 Shas 
 8 Mafdal 
 9 Yahadut Hatorah 
 10 Yisrael Ba'aliya 
 11 Yisrael Betenu 
 12 Ha'ihud Hal'umi 
 13 Other party 
 14 Not willing to say 
 15 Ra'am (The United Arab List :Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and  
     Mahamid)  
 16 Hadash (Rakah)  
 17 Balad headed by Bishara  
 18 The Arab Renewal Party headed by Tibi 
 
45. With regard to ethnic origin, are you an Ashkenazi, Sephardic/Mizrahi, or mixed? 
 1 Ashkenazi 
 2 Sephardic/Mizrahi 
 3 Mixed 
 99 No answer 
 
46. Are you haredi, dati, masorti, or hiluni? 
 1 Haredi (Ultra-orthodox) 
 2 Dati (religious) 
 3 Masorti (traditional) 
 4 Hiluni (secular) 
 99 No answer 
 
47. How old are you? (age in number of years)_________ 
 
48. Martial status 
 1 Single 
 2 Married 
 3 Widowed 
 4 Divorced 











49. What is the last class you attended in school? 
 1 No schooling 
 2 Incomplete primary 
 3 Complete primary 
 4 Incomplete secondary 
 5 Complete secondary 
 6 Post-secondary, incomplete higher 
 7 Bachelor degree 
 8 Master degree 
 9 Doctoral degree 
 99 No answer 
 
50. What do you do in the main? 
 1 Employed (including a civilian in the army or a soldier in the professional army) 
 2 A soldier in a compulsory service 
 3 Not working but seeking work 
 4 Neither working and nor seeking work 
 5 Retired 
 6 A university student, a Yeshiva student, another student, a youth before the draft, a 
volunteer 
 7 A housewife 
 99 No answer 
 
51. The average net monthly income of a family in Israel is about 6,400 NIS. In comparison, the 
income of your family is: 
 1 Much above the average 
 2 A bit above the average 
 3 About the average 
 4 A bit below the average 
 5 Much below the average 
 99 No answer 
 
52. Gender 
 1 Man 
 2 Woman 
 
53. Place of residence: city 
 
54. Classification of place of residence: area code 
 02 Jerusalem 
 03 Tel Aviv and Dan district 
 04 Haifa 
 06 North 
 07 South 
 08 "Shfelah" (coastal strip from south of Tel Aviv to Ashkelon, including Rehovot, 
Ramle, Lod, Ashdod, Yavne, etc.) 
 09 Sharon (coastal strip north of Tel Aviv to Hadera, including Herzlia, Kfar Sava, 
Netanya, Even Yehuda, etc.) 
 
 189
Appendix E: The Hebrew Questionnaire 
 
 
 השאלון ליהודים של שרי לורנס
 : פתיח
 . אנו עורכים סקר בנושאים חברתיים. מאוניברסיטת חיפה____ ת /מדבר, שלום
 .תודה ?י להקדיש לי מספר דקות/האם תוכל
 ?באיזו מידה יש לך אמון בממשלה  .1
במידה . 4ה בינונית    במיד. 3במידה רבה    . 2במידה רבה מאוד    . 1
 כלל לא . 5מועטה    
 ?באיזו מידה אתה מתעניין בפוליטיקה ובענייני ציבור .2
במידה . 4במידה בינונית    . 3במידה רבה    . 2במידה רבה מאוד    . 1
 כלל לא . 5מועטה    
 ?באיזו תכיפות אתה קורא עיתון .3
    לעיתים רחוקות. 4  פעם בשבוע  . 3מספר פעמים בשבוע    . 2כל יום    . 1
 לא קורא. 5
ה /ני באיזו מידה את/ציין. אקריא לך מספר משפטים










לפעמים ענייני פוליטיקה וממשלה הם כה  .4
מסובכים שאדם כמוני לא יכול להבין מה קורה 
 באמת
1 2 3 4 5 
הממשלה מתחשבת בדעת האזרחים הערבים  .5
 5 4 3 2 1 בקבלת החלטותיה
הממשלה מתחשבת בדעת האזרחים היהודים  .6
 5 4 3 2 1 בקבלת החלטותיה
 5 4 3 2 1 אתה מרגיש קרוב לאזרחים הערבים בישראל .7
 5 4 3 2 1 קיימת אפליה נגד האזרחים הערבים בישראל .8
 5 4 3 2 1 לקיימת אפליה נגד המזרחיים בישרא .9
קיים פער בהישגים בין האזרחים הערבים  .10
 5 4 3 2 1 והיהודים בישראל
קיים פער בין יהודים מזרחיים לשאר היהודים  .11
 5 4 3 2 1 בישראל
הממשלה אחראית לפער בהישגים בין האזרחים  .12
 5 4 3 2 1 הערבים והיהודים
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הממשלה אחראית לפער בהישגים בין יהודים  .13
 5 4 3 2 1 דים בישראל מזרחיים לשאר היהו
באיזו מידה נפגעת מאפליה נגד המזרחיים  .14
 5 4 3 2 1 בישראל
, אוכל, מוסיקה: תרבות מתבטאת בתחומים כמו .15
באיזו מידה התרבויות . שפה וערכים של טוב ורע
 ?של ערבים ויהודים בישראל דומות זו לזו
1 2 3 4 5 
 :האם אתה, ף"בנוגע להסכמי אוסלו בין ישראל לאש .16
 מתנגד מאוד. 4  מתנגד. 3  תומך. 2  דתומך מאו. 1
 ? באיזו מידה מקובל עליך אופן היישום שלהם) אם תומך( .17
במידה . 4במידה בינונית    . 3במידה רבה    . 2במידה רבה מאוד    . 1
 כלל לא. 5מועטה    
באיזו מידה אתה תומך בהשתתפות אפשרית של המפלגות הערביות  .18
 ? בקואליציות
 מתנגד מאוד. 4  מתנגד. 3   תומך.2  תומך מאוד. 1
 :מצב היחסים בין האזרחים הערבים והיהודים בישראל היום הוא .19
רע . 5  רע. 4  בינוני . 3  טוב. 2  טוב מאוד. 1
 מאוד
באיזו מידה יש לדעתך השפעה לאזרחים הערבים בישראל על ענייני  .20
 ?המדינה
 השפעה מועטה. 3  השפעה מספקת. 2 השפעה רבה מדי. 1
 אין השפעה כלל. 4 
באיזו מידה יש לדעתך השפעה לאזרחים היהודים בישראל על ענייני  .21
 ?המדינה
 השפעה מועטה. 3  השפעה מספקת. 2 השפעה רבה מדי. 1
 אין השפעה כלל. 4 
האם נסית לשכנע אנשים מסוימים , במהלך מערכת הבחירות הקודמות .22
ל דלג ע(לא . 2 כן. 1   ?להצביע למפלגה או למועמד כלשהו
 )השאלה הבאה
 )  אפשרויות3עד , ריבוי תשובות(? את מי נסית לשכנע) אם כן( .23
אנשים . 4  שכנים. 3  חברים קרובים. 2  קרובי משפחה. 1
 אחרים
 השנים -5בכמה פעולות מחאה חוקיות כמו הפגנות ותהלוכות השתתפת ב .24
   ? האחרונות
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חאה  באיזה עניין עסקה פעולת המ)אם השתתף בפעולה אחת לפחות( .25
 ?החוקית האחרונה בה השתתפת
חילוניים/דתיים, דת ומדינה. 3  עבודה וכלכלה. 2   שלום. 1
  
    אחר . 5 איכות הסביבה. 4
בכמה פעולות מחאה לא חוקיות כמו הפגנות לא חוקיות ותהלוכות אלימות  .26
   ?  השנים האחרונות-5השתתפת ב
 הפגנות מה הסיכויים שתשתתף בעתיד בפעולות מחאה חוקיות כמו .27
 ?ותהלוכות חוקיות
אין . 5  קטנים. 4 בינוניים. 3  גדולים. 2 גדולים מאוד. 1
 סיכוי
מה הסיכויים שתשתתף בעתיד בפעולות מחאה לא חוקיות כמו הפגנות  .28
 ?ותהלוכות אלימות
אין . 5  קטנים. 4 בינוניים. 3  גדולים. 2 גדולים מאוד. 1
 סיכוי
 -5ו להצביע או להימנע מלהצביע בידי מישה-האם התבקשת באופן אישי על .29
 ?השנים האחרונות
 )דלג על השאלה הבאה(לא . 2  כן. 1
 ) אפשרויות3עד , ריבוי תשובות(?  על ידי מי)אם כן( .30
ממונה . 4  שכן. 3  חבר קרוב. 2  קרוב משפחה. 1
  בעבודה
 אחר. 7   חבר ארגון או עמותה. 6  פעיל במפלגה. 5
  
ידי מישהו להצביע בעד או נגד מועמד -האם התבקשת באופן אישי על .31
לא . 2  כן. 1  ? השנים האחרונות-5מסוים או מפלגה מסוימת ב
 )דלג על השאלה הבאה(
 ) אפשרויות3עד , ריבוי תשובות(?  על ידי מי)אם כן( .32
ממונה . 4  שכן. 3  חבר קרוב. 2  קרוב משפחה. 1
  בעבודה
 חרא. 7   חבר ארגון או עמותה. 6  פעיל במפלגה. 5
  
ידי מישהו להשתתף בפעולת מחאה כמו -האם התבקשת באופן אישי על .33
דלג על השאלה (לא . 2  כן. 1  ?תהלוכה או עצומה, הפגנה
 )הבאה
 ) אפשרויות3עד , ריבוי תשובות(?  על ידי מי)אם כן( .34
ממונה . 4  שכן. 3  חבר קרוב. 2  קרוב משפחה. 1
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  בעבודה




ה /ציין באיזו מידה את. אקריא לך מספר משפטים






ישראל יכולה להיות באותו זמן דמוקרטיה ומדינה  .35
 4 3 2 1 יהודית ציונית
ישראל צריכה להכיר בערבים כמיעוט בעל זכויות  .36
 4 3 2 1 תשוות ומלאו
מציע , למרות חסרונותיו, המשטר בישראל .37
לאזרחים הערבים יותר זכויות אזרח וחירויות 
 פוליטיות מאשר מציעות מדינות ערב לאזרחיהן
1 2 3 4 
הצבעה בבחירות היא אחת הדרכים היעילות  .38
 4 3 2 1 ביותר להשגת שוויון לערבים בישראל
 :אשאל אותך מספר שאלות כלליות, לסיכום
   ? מהו גילך .39
. 4  אלמן. 3  נשוי. 2  רווק. 1 ?מהו מצבך המשפחתי .40
 גרוש
   ? מה מספר שנות הלימוד שלך .41
מסורתי. 3   דתי. 2    חרדי. 1   ?האם אתה חילוני מסורתי דתי או חרדי .42
 חילוני. 4 
. 3 מזרחי/ספרדי. 2 אשכנזי. 1 : האם אתה, מבחינת מוצא עדתי .43
 מעורב
 ?מהו עיסוקך העיקרי .44
 )ל וחייל בשירות קבע"אזרח עובד צהכולל (עובד . 1
 חייל בשירות חובה. 2
   לא עובד אך מחפש עבודה. 3
 לא עובד ולא מחפש עבודה. 4
 פנסיונר. 5
 מתנדב, צעיר לפני גיוס, תלמיד בית ספר, תלמיד ישיבה, סטודנט. 6
 עקרת בית. 7
  ? לאיזו מפלגה היית מצביע אילו היו נערכות בחירות לכנסת היום .45
    
 ?יזה מועמד תצביע לראשות הממשלה בבחירות הקרובותלא .46
   פתק לבן. 3  אריק שרון. 2  אהוד ברק. 1
 לא מוכן להשיב. 6  לא אצביע. 5  לא החלטתי. 4
     ? לאיזו מפלגה הצבעת בבחירות הקודמות לכנסת .47
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 ?לאיזה מועמד לראשות הממשלה הצבעת בבחירות הקודמות .48
   פתק לבן. 3 יהובנימין נתנ. 2  אהוד ברק. 1
לא הייתה לי זכות הצבעה. 5 לא הצבעתי אך הייתה לי זכות הצבעה. 4
 לא מוכן להשיב. 6   
 )דלג על השאלה הבאה(לא . 2  כן. 1 ? האם אתה חבר מפלגה .49
       ?  איזו מפלגה)אם כן( .50
. ח נטו לחודש" ש6,400ההכנסה הממוצעת למשפחה בישראל היא  .51
  : של משפחתך היאהאם  ההכנסה, בהשוואה לכך
 כמו הממוצע. 3 קצת מעל הממוצע. 2 הרבה מעל הממוצע. 1
  
 הרבה מתחת לממוצע. 5 קצת מתחת לממוצע. 4
 .שלום, תודה רבה לך על שיתוף הפעולה
 נקבה. 2 זכר. 1  :מין הנשאל) למלא לאחר ניתוק השיחה( .52
      : ישוב מגורים .53
    : אזור חיוג .54
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Appendix F: Coding and Construction of Variables 
(all variable numbers as found in Arabic questionnaire) 
System-Challenging Behavior (SCB) 
1. SCB = v20 + v22 + v23 + v24 + v25 + v26 
V20 (legal protest action): coded 1 for protest participation, 0 for none. 
V22 (illegal protest action) coded 1 for protest participation, 0 for none. 
V23 (Land Day): recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .33, .66, 1 
V24 (Nakba Day): coded 1 for participation, 0 for none. 
V25 (legal protest intent): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response 
values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1 
V26: (illegal protest intent): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response 
values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1 
For SCB, v20  v26 as coded above averaged to create a single continuous SCB index on a 0 to 1 
scale. 
2. Protest Action = v20 + v22 as coded above and averaged to create a single index on a 0 to 1 
scale. 
3. Protest Intent = v25 + v26 as coded above and averaged to create a single index on a 0 to 1 
scale. 




Grievance = v5 + v12 + v14 + v16 + v17 
V5 (Arab opinion): recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1. 
V12 (Arab influence): recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .33, .66, 1. 
V14 (Discrimination): scale reversed and recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response 
values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1. 
V16 (Arab-Jewish Gap): scale reversed and recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response 
values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1. 
V17 (Blame for Gap): scale reversed and recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response 
values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1. 




Identity: v43, order recoded as follows:  
1. Israeli 
2. Israeli Arab  
3. Arab 
4. Israeli Palestinian  
5. Palestinian in Israel  
6. Palestinian Arab  
7. Palestinian.  
Recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .167, .333, .5, .667, .833, 1. 
 
Political Engagement = v2 + v3 
V2 (political interest): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response 
values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1. 
V3 (newspaper consumption): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible 
response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1. 
For political engagement, the two variables were added to create a single index on a 0 to 2 scale. 
 
Age =  v54 (actual age coded) 
Education = v56 
Income = v59, scale reversed 
Gender = v61, recoded female = 0, male = 1 
Religion = v52, recoded to dummy variables. Reference category: Druze 
Recruitment = v31, recoded no = 0, yes = 1 
Mistrust = v1 
PID = v44, recoded as follows: 
1. Jewish right 
2. Jewish left 
3. The Front (Rakah/Communist party) 
4. The United Arab List 
5. Arab Renewal Party 
6. Balad/Tajamu 
 
Party member = v50, recoded no = 0, yes = 1 
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Ethnic Distance = v9 
Cultural Dissimilarity = v10 



























N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mistrust 1190 1 5 3.91 1.09 
Ethnic 
Distance 1182 1 5 3.33 .969 
Cultural 
Dissimilarity 1181 1 5 3.43 .936 
Personal 
Discrimination 1184 1 5 3.09 1.26 
Recruitment 1184 0 1 .146 .353 
PID 1110 1 6 3.86 1.45 
Party 
Membership 1151 0 1 .120 .325 
Age 1131 18 86 34.6 13.8 
Education 1173 1 9 4.67 1.58 
Income 1170 1 5 2.09 1.16 
Gender 1200 0 1 .567 .496 
Muslim  1201 0 1 .787 .410 
Christian 1201 0 1 .122 .328 
Political 
Engagement 1181 0 2 1.06 .528 
Identity 1179 0 1 .518 .276 
Grievance 1169 0 1 .743 .162 
SCB 1092 0 1 .218 .243 
Protest Action 1112 0 1 .181 .290 
Protest Intent 1182 0 1 .253 .256 
National 
Action 1177 0 1 .215 .314 
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